Behavioral Mimicry Covert Communication by Ahmadzadeh, Seyed Ali
Behavioral Mimicry Covert
Communication
by
Seyed Ali Ahmadzadeh
A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2013
© Seyed Ali Ahmadzadeh 2013

Declaration
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Seyed Ali Ahmadzadeh
iii

Abstract
Covert communication refers to the process of communicating data through a channel
that is neither designed, nor intended to transfer information. Traditionally, covert chan-
nels are considered as security threats in computer systems and a great deal of attention
has been given to countermeasures for covert communication schemes. The evolution of
computer networks led the communication community to revisit the concept of covert com-
munication not only as a security threat but also as an alternative way of providing security
and privacy to communication networks. In fact, the heterogeneous structure of computer
networks and the diversity of communication protocols provide an appealing setting for
covert channels. This dissertation is an exploration on a novel design methodology for
undetectable and robust covert channels in communication networks.
Our new design methodology is based on the concept of behavioral mimicry in computer
systems. The objective is to design a covert transmitter that has enough degrees of freedom
to behave like an ordinary transmitter and react normally to unpredictable network events,
yet it has the ability to modulate a covert message over its behavioral fingerprints in the
network. To this end, we argue that the inherent randomness in communication protocols
and network environments is the key in finding the proper medium for network covert
channels. We present a few examples on how random behaviors in communication protocols
lead to discovery of suitable shared resources for covert channels.
The proposed design methodology is tested on two new covert communication schemes,
one is designed for wireless networks and the other one is optimized for public communi-
cation networks (e.g., Internet). Each design is accompanied by a comprehensive analysis
from undetectability, achievable covert rate and reliability perspectives. In particular, we
introduced turbo covert channels, a family of extremely robust model-based timing covert
channels that achieve provable polynomial undetectability in public communication net-
works. This means that the covert channel is undetectable against any polynomial-time
statistical test that analyzes samples of the covert traffic and the legitimate traffic of the
network. Target applications for the proposed covert communication schemes are discussed
including detailed practical scenarios in which the proposed channels can be implemented.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computer systems and the digital revolution undoubtedly have changed modern history.
Computer networks, distributed systems, and cloud computing are symbols of an era in
which instant access to information and the ability to process, store, and share huge vol-
ume of data are no longer optional properties for modern computer systems. However,
such enormous flow of information requires extra attention to data security and privacy
preserving technologies.
It is often believed that using encryption can provide security in computer systems.
However, encryption only limits the access to the content and in turn gives away the fact
that there exist some sensitive data that needs to be protected. In some cases, just a mere
hint about the existence of information or a communication channel is enough to raise
suspicion or trigger adversarial actions. Hence, consideration should be made in order
to protect data by hiding signs of existence of sensitive information or communication
channels.
The art of information hiding is about concealing the very existence of a message or
a communication channel in order to protect data and prevent being detected by possible
system observers. As an example, one can consider the application of spread spectrum
techniques in military radio communications. The objective in such applications is to
prevent the enemy to identify and locate the transmitter as it may direct attack towards
1
the signal source. Steganography and digital watermarking are other examples of informa-
tion hiding techniques that are used in particular in multimedia and copy-write protection
applications. In this way, the message that is intended to be hidden (e.g., sensitive in-
formation, or copy-write data) is embedded within contents of an innocent message often
called cover-data. Thus, as long as the adversarial entity or the system observer (e.g., a
censorship authority) does not have the key that is used in the embedding process, no
information on the hidden message can be gained from the knowledge on the cover-data
and the embedding process.
Another important sub-discipline of information hiding is covert channels. Covert com-
munication often refers to the process of communicating data through a channel that is
neither designed, nor intended to transfer information. In other words, a covert channel
is a communication channel that violates the normal specifications of a system by using a
shared resource or a communication algorithm in such a way that is not initially designed
for data transfer purposes. Thus, the channel can evade detection since it uses resources
that are not intended for data transmission and it should not exist in the first place. These
channels are of a particular importance in evaluating the security of computer systems.
In fact, covert channels have been traditionally used to leak sensitive information from
processes with high access privileges (i.e., high process) to unauthorized recipients that
normally do not have security clearance to access such information (i.e., low process).
Consider Alice and Bob to be two users of a multi-level secure (i.e., MLS) system. In
a multi-level secure structure, the access privileges of each user are thoroughly specified
by a security architecture. Hence, users with low access privileges (e.g., Bob) can not
access data or services that are marked only for users with high clearance (e.g., Alice).
Any attempt to access high level data by low processes will be monitored and blocked
by the access control mechanism. In addition, Alice can not send high level information
directly to Bob as such action is clearly against the access policy of the system. However,
if the reverse case is not prohibited by the access control policies (i.e., if the low process
is allowed to send messages to the high process), Alice can leak sensitive information to
the low process (i.e., Bob) through the delay between consecutive acknowledgments that it
sends to confirm the correct reception of Bob’s messages. In this way, a long delay between
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Ack messages represents covert bit-1, and a short delay denotes covert bit-0. Thus, a covert
channel is formed in a direction that was initially disallowed by the access policy of the
system.
It is worth noting that in contrast to the cryptographic games in which the ethical
position of players is usually straightforward i.e., the “good” guys want to protect the data
from “bad” eavesdroppers or adversarial entities, the situation is not as clear when it comes
to covert channels. In more detail, while in some cases a user wants to detect and eliminate
covert channels in order to prevent unauthorized information leakage in the system, there
are cases in which hiding the communication channel can be used in order to improve user
privacy, or to reduce the risk of adversarial attacks against sensitive information. It is even
suggested to trace back attackers or malicious users of a system by secretly marking traffic
flows in and out of the system using covert channels
1.1 Overview
Covert channels are usually created by exploiting weaknesses in conventional computer
systems or communication protocols. A crucial step in designing a covert channel is to
identify a resource that is (i) shared between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver,
and (ii) can be modified by the covert transmitter in order to modulate the covert message.
The shared resource should also play a major role in normal operation of the original system
(e.g., randomness in resource sharing protocols). Thus, the access control mechanism
should not be able to remove or strictly control the shared resource that is used for covert
communication, without imposing drastic performance degradation on the system.
In general, two major forms of covert channels are defined based on the type of the
shared resource, and how the transmitter uses that resource for covert communication. One
category involves direct or indirect storage of the covert message (i.e., storage channels).
The file-lock covert channel is a typical example of a storage covert channel in which
the covert transmitter operates on a shared file in the system and changes the file access
status to locked/released in order to modulate the covert bit-0 / bit-1, respectively. The
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other category (i.e. timing channels), targets typical time-based properties of the system.
These channels often exploit the resource consumption pattern of a user or a process in the
system in such a way that the covert receiver interprets the covert message by analyzing the
covert transmitter behavior. For instance, a simple timing covert channel can be formed
by congesting the memory access bus with a burst of access requests in a known period
of time to modulate covert bit-1 or leave the bus open by remaining idle to modulate the
covert-bit0. It is noted that splitting covert channels into timing and storage channels
is not a clear cut classification and can be extended by identifying new channels (e.g.,
counting channels) in which the count, the frequency, or the ordering of system events are
used to embed the covert message into the overt channel.
The importance of covert channels becomes more noticeable when they are extended
into computer networks. Modern communication networks benefit from relatively high
data rate and cover a wide range of users that may be geographically spread across the
globe. The large number of users, the diversity of services and the huge volume of network
traffic make it relatively difficult for system observers to effectively monitor and process
all communication channels in computer networks. In fact, the heterogeneous structure
of communication networks and the diversity of communication protocols that are used
in such systems provides an appealing setting for covert channels. This dissertation is an
exploration of a novel methodology that is suitable to design undetectable, robust and high
rate covert channels over public communication networks.
1.2 Motivation and Research Objectives
In traditional covert communication schemes (e.g., the file-lock channel) the undetectability
of the channel mostly relies on the obscurity of the shared resource that is used as the
medium for covert communication. For instance, in the file-lock covert channel, the channel
is undetectable as long as the system observer does not consider the status of shared files
as a potential medium for information leakage. However, if the shared medium between
covert transmitter and the covert receiver is identified by the access control mechanism,
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the channel may be compromised and it can be removed from the system. The situation
is more critical in network covert channels, where the shared medium (i.e., the network
traffic) is clearly used for communication purposes. Network traffic is easily accessible by
monitoring entities that may record, process or even modify the traffic in order to thwart
covert channels. In fact, there are numerous methods that are designed to detect, eliminate
or limit the capacity of network covert channels. Therefore, undetectability becomes one
of the main requirements of covert channels over communication networks.
Channel robustness is another important feature of a covert communication scheme,
specifically for network covert channels. In communication networks, the covert channel
shares network resources with many different traffic sources. Resource sharing is a key
element in distributed systems (e.g., computer networks) in order to spread system re-
sources in an efficient and fair manner to all users and services in the system. However,
contention over the same resources may produce a temporal resource shortage that would
turn into transient performance degradation of the system. Such unpredictable events
change network characteristics and potentially affect the shared medium that is used for
covert communication. For instance, it is known that the TCP/IP connections over the
Internet are served with best-effort quality of service. It means that the network does its
best to deliver the traffic to the destination, however it does not provide any guarantee
on its service level. Hence, data packets may be delivered out-of order, in delay, or they
may not be delivered at all. Now consider a covert transmitter that modulates the covert
information over inter-packet delays (i.e., IPD) of its traffic over the Internet. Thus, any
variation in the IPDs of the covert traffic can potentially force the covert receiver to an
erroneous detection of the covert message. Furthermore, active adversarial entities may
attempt to disrupt the channel by introducing jamming noise into the channel. In fact,
it is shown that adding random delays into inter-packet delays of the covert traffic can
effectively diminish the throughput of timing covert channels in communication networks.
The goal in designing a robust covert channel is to deal with the inherent network noise
(e.g., network jitter), and prevent active adversaries from disrupting the covert channel by
introducing additional noise into the channel (i.e., jamming).
The exchange rate of covert information i.e., channel covert rate, is also of a great im-
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portance in evaluating the effectiveness of covert channels. In fact, the reason to establish a
covert channel is to exchange information without being detected. Thus, if the channel can
not handle enough throughput to the covert receiver, even with high levels of undetectabil-
ity and robustness, it can be hardly beneficial. However, little emphasis has been given to
the covert rate and even robustness of covert channels. On the contrary, these properties
are often scarified in order to achieve higher levels of stealthiness for covert channels.
Our research is inspired by the challenges that exist in designing robust, undetectable,
and high rate covert channels in communication networks. To this end, the process of se-
lecting shared resources and means of exploiting such resources to establish covert channels
are studied. Then, novel design strategies for covert channels over public communication
networks and wireless environment are explored. Each design is accompanied by a com-
prehensive analysis from different perspectives including undetectability, achievable covert
rate and reliability of the covert channel. Target applications for the proposed covert
communication schemes are presented including detailed scenarios for practical implemen-
tation of the proposed channels. In what follows, a more detailed introduction of each
contribution of the thesis is presented.
1.2.1 Covert Channel Design Methodology
In this dissertation we explore a novel design methodology for covert channels over com-
munication networks. Our methodology is based on the concept of behavioral mimicry
covert communication in which the covert transmitter is expected to mimic the behavioral
characteristics of a normal transmitter. The challenge is to design a covert transmitter that
has enough degrees of freedom to behave like an ordinary transmitter in the system and
react normally to unpredictable network events, yet it has the ability to modulate a covert
message over its behavioral fingerprints in the network. To this end, we first highlight the
requirements of a proper resource that can be used for covert communication, and describe
our approach on how to find such resources in computer systems. In fact, we have identi-
fied the inherent randomness in communication protocols and network environments to be
the key element in finding and exploiting the proper medium for covert channels in com-
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munication systems. It is noted that randomness is used in the design of communication
protocols in order to achieve fairness, stability, and scalability. Such sources of random
behavior in communication systems can be exploited for covert communication in order to
facilitate the modulation of the covert message over the behavioral characteristics of the
covert transmitter. We have identified several sources of randomness in communication
protocols (e.g., random elements in cryptographic algorithms), and provided a step-by-
step approach on how to design a covert communication scheme according to the proposed
design methodology.
1.2.2 Wireless Covert Channel
The emergence of mobile devices and wireless networks urges extra attention to the se-
curity of wireless communication. Wireless covert channels are rapidly gaining attention
both as security threats and also as means of protecting sensitive information in wireless
environment. It is noted that the wireless channel is broadcast in nature, hence all activ-
ities over the wireless channel can be monitored by receivers that are in the range of the
transmitter’s radio. In this way, covert channels have found applications in privacy pre-
serving, and improving the reliability of the channel by hiding the communication channel
from possible adversarial entities that would disrupt the channel otherwise. As an example
consider implanted medical devices that use wireless channels to communicate information
with outside world. Due to the critical role of such devices, they may be subject to ad-
versarial attacks if their presence are revealed to the adversary. Covert channels can be a
valuable tool in fortifying the defenses of such vital devices against security threats.
In this thesis we present a new wireless covert communication scheme according to
the concept of behavioral mimicry and the proposed design methodology for undetectable,
robust and high rate wireless covert channels. The objective is to adopt the medium access
control protocol (i.e., CSMA protocol) of a normal wireless transmitter, and modify it in
such a way that gives the covert transmitter enough freedom to embed a covert message
into its overt traffic. The proposed covert channel is basically a timing covert channel that
benefits from other user’s activities in the system in order to transmit the covert message.
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Since the packet transmission mechanism of the covert transmitter is influenced by channel
activities of other elements in the system, the covert transmitter mimics not only the long
term characteristics of a legitimate node, but also it reacts to the temporal changes in
the system similar to a typical network transmitter. Thus, the covert channel remains
hidden due to the indistinguishable packet transmission pattern of the covert transmitter
as compared to any other node in the network. A salient feature of the proposed wireless
covet communication scheme is that it can sustain relatively high covert rate that is scaled
linearly with the overt rate of the communication channel.
1.2.3 Turbo Covert Channel
Timing covert channels over public communication networks (e.g., Internet) have also at-
tracted significant interest recently. The enormous volume of information over the Internet,
and the diversity of protocols and services make the Internet an ideal framework for covert
channels. On the other hand, the unpredictable nature of public communication networks
necessitates robust and reliable covert channel designs that are accustomed to dealing with
extremely high level of network noise and adversarial disruptions. In this dissertation, a
novel design approach for robust and undetectable covert channels over public communi-
cation networks is investigated. The proposed framework is based on modeling the timing
covert channel as a differential communication channel and using the new communica-
tion model in order to derive the formulation for modulation/demodulation processes of
the channel. The key element in this design strategy is the use of a trellis structure in
modulating the covert message over inter-packet delays of the covert traffic. The trellis
structure also enables the covert receiver to perform iterative demodulation and decoding
of the covert message, and form a turbo covert channel that significantly improves the
reliability of the channel.
Further analysis of the proposed turbo covert channel leads to introduction of an adap-
tive modulation strategy that improves the channel robustness even further. To this end,
the covert transmitter takes advantage of the error-resistant portion of the IPD spectrum
in modulating the covert message. However, in order to keep the hidden status of the
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covert channel, the modulation scheme is designed such that it does not force the pattern
of IPDs of the covert traffic to deviate from the traffic pattern of the legitimate traffic of the
channel. Thus, the channel achieves provable undetectability which means that the covert
channel is undetectable against any efficiently computable statistical test. The aforemen-
tioned modulation strategy combined with the proposed trellis structure gives the covert
channel considerable flexibility to achieve a wide range of covert rates with extremely low
decoding error rate at the covert receiver. In fact, the performance analysis of the channel
reveals that the proposed covert communication scheme withstands extremely high levels
of channel noise and adversarial disruption, while it maintains an excellent undetectability
level and high covert rate.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 pretenses a detailed back-
ground on covert communication, the state of the art in covert channel design, and counter-
measures for covert channels. The proposed design methodology for covert communication
schemes is described in Chapter 3. The chapter also includes theorems and definitions
that are used in this dissertation. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the design of a wireless covert
channel. In this chapter a new wireless covert communication scheme is introduced and an-
alyzed from robustness, stealthiness, and achievable covert rate perspectives. The chapter
also includes a discussion on target applications for wireless covert channels in communica-
tion networks. The turbo covert channel design is detailed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter
6 concludes the dissertation and provides insights for future directions one could take to
continue the contributions of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Computer systems depend on resources which are extremely limited when compared to the
growing demands of users. Therefore, it is often suggested to implement resource sharing
mechanisms in order to maximize resource utilization and efficiency of the system. In this
way, computer systems have evolved into complex structures that share same resources
among various users and services with different privileges and sensitivity levels. A very
simple example of such systems can be found in a single CPU computer architecture in
which different users (with different permission levels) share the same processing unit for
their individual tasks. However, sharing resources enables users to open unauthorized
communication channels (e.g., covert channels) in order to exchange information without
proper supervision of the system. Hence, sensitive information could be leaked from a high
level process or user into lower levels that are not authorized to access such information.
Through the rest of this dissertation, it is always assumed that a high level user has higher
clearance level than a low level user. This means a low level user is not allowed to access
high level information.
Since the majority of applications of covert channels are of a malicious nature (e.g.,
leaking information, Botnet command and control channels), these channels are often con-
sidered as security threats in computer systems. To avoid such security threats, one can
simply move to a totally isolated system and disallow the sharing of all resources between
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different security levels [3]. However, this solution is simply too costly and inefficient for
advanced computer systems. Alternatively, one can develop a controlled resource sharing
mechanism like multi-level secure systems (i.e., MLS), in which the transactions between
different security levels are well-defined and monitored [3]. In MLS systems classification
labels are assigned to all objects (e.g., files) in the system and clearance levels are defined
for all subjects that operate on system objects (e.g., users or processes). When a subject
tries to access an object, it is granted access if and only if the clearance level of the subject
supersedes the label of the target object. Such multilevel secure system is used by Bell
and Lapadula [4] as an example for access control mechanisms.
The goal of access control systems is to confine users to their security levels and control
user interactions with other users and processes. This problem is first stated by Lampson
as confinement problem which is defined as the problem of preventing a service leaking
information when it is serving a legitimate client of the system [5]. Lampson presented
several examples of such information leakage scenarios and classified them into three gen-
eral categories i.e., legitimate channels, storage channels, and covert channels. Linper [6]
showed that information leakage through the storage and legitimate channels can be effec-
tively countered by access control mechanisms in which access to the system resources are
carefully evaluated and enforced. However, thwarting covert channels may be costly as it
moves the system toward the total isolation strategy (e.g., one CPU should be dedicated
to each service). In fact, many different solutions to the confinement problem, including
virtualization [7] or sand-boxing [8], are practically simulations of totally isolated systems
as they attempt to restrict the direct access between users of different security levels. Nev-
ertheless, these methods lack the protection against indirect communication methods (e.g.,
covert channels) that may exists between different users in different security levels.
In practice, resource sharing mechanisms are the main target for covert channels. As
an example, consider the bus contention channel [9], a covert channel that is created when
multiple processes share a same memory bus to access a shared memory bank. Consider
two processes with a high and low security levels that are running concurrently on two
distinct processing units. It is noted that the access control mechanism prevents the low
level process to directly access the high level process data even though they share the same
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memory bank module. Despite the existence of the access control mechanism, the high
level process can leak information to the low level process through the following process.
Bus Contention Covert Channel: In this design the time domain is sliced into
intervals of length t milliseconds. During each time period, the high level process floods
the bus contention system with access requests in order to transmit covert-bit 0, or it
leaves the bus open with no access request in order to modulate the covert-bit 1. The low
level process, simply generates a constant number of bus access requests and monitors how
many of its requests are actually serviced by the system during each period. If the number
of serviced requests are small/large, the receiver gleans the covert-bit 0/1 according to the
known behavior of the high process thread. In this way, high level data can be send to the
low level process with relatively high rates (i.e., 1/t kbps).
2.1 Covert Communication
It is often believed that encryption is sufficient to secure a communication channel. How-
ever, encryption only prevents unauthorized access to the channel content. In many cases,
the existence of a communication channel, or even sudden changes in the traffic volume
of the channel are enough to signal an event or raise suspicion. On the other hand, the
art of information hiding and in particular steganography is about concealing the very ex-
istence of a message by means of hiding the sensitive information in the context of other
information [10]. In fact, steganographic techniques usually aim to hide information within
resources that are directly accessible by the receiver. Covert channels are also considered
as an alternative form of information hiding methods, however they are different from
steganographic techniques in the sense that they are usually used in systems where direct
access to the actual resource (e.g., file content, or packet payload) is disallowed or at least
controlled by access control mechanisms.
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2.1.1 Covert Channel Definition
Covert communication refers to the process of communicating data through a channel that
is neither designed, nor intended to transfer information [3]. Alternatively, the Orange
book [11] defines the covert channel as any communication channel that can be exploited
by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the systems security pol-
icy. The domain of this dissertation however, is focused on covert channels that exists in
communication networks, where two distant nodes attempt to communicate covertly by
modifying the communication protocols or node behaviors.
An overt channel is an authorized communication channel that transfers information
according to a legitimate communication protocol (e.g., TCP/IP over the Internet). An
overt channel may contain an embedded covert message (i.e., covert channel), or it may
carry no covert message (i.e., legitimate channel). Figure 2.1 depicts the prisoner’s problem
that is proposed by Simmons [12]. This model is widely considered as the de-facto model
for covert channel in communication networks. In brief, the prisoner’s problem is defined
as the challenge in front of Alice and Bob, two prisoners, who try to negotiate an scape
plan. However, all communication between prisoners has to go through the warden (i.e.,
Wendy) that puts the prisoners into solitary confinement if she detects any suspicious
behavior. The solution is for Alice and Bob to begin an overt communication channel
with innocuous contents while a covert message is embedded into the overt traffic. In this
way, the covert message could be carried to the receiver if the warden does not notice the
existence of the covert message and forward the overt traffic to the receiver.
This model later was extended to communication networks in which Alice and Bob
could be two, possibly distant, computer nodes in a public communication network (e.g.,
Internet) [13]. To this end, Alice and Bob use common network protocols (e.g., TCP/IP)
in order to establish the overt channel and then modify some characteristics of the overt
traffic (e.g., inter-packet delays) in order to modulate a covert message over the overt
traffic. In practice, it is often assumed that Alice and Bob share a secret which is used in
defining the covert channel parameters, and perhaps encrypting/authenticating the covert
message.
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Figure 2.1: The prisoner’s problem and covert channels [1].
2.2 Covert Channel Classification
Covert channels can be characterized based on many different features of the channel in-
cluding shared medium that is used for the channel (e.g., Internet, or wireless channel),
warden type (e.g., active or passive), or the type of resource that is used for covert com-
munication (e.g., timing or storage channels). Figure 2.2 depicts a few possible parameters
that may be used for covert channel classification.
Kemmerer [14] identified three necessary conditions for existence of a covert channel in a
computer system. These conditions cover a wide variety of covert channels from those that
exist in single host computer systems to more advanced covert channels in communication
networks. In brief, these conditions can be described as follows:
Kemmerer Principle: A covert channel can exist between a covert transmitter and
a covert receiver if the following conditions are met:
1. There exist a global resource that is shared between the covert transmitter and the
covert receiver.
For instance, the wireless medium is broadcast in nature and all the nodes in the
wireless channel can intercept transmitted packets. Memory bus is also another
resource that is shared among users of the same system.
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Figure 2.2: A sample classification of covert channels.
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2. Covert transmitter should be able to modify the shared resource such that the covert
receiver can detect and identify such modifications.
As an example, a wireless capable node can transmit packets into the wireless channel
and modify the state of the channel from idle to occupied. The header part of packets
in communication networks (e.g., IP header) is also another resource that can be
modified by the covert transmitter in order to transmit covert messages.
3. The covert transmitter and the covert receiver need to have a method to achieve
synchronization in order to communicate covertly.
The synchronization criterion covers the ability of the covert transmitter and the
covert receiver to initiate the covert communication, and remain in synchronization
state during the communication period. This also includes the ability to determine
how long it takes for each bit of information to be transmitted from the covert
transmitter to the covert receiver.
Using the Kemmerer’s principle, one can classify covert channels based on how each
channel design satisfies the aforementioned requirements for covert channels. In what
follows, a few common examples of such classes of covert channels are presented.
2.2.1 Storage and Timing Covert Channels
It is a common classification approach to divide covert channels into storage and timing
channels [1]. This classification is based on how the covert transmitter modifies the shared
resource in order to embed the covert message into the overt channel. Storage covert
channels often involve direct or indirect storage of the covert message into certain portion
of the overt traffic (e.g., modify the header of an IP packet) [13]. The receiver look for the
same section of the overt traffic in order to read the transmitter’s fingerprint and decode
the covert message. On the other hand, a timing covert channel targets typical time-based
properties of the system, that are visible to the covert receiver (e.g., inter-packet delays,
CPU usage), in order to modulate the covert message. The covert receiver decodes the
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covert message by observing the behavioral fingerprints of the covert transmitter and its
resource consumption pattern [15].
Dividing covert channels into storage and timing channels is not a clear cut classification
and different definitions exist in the literature. However, this classification highlights two
distinct approaches on achieving synchronization according to the Kemmerer’s principle.
In other words, timing covert channels, such as the bus contention channel, require a
reference clock in order to measure time and define the pattern of resource consumption
by the covert transmitter. However, storage timing channels overcome this obstacle by
forcing a writable property of the system to change and remain constant until the covert
receiver observes the modification.
The domain of storage covert channels is extensive. One of the earliest known storage
channel in a single host computer system is called file-lock channel [16]. In this design
the covert transmitter locks a shared file to transmit the covert-bit 1, and releases the file
to send the covert-bit 0. Hence, the shared medium is actually the file, and the covert
transmitter stores the covert message in the access flag of the shared file. The receiver,
decodes the covert message by initiating an access request for the file and records if its
request is granted/denied to access the file. In communication networks, storage covert
channels can be established by modifying unused header bits of data packets such as
reserved bits of IP header [13]. Other designs suggest to use parts of the overt traffic that
does not have standard initial values. For instance, the don’t fragment bit (DF) of the IP
header [17], unused code fields of the internet control message protocol (ICMP) [18], IP
identification (ID) field [19], or initial sequence number (ISN) field of TCP packets [20] are
used as storage mediums for covert communication. A comprehensive list of such channels
can be found in [1]. However, storage covert channels suffer from a fundamental design flaw
as they systematically change the normal format of the overt traffic (e.g., header fields).
Such sever modifications enable access control authorities to detect or at least limit the
capacity of storage covert channels. In fact, in [21] it is suggested that using pattern
recognition methods, a majority of storage covert channels in communication networks
can be detected and removed from the system.
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Timing covert channels on the other hand, are created by modulating the covert message
over the timing of a sequence of events that are observable at the covert receiver. The bus
contention covert channel is an example of timing covert channels in which the covert
message is embedded in the state of the shared memory bus during fixed periods of time.
Wray observed that timing channels crucially depend on the existence of a reference clock in
order to achieve synchronization between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver [22].
It is noted that any sequence of events can be used to form a reference clock. For instance,
a reference clock can be created by monitoring the instructions that are generated by the
system CPU and consider each instruction as an event that increments the clock (i.e.,
clock ticks) [22]. Another example is to build a reference clock using an asynchronous disk
controller. To this end, a large volume of access requests are issued to the disk controller
in such a way that the I/O completion interrupts arrive at a regular pace to the issuing
process. These interrupts can be used as clock ticks in order to form a reference clock for
a timing covert channel [9].
With the reference clock in place, a timing covert channel needs a secondary sequence
of events whose timing contains the covert message. This sequence of events is called the
signaling event stream. For example, in the bus contention covert channel, the signaling
events are the bus access response times at the covert receiver (i.e., low process). It is noted
that the covert transmitter (i.e., the high process) controls the signaling events by flooding
the bus with its requests (i.e., covert-bit 0) or remaining idle (i.e., covert-bit 1). Gray
identified two classes of timing channels according to the relation between the reference
clock and the signaling event stream [9]. The first class consists of a reference clock which
has a much higher rate as compared to the signaling events. In this way, due to the high
accuracy of the reference clock each signaling event can be individually timed. Therefore,
covert information can be modulated on each individual event in the signaling event stream.
A timing covert channel that encodes covert messages directly into inter-packet delays of
an IP traffic flow is an example of such timing channels [23].
In the second class, the signaling event stream has a much higher rate than the reference
clock. Hence, the timing of individual signaling events can not be measured accurately.
In such cases the channel is exploited by counting the number of signaling events that
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are observed during a known period of time according to the reference clock. In this
way, the covert transmitter can modulate its covert message by controlling the number
of signaling events that happens during each interval. These channels are called counting
covert channels [9]. An on/off network covert timing channel [15] is an example of such
class of covert channels in which the transmitter either transmits packets or remains silent
in each time interval in order to transmit the covert message. The receiver counts the
number of observed packets in each interval and records covert-bit 0 if its packet count is
zero and records covert-bit 1 otherwise.
As a final remark, it is worth mentioning another variant of timing covert channels called
sorting channels [19]. In this design the covert information is embedded in the ordering of
the received signaling events during one or multiple timing intervals. Consequently, if the
receiver can observe n different event during a given time interval, it has a message space
of n! depending on the ordering that these events are observed.
2.2.2 Noiseless and Noisy Covert Channels:
A covert channel is noiseless if the shared medium is dedicated to the covert transmitter
and the covert receiver. Hence, there is no interference from other parties on the covert
channel. In contrast, if the shared medium is accessible by other legitimate users or access
control mechanisms, the covert channel is noisy meaning that there is a chance that the
covert receiver decodes a message other than the covert message that is intended by the
covert transmitter. For instance, in a file-lock covert channel, if another process can access
the file that is used as the shared medium for the covert channel, it may toggle the state
of the file forcing the covert receiver to record a wrong covert-bit.
It is noted that the noise described here (i.e., the covert noise) is different from signal
noise of the communication channel. In more detail, the covert noise is generated based on
other user’s contention to access the shared resource or by an active adversarial entity who
deliberately injects noise into the system in order to cause errornous detection of the covert
message at the covert receiver. As another example, in the bus contention covert channel,
memory access requests of other processors in the system may reduce the response time
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at the covert receiver despite the fact that the covert transmitter is trying to keep the bus
open by remaining idle.
The effect of covert noise on the capacity of covert channels has been vigorously stud-
ied in the literature [24]. In [24] the authors discussed the effect of jamming noise on the
capacity of timing covert channels. They also proposed noise generating strategies accord-
ing to a game theoretic analysis of the timing covert channels that significantly reduces
the available bandwidth of the channel. Another example of using noise to control timing
covert channels is an approach called fuzzy time [25]. In this approach, the jamming noise
is introduced to the reference clock by means of random interrupt requests in different
security levels. Random interrupts cause random clock shifts that disrupt the system clock
in different security levels. Thus, the synchronization between the covert transmitter and
the covert receiver is lost which makes the covert channel unreliable and extremely noisy.
2.2.3 Covert Channels in Computer Networks
The file-lock covert channel or the bus contention channel are examples of covert com-
munication schemes in single host systems. However, the importance of covert channels
becomes more noticeable when these channels are extended beyond the limited scope of
a single host environment and into computer networks. The diversity of existing network
protocols, the variety in resource sharing algorithms, and the high data rate of communi-
cation networks make them an appealing setting for covert channels. In fact, the scale of
the shared medium (i.e., the network) makes it extremely difficult to have a global access
control mechanism in the system. More importantly, the enormous number of users and
services in communication networks necessitates the existence of resource sharing algo-
rithms in order to efficiently allocate system resources to all network users. Thus, there is
more possibility to create covert channels while the risk of being detected or denied by a
global access control mechanism is significantly reduced. The majority of the contributions
of this dissertation are focused on network covert channels.
In communication networks, information are often transmitted in data packets. A
packet is a sequence of information bits (i.e., packet payload) that is augmented by one or
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multiple protocol headers. The information in protocol headers are used to deliver each
packet to its destination in the network. Hiding information in the packet payload is often
regarded as a subset of information hiding through steganography which is out of the scope
of this thesis. Designing storage covert channels using unused or uninitialized portions of
protocol headers also received significant attention in the literature [1,13,26–28]. However,
as suggested by Murdoch, the majority of these channels are vulnerable to the pattern
analysis detection schemes [21]. Furthermore, the network routers and firewalls are usually
configured to overwrite unused and reserved fields of packet headers in order to prevent
covert channels.
To bypass these countermeasures, it is suggested to use the variable fields of IP or TCP
headers that change from one connection to another. To this end, Rowland proposed to
use IP identification fields or TCP initial sequence number fields as the medium for covert
communication [29]. A more advanced version of such network covert channels benefits
from a bounce back strategy in which the covert transmitter uses a middle, a bounce proxy,
to communicate to the covert receiver. In this way, the transmitter generates a TCP SYN
packet with an spoofed source IP address field that contains the address of the covert
receiver. The ISN field in the packet header is set according to the value of the covert
message and the packet is sent to the bounce proxy. Upon reception of the SYN packet,
the bounce proxy sends a SYN/ACK or SYN/RST message to the covert receiver. The
receiver simply decrements the value of the ISN field of the acknowledgment packet by one
unit and decodes the covert message. Rutkowska [20] proposed to use encrypted covert
messages in order to generate ISN fields with uniformly distributed values. Nevertheless, it
is shown that the distribution of initial sequence numbers that are generated according to
the encryption approach is notably different from the distribution of sequence numbers that
a real operating system generates [21]. To tackle this problem, in [21] an implementation
of an ISN based covert channel called Lathera is presented in which the distribution of the
ISN header fields of the covert traffic mimics the same distribution as the traffic that is
generated by a normal operating system (i.e., Linux open BSD).
Checksum fields and in general message integrity protection headers are also considered
as possible medium for network storage covert channels. In fact, since the Checksum field
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is calculated based on the packet payload, its contents can be considered random with no
particular initialization value. Hence, it is a suitable field for storage covert channels as
it can not be reset at the middle nodes in the network (e.g., routers and switches). Abad
described how IP header Checksum fields can be used for covert communication [30]. In
this approach, the header of IP packets are extended using IP header extension fields such
that the calculated code redundancy check (i.e., CRC) of the header matches the value that
corresponds to the covert message. The same technique is applicable to the TCP header
Checksum. Rivest extended this idea to the message authentication codes by introducing
chaffing and winnowing [31]. In this model, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret
key that is used to generate keyed-hash digests of packet payloads. The transmitter can
choose to send a packet with a matching hash digest or just generate a packet with random
bits. The receiver verifies the hash-digest of each packet and drop all packets except those
with matching hash digests. Although the original application for this scheme was to
achieve confidentiality without encryption, this scheme can be modified to form a network
covert channel. To this end, the covert transmitter appends the matching hash digest to
its data packet in order to modulate the covert-bit 1, or it sends a packet (random or data
packet) with a random hash digest to represent covert-bit 0. It is noted that as long as
the shared secret remains secure, given the collision-resistant property of the hash function
in use [32], there exist no system observer that can distinguish between a matching hash
digest and a random bit stream. Hence, the covert channel remains undetected.
The potential of timing covert channel for stealth communication over data networks
is known for more than three decades [15,33]. Early timing covert channels were based on
a simple idea in which the transmitter either transmits a packet or remains silent during a
known period of time in order to communicate covert-bit 1 or bit 0, respectively [33]. An
implementation of such timing covert channel was demonstrated by Cabuk [34] in which
the synchronization between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver is achieved
using a special preamble sequence at the start of each transmission period. However, the
author explained that the simple on-off strategy is extremely sensitive to the accuracy of
the reference clock and the synchronization between the covert transmitter and the covert
receiver. More importantly, it was shown that due to the radical changes in the packet
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transmission pattern of the covert transmitter, an on-off timing channel can be easily
detected by a system observer.
Girling proposed to encode the covert message directly into the inter-packet delays
(i.e., IPD) of the overt traffic in a LAN environment [15]. He also suggested to increase
the inter-packet delays in order to mitigate the effect of network noise on the error rate
of the covert receiver. Although this strategy can improve the channel robustness, it is
mentioned that the capacity of the channel is inversely linked to the length of traffic inter-
packet delays. Hence, there exists a tradeoff between the capacity and reliability of the
channel. A salient feature of encoding covert information into the IPDs of the overt traffic
is that it does not require accurate synchronization between the covert transmitter and
the covert receiver. In fact, as long as the receiver can distinguish between long delays
and short delays that are intended to modulate different covert bits, the channel operates
normally. Berk et al. designed a variant of this strategy in which multiple delays can be
used in order to modulate more information bits in each packet transmission interval [23].
They also proposed a mechanism in which the transmitter can pick the optimal encoding
strategy based on properties of the channel (e.g., noise level, adversary model, packet
transmission rate) in order to maximize the covert channel data rate.
Network timing covert channels are usually implemented in public communication net-
works such as the Internet. Hence, these channels should be designed based on the assump-
tion that there exists a system observer with access to the covert traffic and also samples
of the legitimate traffic of the same network. Based on such assumptions, in advanced tim-
ing covert channels the covert transmitter is designed to mimic the normal transmission
pattern of a legitimate node of the network. Therefore, it would be less likely that the
existence of the covert channel be detected due to the difference between the behavior of
the covert transmitter and the ordinary elements of the system. Such design methodology
is used by Cabuk [35]. To this end, a covert channel is designed in which the empirical
distribution that characterizes the IPDs of the legitimate traffic is split into small delay
and large delay halves. Then, the transmitter generates its covert traffic according to the
large delay/small delay patterns in order to transmit the covert-bit 1/0, respectively. The
keyboard Jitter Bug [36] uses a similar technique to leak the information entered through
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the keyboard into a third party receiver over a public network such as the Internet. Com-
pared to the simple on-off strategy of the elementary timing channels, these designs provide
much higher level of stealthiness. Nevertheless, modulating the covert message over the
IPDs of the overt traffic, affects key statistical attributes of the overt traffic such as dis-
tribution [35], entropy [37], and temporal characteristics of the covert traffic [38]. Such
changes can be used in order to detect the covert channel.
To prevent detection, model-based covert channels were designed that aim to mimic
the statistical behaviors of the legitimate traffic [39, 40]. In this way, the transmitter
estimates a model that fits the pattern of IPDs of the legitimate traffic and uses this
model to generate the covert traffic. The design in [40] incorporates a linear modulation
scheme in which the parameters of the modulation formula are calculated based on the
distribution of the inter-packet delays of the legitimate traffic of the channel. Hence, the
covert transmitter can mimic the first order statistical behaviors (e.g., distribution shape)
of the legitimate transmitter of the channel. The channel also benefits from a shared secret
between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver that enables them to dynamically
update the modulation parameters. In this way, the transmitter can influence higher
order statistical properties of the covert traffic (e.g., traffic correlation) and blend itself
among the legitimate users of the network. To achieve robustness against network noise
and adversarial disruptions, channel coding (i.e., spreading code) is applied to the covert
message prior to modulating the message over inter-packet delays of the covert traffic.
However, in order to best fit a non-stationary traffic model of the legitimate traffic, this
approach requires periodic updates of the model parameters between the covert transmitter
and the covert receiver that may reduce the achievable rate and channel robustness.
In [41] a network timing covert channel called liquid is proposed. In this approach, the
IPDs of the covert traffic are split in two parts. The first part is used to modulate the covert
message in a similar approach as Jitter Bug [36]. The rest of the inter-packet delays (i.e.,
shaping IPDs) are used to mimic the statical behavior of the legitimate traffic according
to the estimated model of the normal traffic of the channel. However, liquid is capable of
exploiting only a fraction of the channel capacity as the shaping IPDs can not carry covert
information. To tackle the shortcomings of liquid, Kothari [42] suggested to use a regularity
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tree structure in order to control the correlation among inter-packet delays of the covert
traffic in combination with a shape enforcing module. The shaping module forces the
distribution of the covert traffic to mimic the statistical behavior of the legitimate traffic.
Meanwhile, the regularity tree sets constraints on the acceptable sequences of inter-packet
delays that the covert transmitter is allowed to use in modulating the covert message. In
this way, the channel can evade detection by covert channel detection schemes that are
based on the average conditional entropy of the covert traffic [37].
Recently, the focus of model-based covert channels has shifted towards designs with
provable undetectability. This means that the covert channel should be undetectable against
any efficiently computable statistical test that has access to samples of the legitimate traffic
and covert traffic in the network. Sellke et al. [43] pioneered this design methodology
and introduced a covert channel that is provably undetectable against any polynomial-
time statistical test, assuming that the inter-packet delays of the legitimate traffic are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. The main idea is to use
the output of a cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator (i.e., CSPRNG)
and feed the result to the Quantile function of the distribution of the legitimate traffic.
The result is a sequence of inter-packet delays that has a similar probability distribution
function as the normal traffic of the network. In order to increase the achievable rate of
the channel, geometric codes were designed that maximize the covert rate of the channel.
However, such improvement is only possible under the strong assumption that the channel
noise (i.e., network jitter) is bounded.
A high portion of the Internet traffic is made of HTTP traffic that reflects long range
dependent (LRD) characteristics. In [44] a covert channel was presented that aims to
mimic not only the marginal distribution of the legitimate traffic but also the long range
dependency and correlation of the traffic samples. The design is based on modeling the
web traffic connection start times using Fractional Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving
Average (FARIMA) time series. The FARIMA model enables the covert traffic to achieve
desirable LRD characteristics without disturbing the shape of the marginal distribution
of the inter-packet delays of the covert traffic. However, due to the implementation of
persistent connection functionality in modern web browsers and web servers, the TCP
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connections that carry HTTP traffic last much longer than before. Hence, the rate of the
new connection request packets in HTTP traffic has reduced significantly which in turn
diminishes the achievable covert rate of the aforementioned covert channel.
Achieving robustness and high covert rate along with high levels of undetectability has
been proved to be a challenge in designing covert channels [45]. In fact, in many covert
channel designs there exists a tradeoff between the level of stealthiness and the effect
of network noise on the robustness of the covert channel. In [46] the effect of different
channel codes (e.g., convoloutional codes, linear codes) on the reliability of covert channels
is analyzed. The same analysis using fountain codes and LDPC codes are presented in [47]
and [48], respectively. However, the aforementioned schemes trade channel undetectability
in favor of robustness which is undesirable in network covert channels. The design in
[49] incorporates spreading codes in order to thwart the effect of the channel noise while
maintaining provable polynomial undetectability. Nevertheless, this scheme requires a very
strong channel code that significantly reduces the covert rate of the channel.
Smith and Knight [50] studied the application of convoloutional codes, a very well
known family of channel codes [51], for improving the reliability of covert communication
schemes. They argued that the traditional implementations of convoloutional codes may
lack enough resistance against some of the error events that could occur in covert channels.
In particular, they observed that the symbol insertion error event i.e., the error event in
which a symbol that is exploited as a covert channel signaling element occurs due to the
natural operation of the channel, can push the decoder at the covert receiver into a wrong
path. Such an error event may cause loss of synchronization between the covert transmitter
and the covert receiver that would eventually turn into high message decoding error rates
at the receiver. To tackle this challenge, in [50] the authors proposed toroidal codes, a
family of trellis codes based on a ring structure. In this way, the encoder state remains
within a local ring if the next input bit is 0, and it jumps to an outer ring if the input to
the encoder is a bit 1. This coding scheme is much more efficient in dealing with symbol
insertion error events as compared to the traditional implementations of convoloutional
codes. However, this approach is mostly effective for covert communication schemes that
are vulnerable to symbol insertion errors (i.e., passive covert channels). An example of
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such covert channels can be constructed by injecting a subset of naturally occurring events
of the legitimate traffic (i.e., signal events) in order to modulate the covert message over
the overt traffic of the network.
2.2.4 Wireless Covert Channels
Covert channels can also exist in wireless networks as the wireless medium offers unique
properties for covert communication. In fact, the wireless environment satisfies all neces-
sary conditions for existence of a covert channel according to the Kemmerer’s principle.
The wireless channel is broadcast in nature, meaning that the covert transmitter and the
covert receiver can both detect channel activities that happen within their radio ranges.
Thus, the wireless medium can be used as the shared medium for the covert channel. More-
over, the transmitter can change the state of the channel from idle to occupied simply by
accessing the channel for packet transmission or jamming. Such modifications are notice-
able at the covert receiver which monitors the status of the wireless channel. The broadcast
nature of the wireless medium also enables the covert transmitter and the covert receiver
to observe a wide variety of events (e.g., activities of other nodes in the network), and use
those events as clock ticks in order to create a reference clock and achieve synchronization.
Given such desirable properties, and with unprecedented growth in the number of wireless
users and devices, designing wireless covert channels has attracted a lot of attention in the
literature [52–54].
On the other hand, the same characteristics that make the wireless medium such a per-
fect environment for covert communication impose unique challenges in designing stealthy
communication channels. For instance, the broadcast nature of the wireless channel en-
ables a system observer to monitor all channel activities of the transmitters in the network.
Therefore, detecting a covert transmitter based on its abnormal communication behaviors
is much easier in wireless networks. The noise level in wireless channels is higher as com-
pared to wired communication networks. Hence, consideration should be made in order to
compensate for the error-prone nature of the shared medium in wireless covert channels.
Finally, since the channel is easily accessible to other nodes in the network, performing
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active adversarial attacks (e.g., jamming, packet injection, selective packet drop) is much
more convenient for a malicious network element.
One approach in designing wireless covert channels aims to conceal the very existence of
the communication signal by forming a signal that is similar to the background noise of the
channel [55]. This technique is similar to the direct sequence spread spectrum (i.e., DSSS)
communication system [56] in which the information signal is multiplied by a spreading
signal that runs in a much higher rate as compared to the information signal. Since the
spreading signal has larger bandwidth as compared to the information signal, it spreads
the bandwidth of the transmitted signal. Hence, the peak power of the transmitted signal
is reduced considerably. This reduction in signal power can be used in order to hide the
wireless signal behind the background noise of the channel. However, the DSSS signal
relies on a periodic carrier wave for transmission over a wireless channel. The periodic
carrier forces the transmitted signal to become cyclostationary. Thus, squaring the signal
makes it much easier to detect which is a drawback for a covert channel design. In [55] it
is suggested to use chaotic systems [57] to generate the carrier signal as an alternative for
the traditional periodic carrier waves.
A chaotic system is a non-linear dynamic system that has extreme sensitivity to its ini-
tial conditions [58]. Two autonomous identical chaotic systems that start in nearly same
initial conditions, would choose two completely different trajectories and become uncorre-
lated very quickly. The well-known Lorenz system is a series of differential equations with
chaotic characteristics [59]. Chaotic systems have many intrinsic behaviors that makes
them specifically attractive for secure communication. These systems provides noise-like
behaviors and are extremely sensitive to initial conditions. Therefore, a considerable re-
search was done on developing a real world circuits with chaotic behaviors [60]. Followed by
the discovery of the self-synchronized chaotic circuits by Pecora and Carroll [61] the appli-
cation of chaotic systems for secure and covert communication has been intensely studied
and few schemes were developed [55,58,62]. However, the need for perfect synchronization
between the transmitter and the receiver in chaotic covert communication schemes limits
the application of such schemes in wireless environment due to the high noise level of the
wireless channel.
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Storage wireless covert channels follow the same design criteria as storage channels in
wired networks. In addition to the existing storage covert channels that exploit header fields
in higher protocol layers, the MAC layer of wireless communication protocols (e.g., IEEE
802.11) can also used for covert communication [52, 63]. In [53] it is proposed to use the
destination address field of unsolicited IEEE 802.11 acknowledgment frames as the medium
for covert communication. The authors also suggested to use invalid frames (i.e., frames
with incorrect checksums) as an enhancement to their covert communication scheme. Li et
al. proposed to exploit the routing protocols in ad-hoc wireless networks and create covert
channels with applications in authentication services [64]. In this approach, the covert
message can be modulated over different fields of the route request or route reply frames
of the routing protocol. The authors proposed to use the source sequence number, request
lifetime, and also the destination ID section of the route request messages. Nevertheless,
wireless storage covert channels are vulnerable to pattern matching detection schemes as
the transmitted packets are easily accessible by network monitoring entities.
Wireless network protocols often allow high degrees of randomness in order to share
system resources in an efficient and fair manner. Combine such randomness with the
diversity of network protocols, number of users, and heterogeneous system architectures,
wireless networks form a ubiquitous environment that offers a wide variety of resources
for covert communication schemes. A covert channel based on exploiting randomness in
binary collision resolution algorithm was described in [65]. To this end, the covert message
is transmitted by the number of collisions that is observed at the covert receiver during the
collision resolution period. A similar approach based on splitting tree collision resolution
algorithm is introduced in [66]. In this approach, the covert transmitter is configured to
choose a particular path in the splitting tree according to the covert message. The receiver
on the other hand, decodes the covert message through the relative position of the covert
transmitter in the tree. Later, Wang et al. [67] extended the aforementioned design into an
anonymous covert channel in which the receiver decodes the covert message using a specific
voting approach that considers the probabilistic decisions of multiple covert transmitters in
the network. Rate switching protocols [68], packet retransmission strategies [69], and the
size of back-off timer in the contention resolution algorithm of IEEE 802.11 protocol [70]
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are among other wireless protocols/schemes that can be used for covert communication
in wireless environment. In [71] a covert channel based on signal jamming over slotted
ALOHA was presented. To this end, the covert transmitter influences the collision rate of
the network by introducing jamming noise into the wireless channel. The receiver decodes
the covert message by analyzing the packet loss pattern in the channel that is controlled by
the covert transmitter. The authors also presented a detailed information theoretic analysis
of their covert communication scheme and derived the upper bound on the capacity of the
covert channel.
2.3 Covert Channel Countermeasures
In designing a covert channel special consideration should be made in order to maintain
the stealthiness property of the channel and protect the identity of the covert transmit-
ter and the covert receiver. Therefore, understanding covert channel countermeasures
and detection techniques play a major role in designing undetectable and efficient covert
communication schemes. On the other hand, from a secure system design point of view,
identification of covert channels is equally important in order to prevent information leak-
age from high priority level processes to the lower levels. Thus, a great deal of attention has
been focused on developing efficient methods for identification of weaknesses and design
oversights that may be used for covert communication [72].
A majority of covert channel identification methods were first developed for single host
systems. Such identification schemes include lattice based formal method identification
techniques [73], covert flow tree (CFT) data structures [74], and shared resource matrix
(SRM) methods [14]. The SRM method is important since it can be used to visually
identify system dependencies that may be exploited by covert channels in the system [75].
To form a shared resource matrix structure of a particular system, each attribute of the
system is assigned to a row in the matrix while the columns of the matrix are dedicated
to the operations on each attribute of the system. Hence, the relation between operations
and attributes are reflected in the elements of the shared resource matrix. In this way, one
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can focus on identifying an implicit flow of information by calculating a transitive closures
of the resource matrix of a particular system. Kemmerer argued that this approach can
be used to identify timing channels provided that the system time is included as one of
the attributes in the matrix. The application of the SRM approach in identification of
network covert channels was discussed in [76], where the authors proposed to split the
communication channel into host-by-host segments and inspect each segment separately.
However, most of covert channel identification methods rely heavily on information that is
manually acquired and processed. Hence, it is highly probable that some attributes of the
system are neglected and overlooked during the design phase of the system.
In general, covert channels exist due to either design oversights or inherent weaknesses of
the system [77]. The design oversights can be fixed once they are identified [72]. Therefore,
covert channels that are designed based on such weaknesses can not have long life spans
and will be removed easily when their target systems are upgraded. However, the intrinsic
vulnerabilities of the system can not be removed without redesigning the system which
may be costly or impractical in some scenarios. Thus, it is often conjectured that covert
channels can not be completely removed from computer systems due to the implication
of inherent design flaws in distributed systems [78]. Alternatively, one can aim to limit
the capacity of covert channels, or provide means of channel detection in order to thwart
the unwanted effects of such security threats in computer systems. In particular, detecting
network covert channels has attracted a lot of attention since the diversity of network
structures and users makes it increasingly difficult to control covert communication schemes
over computer networks. In what follows, a brief discussion on elimination, limitation, and
detection schemes for covert channels is presented.
2.3.1 Eliminating Covert Channels
Eliminating a covert channel is possible by removing or blocking access to the shared
resource that is used by the covert communication scheme. For instance, filtering the
ICMP network traffic can effectively eliminate covert channels that rely on ICMP packets
as the medium for covert communication (e.g., Loki channel [18]). Obviously, applying
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such policy is not possible on other network protocols (e.g., IP, TCP) that form the basic
building blocks of public communication networks. As another example, it can be observed
that bouncing covert channels, including the channel that is described by Rowland [29],
exist only if the network allows packets with arbitrary source address fields. However, it is
a common practice to configure routers and switches in public communication networks to
drop packets with source address fields that do not belong to the network path in which
the packets are received. Hence, the covert channel is removed as the proxy node can not
be driven properly. Storage network covert channels that exploit unused or uninitialized
packet header fields are also subject to elimination by traffic normalization. In this way,
network middle nodes (e.g., routers, firewalls) overwrite header fields of the overt traffic in
order to eliminate network storage covert channels. For instance, network routers can be
configured to set the identification header field of IP packets to zero if the DF bit of the
header is set. Also, time-to-live (i.e., TTL) header fields can be set to arbitrary values for
destinations that are known to be close in the network. Thus, the covert channel would be
eliminated as the shared resource does not exist anymore.
2.3.2 Limiting the Capacity of Covert Channels
Removing covert channels is not always the best possible solution as it may cause extreme
performance degradation in the system. In some scenarios limiting the capacity of the
covert channels in the system may be a better choice. Thus, one can reduce the risk of
leaking information through covert channels, yet assure certain level of system performance.
In order to effectively limit the capacity of a covert channel it is often useful to calculate the
formulation of the channel capacity or at least identify the major parameters that dictate
the rate of the channel.
Millen estimated the capacity of timing covert channels by modeling timing covert
channels as legitimate communication channels and applying normal information theoretic
approaches [79]. Moskowitz extended this analysis to the discrete memory-less timing
channels [80]. Another formulation for the capacity of timing covert channels and its
application on limiting covert channels is studied in [24]. In this approach, the timing
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channel is modeled as a game between the covert transmitter who intends to modulate the
covert message over inter-packet delays of the overt traffic and a jammer (i.e., an active
adversary) who wants to limit the capacity of the covert channel through jamming. The
objective of the game is the mutual information between the input and the output of the
chanel, where the covert transmitter/jammer attempts to maximize/minimize the game
objective. The authors also provided coding strategies for the covert transmitter and the
jammer in different game setups and channel configurations.
Gray studied the capacity of bus contention covert channel in the presence of fuzzy
time disruption [9]. In fuzzy time attacks, the accuracy of the system clock is randomly
affected by random interrupts at different security levels [25]. Gray also proposed another
capacity limiting approach (i.e., probabilistic partitioning) in which the accuracy of the
reference clock remains intact, however the bus controller randomly changes the access
policy for the shared bus from a secure mode to a normal mode and vice versa. In the
secure mode different security levels have dedicated time partitions to access the bus, while
in the normal mode processes from different security levels share the bus in order to improve
system performance by resource sharing.
In the bus contention covert channel, the high process controls the response time of
the low process by selectively congesting the access bus or remaining idle. A more direct
approach in designing covert channels can be used if the message from low level process
has to be acknowledged by the high level process. In this way, the high process (i.e., the
covert transmitter) can create a timing covert channel by manipulating the timing of its
Ack messages. To prevent such covert channels, a middle node is placed between the low
and high processes that accepts the messages from the low process, sends acknowledgment
to the low process, forwards the message to the high process, and removes the message
from its buffer when the high process acknowledges the message. In this way, the middle
node aims to break the dependency between the timing of Ack messages that are generated
by the high process and the Ack messages that are received at the low process.
However, this store and forward protocol (SAFP) is limited by the size of the buffer
at the middle node. In other words, if the buffer is full, the middle node has to wait
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until it receives an acknowledgment (from high process) for one of the messages in the
buffer before it can accepts another message from the low process. Hence, the dependency
between the Ack messages transmitted by the high process and the ones that are received
at the receiver can be restored. The low process floods the middle node by a sequence of
messages until it does not receive any more Acks (i.e., the buffer is full). From this point
forward, the middle node can accepts new message, from the low process, only if it receives
acknowledgment for previous messages from the high process. Therefore, the high process
can control the rate of sending Ack messages to the low process by manipulating the rate
of generating Ack messages. In this way, to send a covert-bit 1, the high process sends
an Ack to remove a packet from the buffer and allows the middle node to accept (and
acknowledge) one packet from the low process. To send a covert-bit 0, the high process
remains idle and leaves the buffer in full state.
Data PUMP [81] is a store and forward buffer structure that is designed to eliminate
such covert channels by adding probabilistic delay to the pattern in which the low process
receives its Ack messages. In brief, the PUMP uses the statistical behavior of the covert
transmitter (i.e., the high process) in sending Ack messages and mimics the same behavior
when it acknowledges the message that are received from the low process. To this end,
upon receiving a packet from the low process the trusted low process puts the message in
queue and wait for a random amount of time before sending the Ack to the low process.
The delay is based on a modified exponential distribution with the same mean as the
average inter-acknowledgment delay of the high process [81]. The mean value is updated
every time a new acknowledgment is received at the PUMP. Hence, the low process can
not overflow the buffer and the PUMP decouples the timing of acknowledgments that are
received from the high process and the ones that are sent to the low process. Figure 2.3
depicts a schematic view of a simple PUMP system. The trusted low and the trusted high
nodes are gateways that control the input to the PUMP.
The requirement to acknowledge the received packets exists in computer networks as
well. In fact, the reliability of the TCP protocol, which handles most of the Internet traffic
(including web traffic), is based on the receiver to send acknowledgments for the packets
that are received correctly. Network PUMP [82] is the network version of the simple PUMP
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Figure 2.3: The simple PUMP architecture [1].
that is designed to decouple the timing of Ack messages in order to limit the capacity of
network timing covert channels. The design of network pump is similar to the simple
PUMP. However, the network PUMP is capable of handling multiple data links from a
group of source nodes to different destinations in the network. The design also provides
fairness, congestion control capability, and it is resilient against denial of service (i.e., DoS)
attacks.
The network pump model is used in to analyze the effect of active adversarial disruptions
on network timing covert channels [83]. It is noted that an active adversary can effectively
reduce the capacity of timing covert channels by introducing random noise into the inter-
packet delays of the overt traffic [43]. However, such disruption may have a catastrophic
effect on the overall capacity of the network [24]. In Chapter 5, a design methodology
for network covert channels is presented that can tolerate extremely high levels of channel
noise and adversarial disruptions while it maintains an excellent undetectability level and
covert rate.
2.3.3 Detecting Covert Channels:
Covert channel identification often requires manual system analysis or inputs that have to
be prepared according to the system configuration and network scenarios. Since human
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factor is involved in this process, some aspects of the design may be overlooked and a
number of covert channels remain undetected. Channel elimination and control techniques
may impose high performance degradation on the system that is not acceptable for high
performance and distributed systems. Covert channel detection is an alternative in thwart-
ing unauthorized communication channels in computer systems. The key in covert channel
detection is to pinpoint anomalies in the overt channel that signal the existence of a covert
channel. From the covert channel design point of view, it is often assumed that the system
observer (passive or active) is aware of the covert communication scheme, and it knows
the normal behavior of the legitimate channel. Therefore, the covert traffic should have
similar characteristics as compared to the legitimate traffic in order to prevent detection.
To detect abnormal behaviors of a covert traffic flow, a system observer may use statis-
tical analysis tools to compare the legitimate traffic with the covert traffic. These tools are
often classified in two different categories, namely shape tests and regularity tests. Shape
tests study first order statistical metrics of the covert traffic (e.g., mean, variance, etc) and
compare them with similar results that are calculated from samples of a legitimate traffic
flow of the same system. On the other hand, regularity tests are mostly focused on higher
order statistical characteristics of the traffic flow such as correlation metrics.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test:
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (i.e., KS-test) is a well-known statistical measure that de-
termines if a set of sampled data comes from a particular distribution or not [84]. In other
words, given the distribution of the legitimate traffic of the network (e.g., the distribution
of inter-packet delays of a normal traffic flow), the KS-test distinguishes traffic samples
that follow the distribution of the legitimate traffic from samples that have slightly differ-
ent distribution due to the existence of an embedded message (e.g., covert channels). A
salient feature of the KS-test is that it is not based on any a priori assumption about the
distribution of the legitimate traffic and the covert traffic. Hence, it can be effectively used
against any arbitrary distribution. Let S(x) be the empirical distribution of the samples
that are taken from the target traffic (i.e., possible covert traffic flow). Let F (x) be the
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cumulative distribution function of the legitimate traffic in the same system. The KS-test
is defined as follows:
Hs = sup
x
|S(x)− F (x)|. (2.1)
The application of the KS-test in detecting timing covert channels was demonstrated by
Peng et al. [85]. The authors showed that using KS-test it is possible to detect watermarked
inter-packet delays (i.e., a network timing covert channel) that is used to trace back a traffic
flow to its original source.
Regularity Score:
In addition to the first order statistical tests (e.g., KS-test) another statistical measure
called regularity score was introduced in [35]. The regularity score is designed to detect the
temporal abnormal behaviors of the covert transmitter. In general, public communication
networks (e.g., Internet) are designed based on a stateless architecture. This means that
the network condition can change suddenly and drastically at any time. For instance,
a sudden surge in the number of users may cause network congestion that reduces the
available bandwidth dramatically. Network jitter, packet loss, and out of order delivery
also contribute to the unpredictable nature of communication networks. A normal user
reacts to these unexpected interrupts according to the network protocol specifications (e.g.,
a TCP connection drops its rate to prevent congestion). However, a covert transmitter
is committed to modulate a covert message over its traffic flow. Hence, it may not be
possible for the covert transmitter to react freely to such unpredictable network events.
The regularity score is designed to catch such behavioral differences in order to detect
covert channels.
To calculate the regularity score of a given traffic flow, samples of the traffic are dis-
tributed into different sets, where each set contains γ samples. Then, the variance of the
samples in each set is calculated. Let σi denotes the variance of the samples in the i
th set.
In this way the regularity score (i.e., Hr) of the traffic flow is derived as follows:
Hr = std(
|σi − σj|
σi
, ∀i, j, i < j). (2.2)
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Where, std is the standard deviation operation. In general, a high regularity score signals
a noticeable change in the variance of the samples in different sets. This is most likely due
to variable network conditions that affect the behavioral characteristics of normal users of
the system. On the other hand low values of the regularity score, depicts highly regulated
traffic samples that may contain embedded information, perhaps a covert message.
Entropy Based Detection:
Gianvecchio and Wang [86] proposed a covert channel detection method based on the en-
tropy of traffic samples. The idea is to compare the randomness of the samples of the covert
traffic and the legitimate traffic of the same system. This approach is primarily designed
to detect network timing covert channels in which the covert message is modulated into
the inter-packet delays (i.e., IPDs) of the covert traffic. Furthermore, the authors proposed
another detection scheme based on the conditional entropy measure of the sampled traffic.
The latter approach aims on detecting irregular correlation between consecutive IPDs of
the covert traffic as compared to the samples of the legitimate traffic of the overt channel.
It is noted that the term entropy refers to the Shannon’s measure of entropy [87] which
represents the average amount of information one requires to determine a random variable
without any ambiguity.
Let X = (X1, X2, ..., Xm) be a sequence of random variables with n possible outcomes
from the alphabet X (i.e., |X | = n). The entropy of X (i.e., H(X)) is defined as follows:
H(X) = −
∑
X1,X2,...,Xm
P (x1, x2, ...xm) log(P (x1, x2, ...xm)), (2.3)
Where, P (x1, x2, ...xm) is the joint probability mass function of the elements of X (i.e.,
P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2, ..., Xm = xm), xi ∈ X ). It is easy to verify that the entropy measure
is maximized when all possible sequences are equiprobable. A very complex process often
has a high entropy signature (e.g., a sequence of (i.i.d.) random numbers). In contrast
a rigid and highly regulated process has much lower entropy. The conditional entropy of
sequence X is also defined using Equation (2.3) as follows:
H(Xm|Xm−11 ) = H(Xm1 )−H(Xm−11 ) (2.4)
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Figure 2.4: Equiprobable bins of inter-packet delays for Q = 4.
Where, Xji = (Xi, Xi+1, ..., Xj), i ≤ j. In other words, the conditional entropyH(Xm|Xm−11 )
denotes the amount of information requires to determine sample Xm, given complete knowl-
edge on all previous elements in X (i.e., Xm−11 ).
To perform entropy based detection, the probability of occurrence of the sequence X
should be derived. To this end, the domain of the sampled traffic (e.g., inter-packet delay)
is partitioned into Q equiprobable bins, each of which is identified by a unique number
(i.e., bin ID). Each bin covers a non-overlapping range of possible values for the sampled
parameter Thus, the corresponding bin ID to the sample value di (i.e., qi) can be calculated
as qi = bF(di) × Qc, where F(di) = P (d ≤ di). Figure 2.4 depicts the binning strategy
for samples of inter-packet delays. According to the aforementioned binning strategy, one
can map a sequence of samples (i.e., X) to a sequence of bin IDs that cover the elements
of X. To derive the estimated probability of a specific sequence of samples (i.e., X), the
number of occurrences of the sequence of bin IDs that correspond to the elements of X is
divided by the total number of unique bin ID sequences of size |X| = m that are observed
according to the set of sampled traffic.
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2.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we reviewed the state of the art in covert communication. We introduced
the general idea, definition, and the early versions of covert channel designs in computer
systems. The traditional view on covert channels was to consider them as security threats.
Hence the focus was initially on the countermeasures for eliminating, limiting, and detect-
ing covert channels. We discussed different classification methods for covert channels and
studied few categories that are commonly used in the literature, including the storage and
timing covert channels. The early design approach for covert communication schemes were
based on the concept of security through obscurity. This means that the covert channel is
hidden since the communication medium that is exploited by the channel is not expected
to be used to exchange information. Thus, it is not being monitored by access control au-
thorities. However, if the channel design and the resource it uses for covert communication
is identified, opposing the covert channel will be straightforward. We also reviewed the
requirements for a proper resource that can be used as the covert communication medium,
and provided several examples of such designs in computer systems.
Network covert channels have attracted a lot of attention due to the popularity and
the scale of communication networks. In fact, network covert channels force the network
security community to revisit the idea of covert communication, however this time the
trend is to consider these channels as an alternative solution to provide security and pri-
vacy in communication systems. We presented several examples of covert channel designs
in computer networks, and discuss different challenges that exist in designing robust and
undetectable network covert communication schemes. Finally, we turned our attention to-
ward countermeasures for covert channels specifically in computer networks, and provided
a detailed description of methods that are designed to eliminate, control, and detect net-
work covert channels. In the next chapter, we present our design methodology for network
covert channels in public communication networks.
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Chapter 3
Covert Channel Design Methodology
In Chapter 2 we discussed the variety of covert channels and the diversity of methods
that can be used in order to open a covert channel in computer systems. Considering
the stealthiness property of covert channels, in this chapter we identify two main cate-
gories in designing covert channels. The first group involves covert channels that achieve
undetectability based on the concept of security through obscurity. In other words, the
covert channel is hidden because the shared resource between the covert transmitter and
the covert receiver (e.g., the status of a file on disk) is not being monitored or controlled
by access control authority of the system. The file share covert channel, or network covert
channels that use reserved bits of header fields of data packets are examples of these chan-
nels. However, once the nature of the shared resource is identified, it is a matter of simple
pattern analysis techniques to uncover the existence of the covert channel or at least control
the channel.
The second category of covert channels are designed based on the assumption that
the adversary (e.g., the system observer) is completely aware of the covert communication
scheme. In other words, the shared resource between the covert transmitter and the covert
receiver, and also the exploitation method of the resource is completely known to the
adversarial entity. The key in designing such channels relies on a shared secret between
the covert transmitter and the covert receiver. The shared secret defines how the covert
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transmitter modulates covert information over the channel, and how the receiver decodes
the covert message. However, it is shown that these channels are vulnerable to statistical
analysis detection methods, since modulating a covert message could drastically change
statistical characteristics of the covert channel traffic. For instance, the on/off strategy in
designing network timing covert channels [15] forces the pattern of inter-packet delays of
the covert traffic to deviate significantly from the normal behavior of the legitimate traffic
of the network. Such clear behavioral mismatch could be easily picked up by a system
observer in order to uncover the covert channel. Knowing the structure of the covert
channel and the shared medium also enable active adversarial entities to disrupt the covert
channel by directing noise into the channel. In other words, one can reduce the available
bandwidth of the covert channel by jamming the shared resource such that the channel
becomes practically unusable due to its limited capacity.
A majority of timing covert channels over communication networks, including the covert
channels that are discussed in this thesis, fall in the second category as the shared resource
(i.e., the communication network) is known to be easily accessible to adversarial entities.
Thus, in order to remain hidden the covert channel should be designed such that the
behavioral characteristics of the covert transmitter, and the statistical attributes of the
traffic that carries the covert message resemble the legitimate elements of the same net-
work. In brief, we have identified the following challenges in designing a covert channel in
communication networks.
1. The identity of the covert transmitter, the privacy of the covert receiver, and the
stealthiness of the channel should be protected against passive and active detection
schemes, given the assumption that the adversarial entity is completely aware of the
covert communication scheme.
2. The covert channel should be designed such that it can tolerate network noise and
adversarial disruptions, while it provides high covert communication rate.
3. The shared resource that is used for covert communication has to be selected such
that the access to the resource can not be eliminated without drastic measures to the
system performance.
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As an example, consider storage network covert channels in which the unused header
bits in data packets are used as the shared resource for covert communication. In fact,
one can disrupt the normal operation of such covert channels by simply reset the unused
portion of packet headers into a predefined value (e.g., reset all bits to zero). This action
practically reduces the achievable bandwidth of the covert channel to zero and eliminates
the channel form the system. It is noted that the aforementioned elimination process
does not have any effect on the overall network performance. In addition, as the covert
transmitter constantly changes the unused portion of the header fields, its network traffic
exhibits different characteristics as compared to a normal traffic flow in the network. Thus,
a simple pattern analysis attack could reveal the existence of the channel and compromise
the privacy of the covert transmitter.
3.1 Behavioral Mimicry Covert Communication
To address the aforementioned design requirements, in this thesis we explore different
ways of exploiting system resources according to the concept of behavioral mimicry covert
communication. In principle, the behavioral mimicry covert communication is based on
adopting one or more behavioral characteristics of normal elements in a communication
network (e.g., packet transmission pattern, inter-packet delay, payload size, CRC calcula-
tion, etc), and use them in order to modulate a covert message and create a covert channel.
It is noted that the behavioral fingerprints that are used for covert communication should
be selected such that the covert communication scheme binds to a normal communication
process of the network (e.g., access control, packet generation, acknowledgment, or error
detection processes). In this way, the covert channel can not be removed unless drastic
measures are taken in removing/controlling the related services in the network.
In addition to binding the covert channel to the critical elements of the communica-
tion process, consideration should be made of the exploitation method that is used at the
covert transmitter. In fact, modulating the covert message over behavioral characteristics
of the covert transmitter should not force the transmitter to exhibit abnormal behaviors as
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compared to a normal transmitter in the network. Any irregularity in the behavioral finger-
prints of the covert transmitter may lead to detection of the covert channel by monitoring
entities in the channel.
The challenge in using behavioral attributes of the covert transmitter for covert com-
munication lies in the unpredictable nature of communication networks (e.g., Internet).
On the one hand, the covert transmitter is bound to transmit a particular covert message
that has to be decoded with no ambiguity at the covert receiver. On the other hand,
the transmitter has to react to unpredictable network events (e.g., packet loss, collision,
or network congestion) that demand specific responses according to the communication
protocol (e.g., CSMA, TCP). It is noted that while the former constraint forces the covert
transmitter to have a regular and controlled behavior (i.e., to represent the covert message
at the covert receiver), the latter case involves reaction to random events that may happen
at any time. Thus, one can view the design of a network covert channel as the challenge of
finding the correct balance between the controlled nature of the covert message modulation
process, and the uncertainty in the forthcoming actions that are expected from the covert
transmitter as a part of the communication network.
3.2 Randomness in Communication Protocols
The behavioral characteristics of a normal node in a communication network are influenced
by the events that require direct responses from the elements of the network. For instance, a
collision in a WLAN network can happen at any time when two or more transmitters decide
to send their packets simultaneously. The reaction to this event is to expand the size of the
contention resolution window and wait for a random amount of time before retransmitting
the packet. The unpredictable nature of network events, forces the transmitter to exhibit
random and unforeseeable behavioral characteristics.
Randomness can also be found in design of communication protocols in order to achieve
fairness, stability, and scalability. This alternative source of randomness can be exploited
for covert communication, in particular to modulate the covert message over the behavioral
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characteristics of the covert transmitter. To this end, the covert transmitter combines the
covert message with the output of a random generating function (e.g., a pseudo-random
number generator) that can be traced by the covert receiver seamlessly. The result of
this combination replaces the original random source and takes its role in controlling the
behaviors of the covert transmitter according to the communication protocol. Thus, the
modulating process at the covert transmitter is transformed from a rigid and predictable
procedure into a process that contributes a considerable amount of randomness to the
behaviors of the covert transmitter. On the other end of the channel, the covert receiver
removes the effect of random function from the observed attributes of the covert transmitter
and recovers the covert message.
The first step in finding a proper shared resource for covert communication is to identify
sources of randomness in the target system. Then, the modulation process of the covert
message is combined with the communication protocol such that it inherits the randomness
that is involved in the normal behaviors of a network transmitter. Binding the covert
modulation process with inherent randomness in the communication protocol gives the
covert transmitter enough degrees of freedom to respond to network events similarly to
a normal transmitter in the network, while it maintains a covert channel with the covert
receiver through its behavioral fingerprints in the network. Furthermore, as the covert
modulation process has been integrated with the normal communication process in the
network, eliminating the covert channel would likely require major modifications in the
communication protocol (e.g., removing randomness) which in turn imposes a significant
performance degradation or complexity escalation to the communication protocol.
3.2.1 Sources of Randomness in Communication Systems
As discussed before, the first step in the behavioral mimicry covert communication design
methodology is to discover a proper source of randomness that can be exploited by the
covert modulation process at the covert transmitter. Here, we provide a few examples of
such random sources that we have identified in computer and communication systems.
Resource Sharing Algorithms: In communication networks, in particular those
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that involve a broadcast communication medium (e.g., wireless channel), the communi-
cation resources have to be distributed to all users of the channel in a fair and efficient
manner. To this end, resource sharing algorithms (e.g., carrier sense multiple access) often
rely on randomness in order to provide fair resource allocation to all users of the system.
In more detail, to prevent frequent collision among users of the network, the access control
mechanism requires each node to schedule its channel access event for a random time slot
in the future. Thus, it is less likely for two nodes to select the same time slot to access the
channel and cause a collision in the network. The advantage of such a strategy is its ease
of implementation and scalability which is of a great importance in distributed systems.
Without such randomness, the performance of the system is reduced dramatically and a
drastic increase in complexity and communication overhead could occur.
The same random behavior of resource sharing algorithms can be used to open a covert
channel between a covert transmitter and a covert receiver. In Chapter 4 a detailed de-
scription of a wireless covert channel is presented in which the exploited randomness is
inherited from carrier sense multiple access protocol (i.e., CSMA). The design also in-
cludes a set of design criteria for the covert transmitter that is capable of modulating a
covert message in its channel access pattern, yet it exhibits a similar packet transmission
pattern as compared to a normal user of the network.
Initial Sequence Number: In order to provide reliable and in order delivery of data
packets in communication networks, in some implementations of network communication
protocols (e.g., TCP) each packet carries a sequence number field that denotes the relative
position of information bits that are in the packet as compared to other packets in the
flow. In this way, the receiver can identify lost packets and request retransmission from
the transmitter. Moreover, the receiver can use sequence number information to reorder
the received packets. It is noted that data packets may be delivered out of order due to
different paths that each packet may have taken to reach the destination.
The transport communication protocol (i.e., TCP) is an example of such communica-
tion protocols that incorporate sequence number fields for reliable delivery of data packets
over communication networks. The TCP sequence number is usually initialized with a
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random number at the start of a new connection. Thus, each connection can be identified
from previous reincarnations of a similar communication channel between the transmitter
and the receiver. In this way, one can take advantage of the random behavior of the initial
sequence number (i.e., ISN) and exploit such source of randomness for covert communica-
tion over computer networks. This method has been explored by Rutkowska and Murdoch
in order to design storage network covert channels [20, 21].
Cryptographic Algorithms: Pseudo-random number generators (i.e., PRNG) are
one of the major components of cryptographic algorithms. These sources of randomness
are often used to increase the uncertainty of the attacker in guessing the correct parameter
(e.g., password) to violate the security of the cryptographic algorithm. Random numbers
are utilized in key exchange protocols (e.g., Diffie-Helman algorithm [88]) as the contri-
bution of each party in the final session key. In symmetric encryption schemes random
numbers are used both as keys and also as initial vectors in block cipher modes. The so
called salt parameter in crypto-systems is basically a random number that is combined
with user passwords before the hash of the password is saved in the database. The salt
parameter is used in many operating system (e.g., Linux) to prevent dictionary attacks on
password databases in computer systems. In general, any challenge and response protocol
that is used in cryptographic algorithms (e.g., Key exchange, authentication, zero knowl-
edge proof) relies on PRNGs for generating random numbers. Digital signature schemes
(e.g., DSA) also depend on random number generators to increase the entropy of the gen-
erated signatures and protect the private key of the signing entity. Without such random
parameters, the adversary can glean information about the private key that is used in
signing process and compromise the security of the signature scheme.
The output of cryptographic functions (e.g., encryption) can also be considered as
a source of randomness in computer systems. An encryption scheme is designed such
that its output (i.e., cipher text) does not reveal any information about the original plain
text unless the encryption key is available. One way functions (e.g., cryptographic hash)
are another frequently used functions in cryptographic algorithms. These functions are
designed such that the output of the function (e.g., hash digest) can not be associated
to any arbitrary text message with non-negligible probability. Thus, one can consider the
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result of a cryptographically secure hash functions (e.g., SHA-256) or an encryption scheme
(e.g., AES) as a random sequence of bits until more information about the cryptographic
process (e.g., original message, or encryption key) is disclosed.
As an example, consider a transmitter and a receiver that use a keyed hash function as
message authentication code (i.e., HMAC) to provide integrity and authenticity assurance
for the transmitted message. In this way, the transmitter sends the hash digest of the
original message along with the message to the receiver. The receiver verifies the message
as it possesses the key that is used in the authentication process. However, without access
to the key, the HMAC portion of the message seems as a random sequence of bits. This
communication process can be simply modified to open a covert channel between the
transmitter and the receiver. To this end, the covert transmitter appends the matching
hash digest to its packets in order to modulate the covert-bit 1, and it sends a packet with
a random HMAC to represent covert-bit 0. Since the monitoring entity has no way of
verifying the hash digests without the key, the covert channel is undetectable as long as
the hash function is secure and the shared secret is not exposed to any unauthorized party.
To thwart such covert channels, access control mechanisms may forbid the use of keyed
hash functions for message authentication, or prevent strong encryption schemes for data
communication. In other words, the monitoring authority demands to be able to verify
the authenticity of the cryptographic algorithm at all times. In the following section we
describe a covert communication scheme that exploits randomness in the digital signature
algorithm (i.e., DSA) [89]. In fact, it can be shown that while the signature scheme can
still be verified by any monitoring entity, the covert channel between the covert transmitter
and the covert receiver remains undetected.
3.2.2 Exploiting Randomness
Once the proper source of randomness is identified, it is the matter of designing an ex-
ploitation method that combines the random behavior with covert modulation process. In
this section, we provide an example of such covert channel design process according to the
method by Simmons [12], where the target system is the digital signature algorithm (i.e.,
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DSA). The digital signature algorithm is a signature scheme based on asymmetric cryp-
tography, that is used in order to verify the authenticity of a digital message. By verifying
the signature on a particular message, one can assure that the message is created by a
known sender in which he can not deny signing the message. Moreover, the receiver can
verify that the message has not been tampered with during the transmission. The digital
signature algorithm (i.e., DSA) is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem
with respect to a primitive element in a finite field. In the interest of both brevity and
completeness, we briefly describe the essential elements of the signature scheme.
1. Public elements of the signature scheme: These elements are publicly known
and are defined as follows:
Signature Scheme Public Elements
• A cryptographically secure hash function H(.) (e.g., SHA-256).
• A prime number q with length N -bits, where N is at most equal to the size of the
hash digest.
• An L-bit prime p such that q divides p− 1.
• A base generator element g > 1, such that g ≡ ρ p−1q mod p, where 1 < ρ < p− 1.
2. Key generation: Each transmitter has a unique pair of public and private keys. The
private key (i.e., x) is kept secret, while the public key (i.e., u) is advertised along with
the public elements of the signature scheme.
Key Generation
• The private key x is chosen according to a random process, where 1 < x < q.
• The public key is calculated as u ≡ gx mod p.
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To generate the signature on the message m, the transmitter performs as follows:
Signature Generation
• Calculate the hash digest of the message m (i.e., H(m)).
• Choose a random number k and calculate r ≡ (gk mod p) mod q, where 0 < k < q.
• Find s such that s ≡ k−1[H(m) + xr] mod q.
The pair (s, r) forms the signature on m. To verify the signature, one can execute the
following steps:
Signature Verification
• The verifying process receives the original message m, the signature (r, s), the public
elements of the digital signature scheme (i.e., p, q, g), and the public key of the
transmitter (i.e., u).
• Let ω ≡ s−1 mod q.
• Let v1 ≡ ωH(m) mod q.
• Let v2 ≡ rω mod q.
• Let w ≡ gv1uv2 mod q.
• The signature is valid if and only if r = w.
It is worth noting the effect of random parameter k in the security of the signature
scheme. In fact, it can be easily shown that if two distinct messages (i.e., m1,m2) are
signed with the same private key (i.e., x) and no additional randomness in the signature
scheme, one can solve a system of linear equations to get the private key from the generated
52
signatures and the hash digests of the original messages that are signed. This requirement
for additional random parameter can be used as a source of randomness to create a covert
channel in the system.
To this end, in addition to the public elements of the signature scheme and the public
key, the covert transmitter shares x with the covert receiver as well. In this way, when
the transmitter sends the signature of the message m through the overt channel (i.e., the
channel that is observable by monitoring entity), it can also modulate a covert message
(i.e., mc) that is only visible to the covert receiver. Meanwhile, any party with access to
the public elements of the signature scheme can still verify the correctness of the digital
signature on the original message (i.e., m). To modulate the covert message, the covert
transmitter modifies the signing process. It is noted that that the entropy of the covert
message is assumed to be at least equal to the entropy and the size of the random parameter
k. In case mc does not have the same entropy as the random parameter k, one can use
a random interleaver, or a symmetric encryption scheme (e.g., AES) in order to encode
the covert message into a bit-stream with higher entropy factor. The modified signature
scheme at the covert transmitter can be illustrated as follows:
Signature Generation and Covert Message Modulation
• Given the covert message mc, the overt message m, and public elements of the sig-
nature scheme.
• Let r ≡ (gmc mod p) mod q, where 0 < mc < q.
• Find s such that s ≡ m−1c [H(m) + xr] mod q.
The pair (s, r) is the signature on the overt message m and can be verified using the
same verification process as the one that is used in the original signature scheme. On the
other hand, the generated signature at the covert transmitter contains an embedded covert
message that can be decoded at the covert receiver as follows:
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Decoding Covert Message
• Given x,m, (r, s), the covert receiver recovers the covert message mc as follows:
mc =
(
[H(m) + xr]−1)−1 mod q.
By combining the covert modulation process with the inherent randomness of the orig-
inal signature scheme, the covert transmitter is capable of generating a signature that is
verifiable by any node in the network, given the verification process has access to the public
elements of the signature scheme. Meanwhile, the generated signature carries an embedded
covert message that is visible only to the covert receiver. In other words, modulating the
covert message does not change the behaviors of the signature scheme from a third party
perspective. Furthermore, due to the vital role of the exploited randomness in the security
of the signature scheme, the access control entity can not remove the random parameter
from the signature scheme in an attempt to eliminate the covert channel. The expected
covert rate of the presented covert channel is equal to log2(max(k)) = log2(q − 1) bits per
signature.
In the following chapters, we demonstrate how to exploit different sources of randomness
in communication networks in order to design robust and undetectable network covert
channels. First, let’s define the system model and the elements of the communication
network that are used in this dissertation.
3.3 System Model
3.3.1 Channel Model
A covert communication scheme consists of a covert transmitter, a covert receiver, and a
shared medium that is used for covert communication in the system. An overt channel is
defined to be an authorized communication channel in the network that may contain an
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embedded covert message. The term covert channel refers to an overt channel that has an
embedded covert message in the channel traffic. In contrast, the legitimate channel is an
overt channel that carries no covert message. The objective of the covert transmitter is to
modulate the covert message and at the same time mimic the behavioral characteristics
of a normal node in the system. In this thesis, we are focused on designing active covert
channels over communication networks. In an active covert channel the covert transmitter
is actively involved in generating the traffic of the covert channel (i.e., covert traffic), with
respect to the covert message it intends to send to the covert receiver. On the other hand,
in a passive covert channel the covert transmitter intercepts a legitimate traffic flow and
modifies the traffic in order to modulate the covert message. The covert receiver is assumed
to be aware of the identity of the covert transmitter, the covert communication scheme,
and it shares a secret with the covert transmitter. It is noted that the terms covert receiver
and receiver and also covert transmitter and transmitter are used interchangeably.
The covert rate of the covert channel denotes the rate in which covert information is
exchanged between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver. Also, the robustness
of the covert channel is primarily defined based on the error-rate of the covert receiver
in decoding the transmitted covert information. Through the rest of this dissertation the
following notations are used:
• The term [n] is used to represent the set of all positive integers smaller or equal than
n (i.e., [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}).
• A sequence of elements is illustrated with letters in bold case. Hence, v = (v1, v2, ...vn)
depicts a sequence of n numbers, where vi, i ∈ [n], is an element of the sequence v.
• Given a sequence of n elements (i.e., v), the term vji , i ≤ j ≤ n ,represents the
subset of v that contains elements from index i to j (i.e., vji = (vi, vi+1, ..., vj)).
• The term v ∼ D, expresses that the elements of v are sampled according to the
probability distribution function D.
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3.3.2 Adversary Model
The adversarial entity is a network node that can monitor the overt traffic of the network,
including the traffic from the covert transmitter and the covert receiver. The adversarial
entity is assumed to be aware of the covert communication protocol, and it has access to
samples of the legitimate traffic and the covert traffic. The primary goal of the adversary
is to detect the covert channel and distinguish the traffic of the covert transmitter from
a legitimate traffic flow in the network (i.e., passive adversarial attack). In addition, the
adversary is assumed to be capable of actively disrupting the communication channel by
introducing random noise into the covert channel (i.e., active adversarial attack). For
instance, the adversary can deliberately increase the packet delay or drop some of the
packets from the traffic flow. The objective of an active attack is to limit the effect of the
covert communication scheme by reducing the capacity of the covert channel.
However, the adversary does not have any a priori knowledge about the existence of the
covert channel in the system, or the identity of the network nodes that may be involved
in the covert communication process. Furthermore, the shared secret between the covert
transmitter and the covert receiver, and any information that may be derived from the
secret key, is assumed to be unknown to the adversarial entity in the system.
3.3.3 Undetectability
The undetectability of a covert channel is defined according to the ability of the adversarial
entity to distinguish the covert traffic from the legitimate traffic in the network. In other
words, the more the covert transmitter behaves like a legitimate node in the network,
it is less likely that the covert channel be discovered and the covert message becomes
exposed. Probabilistic statistical tests provide a set of reliable metrics in order to study
the stealthiness property of covert channels. In this way, one can compare the statistical
characteristics of the covert traffic with the same attributes of the legitimate traffic of the
network, and look for abnormalities that may be the result of embedding a covert message.
A probabilistic statistical test analyzes a set of traffic samples and determines a unique
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identifier that fits the statistical characteristics of the input sequence. Since in analyzing
covert channels often large volume of samples are used as the input to the test functions,
in this dissertation only a subset of statistical tests that have polynomial-time complexity
are considered. The following definition adequately describes the statistical tests that are
used in this thesis for the purpose of detecting covert channel.
Definition 3.1 (Probabilistic statistical test). A probabilistic statistical test is a polynomial-
time function (i.e., T (.) : R∗ → [0, 1]) that accepts an arbitrary number of input elements
and assigns a real number in the range [0, 1] to the input set.
It is worth noting that this definition easily covers the covert channel detection tests
that are mentioned in Section 2.3.3 (e.g., KL-test, regularity test). In fact, one can consider
the result of the statistical test T (.) as the probability that the detection scheme marks
the sampled traffic as a covert traffic. In addition, one can define an extreme case of
undetectability in which the covert channel can not be detected by any polynomial-time
statistical test.
Definition 3.2 (Polynomial undetectability). A covert channel is polynomially unde-
tectable with respect to the parameter κ, if for any number of sampled traffic from the
covert channel (i.e., d) and the traffic from the legitimate channel (i.e., d˜), given any
probabilistic polynomial-time statistical test T , there exists a negligible function1 ν(κ) such
that:
|T (d)− T (d˜)| ≤ ν(κ) (3.1)
As mentioned before, pseudo-random number generators (i.e., PRNG) play a major
role in communication systems. In fact, PRNGs are considered one of the main sources of
randomness in computer systems. A pseudo-random number generator is a deterministic
algorithm that accepts a sequence of truly random bits (i.e., the seed parameter) of length
κ (i.e., K ∈ {0, 1}κ), and generates a longer sequence of numbers. The function is called
deterministic since it generates a same sequence of numbers if the seed parameter (i.e., K)
1ν(κ) is called negligible if for any positive polynomial p(.), and for all sufficiently large κ, ν(κ) ≤ 1p(κ) .
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is the same. A cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator (i.e., CSPRNG)
is a PRNG in which its output can not be distinguished from a sequence of truly random
numbers by any polynomial-time statistical test. By true random sequence we mean a
sequence of independent and identically distributed numbers (i.i.d.) that are chosen ran-
domly according to a uniform distribution. In a more mathematical form, a CSPRNG can
be defined as follows:
Definition 3.3 (CSPRNG). A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm G : {0, 1}κ → Rn
is a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator, if for all positive integers
0 < κ < n, for all (secret) seed sequences K ∈ {0, 1}κ, and any probabilistic polynomial
time statistical test T (.), there exists a negligible function ν(κ) such that:
|T (v)− T (v˜)| < ν(κ) (3.2)
Where, v = G(K), and v˜ is a sequence of n elements generated according to a truly random
distribution uniformly distributed over R.
In other words, the output of a CSPRNG is indistinguishable, with respect to the
parameter κ, from a true sequence of random numbers by any polynomial-time statistical
test.
Theorem 3.1. Let F(.) : R→ [0, 1] be an invertible function (i.e., F−1(.) exist). Consider
v and v˜ to be two sets of (i.i.d.) random numbers in the range [0, 1], generated by a
CSPRNG and a truly random uniform distribution, respectively. Let d = F−1(v), and
d˜ = F−1(v˜). Then, for any probabilistic polynomial time statistical test T , there exists a
negligible function ν(κ) such that:
|T (d)− T (d˜)| = ν(κ) (3.3)
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume there exists a polynomial time statistical
test (i.e., T ) that can tell apart d and d˜ with non-negligible probability. Hence, one can
define another polynomial time statistical test T ∗ = T ◦ F−1, that can distinguish v and
v˜ accordingly. However, this contradicts with the fact that v is generated by a CSPRNG
according to Definition 3.3.
58
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we presented our design methodology for robust and undetectable covert
communication channels in communication networks. The objective of the proposed de-
sign methodology is to systematically construct a covert transmitter that is capable of
modulating a covert message over its behavioral fingerprints in the network (e.g., packet
transmission pattern), yet it exhibits the same behavioral characteristics as compared to
a normal node in the system. To this end, we identified the randomness in communica-
tion protocols and network environment as the key to find the proper resource that can
be exploited as the medium for covert communication. By combining the covert modu-
lation process with the inherent random behavior in communication protocols, the covert
transmitter gains enough degrees of freedom to release itself from the constraints that are
imposed by the existence of a fixed covert message in its behavioral fingerprints. Thus,
the covert transmitter is capable of acting like a normal transmitter of the system and the
covert traffic resembles the properties of a normal traffic flow in the network. A salient
feature of such design methodology is to provide a path for designing covert channels with
high levels of stealthiness that is a vital advantage for covert communication over tightly
monitored environments like communication networks. To elaborate more on this mat-
ter, we presented an example of a covert channel design based on the proposed design
methodology.
The chapter also includes the definitions and the notations that are used in the rest
of this thesis. A detailed description of the system model that is studied in the rest of
this dissertation is presented, including the parameters of the overt channel, the normal
traffic of the network, and the ordinary transmitters in the system. The adversary model
and the attack scenarios are also described in detail. Furthermore, a formal definition on
the notion of undetectability is illustrated that is used to evaluate the stateliness of the
proposed covert communication schemes in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4
Wireless Covert Communication
4.1 Introduction
Wireless channels offer unique and peerless properties for modern communication networks.
The wireless medium can reach beyond physical boundaries of the surrounding environ-
ment, and serve any user that is in the range of the transmitter’s radio. Such unique
characteristics enable wireless devices to play major roles in mission critical applications
(e.g., health devices), and distributed systems (e.g., sensor networks). However, the hetero-
geneous structure of wireless networks, the limitations of wireless devices, and the diversity
of wireless services make it a challenging task to provide security and privacy to wireless
users. As an example, a majority of mobile wireless devices have limited processing and
power resources. Thus, it is extremely difficult to rely merely on cryptographic primitives
to achieve confidentiality and privacy in wireless networks.
Covert channels provide an alternative solution to improve the security of wireless de-
vices by hiding the communication channel from adversarial entities. The wireless medium
is broadcast in nature which means all activities over the wireless channel can be observed
by other users in the network. The channel can be easily modified just by sending a signal
over the channel, and such modification can be detected by any receiver in the range of the
transmitted signal. Therefore, one can observe that wireless networks satisfy all conditions
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for existence of a covert channel according to the Kemmerer’s principle. Resource sharing
is also a fundamental part of most wireless communication architectures. The adaptive
nature of wireless medium necessitates the existence of rather complex and flexible chan-
nel access mechanisms in order to serve an ever changing number of users in the system.
Thus, behavioral mimicry covert communication can be applied to design undetectable
covert channels in the wireless environment.
Inspired by this observation, in this chapter a new covert communication scheme is
presented which is based on mimicking the structural behaviors of multiple access protocols
in wireless networks. In particular, the proposed covert channel targets the Carrier Sense
Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) algorithm [90], which is used in popular
wireless architectures such as Wireless LAN, Bluetooth, and Zigbee. In brief, the proposed
covert channel is based on adopting the structure of the CSMA/CA algorithm that controls
the packet transmission process of ordinary users of the system. In this way, the channel
access mechanism of the covert transmitter is modified in such a way that gives the covert
transmitter enough freedom to embed the covert message into its overt traffic. However,
the modification is done under the constraint that the packet transmission pattern of the
covert transmitter remain the same as compared to ordinary users of the network. The
key element in this design is to use the randomness that is brought into the system by the
multiple access protocol in order to provide each user with a fair share of network resources
(i.e., channel bandwidth). By adopting the structure of the communication protocol, one
can exploit the aforementioned random behavior and establish a hidden communication
channel in the system.
4.2 Preliminaries and System Model
4.2.1 Shared Medium and Multiple Access Protocols
Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance algorithm is one of the most common
multiple access protocols that is used in modern communication networks specifically in
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the wireless environment. IEEE 802.11 [91] (i.e., WLAN) is an example of wireless com-
munication standards that uses the CSMA/CA algorithm to control the access to the
wireless medium. Due to the popularity of IEEE 802.11, the proposed covert communica-
tion scheme is described according to the WLAN specifications, however our design can be
easily extended to any communication model that involves a multiple access protocol and
a shared broadcast medium similar to the wireless channel.
In CSMA/CA, the wireless channel is divided into small time periods called time slots.
In order to access the wireless channel, network users constantly check the channel and
monitor network activities (i.e., packet transmission) of other users of the wireless channel.
If the channel is busy (i.e., a user is transmitting information over the channel), other users
postpone packet transmission and randomly select a backoff time (measured in slot times)
in the interval [0, W ), where W is the size of the contention window. The backoff timer
is decreased any time that the channel is sensed idle for a specific period of time called
distributed inter-frame space (i.e., DIFS). The timer stops if the channel gets busy again
(i.e., another node uses the channel for transmission). When the backoff timer reached zero,
the user transmits its packet and the receiver acknowledges the packet, if the transmission
was successful, after a predefined period of time called short inter-frame space (i.e., SIFS).
The size of the contention window (i.e., W ) is initialized at Wmin and it is doubled after
each unsuccessful transmission attempt. The expansion process continues until the size of
the contention window reaches Wmax. Then, the window remains unchanged until the
transmission is successful or the number of retransmission attempts reaches a predefined
number. In either case, the size of the contention window is reset to Wmin for the next
packet transmission round. This mechanism is called exponential binary backoff algorithm
which is used in IEEE 802.11 communication protocol. Figure 4.1 depicts the structure
of CSMA/CA and the binary back off mechanism according to the specifications in IEEE
802.11 standard.
An important feature of the CSMA/CA algorithm is the randomness that is involved
in the binary backoff algorithm. Suppose all the nodes that share the wireless channel
select a predetermined time slot. Since all of them monitor the same channel, their backoff
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Figure 4.1: The CSMA/CA and the binary backoff algorithm. In each stage Wi is the
size of the contention window, where Wi = 2
iWmin and p is the probability of unsuccessful
transmission attempt [2].
timers would reach zero simultaneously and a collision is inevitable. However, with random
selection of the backoff time, it is possible that only one node attempts to access the channel
in each particular time slot. Hence, the probability of a successful packet transmission
is improved significantly. In what follows we demonstrate how to exploit such random
characteristic of the channel access mechanism in order to create an undetectable wireless
covert channel.
4.2.2 System Model
The proposed wireless covert channel is designed based on the IEEE 802.11 (i.e., WLAN)
environment, where a group of nodes (including the covert transmitter and the covert
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receiver) share a wireless channel using the CSMA/CA and the binary backoff algorithms.
The network parameters (e.g., SIFS, DIFS, slot size, ...) are assumed to be known at
the covert transmitter and the covert receiver. All users in the network are assumed
to be backlogged, and always ready to send packets through the channel (i.e., saturated
network). This assumption makes the communication model tractable in order to facilitate
the analytic study of the covert communication scheme. However, due to the adaptive
nature of the proposed scheme, relaxing this assumption does not affect the ability of the
covert transmitter and the covert receiver to establish a covert channel in the system. It
is also assumed that each packet contains the identity of its transmitter (e.g., the source
address field in the IEEE 802.11 frame).
4.3 Fixed Rate Covert Channel (FRCC)
The FRCC scheme is basically a timing covert channel in which covert information is
modulated over packet transmission pattern of the covert transmitter. It is noted that the
normal operation of the CSMA/CA algorithm depends on the binary backoff algorithm
according to the discussion in Section 4.2.1. The key element in this process is the backoff
timer that defines the wait times for each node before it tries to access the channel. By
adopting this timing process, it is possible to design a timing covert channel that allows
the covert transmitter and the covert receiver to communicate without being detected.
4.3.1 Covert Clock
Synchronization is one of the main building blocks of a timing covert channel according to
the Kemmerer’s principle [14]. In timing covert channels, synchronization can be achieved
using a reference clock that is accessible to the covert transmitter and the covert receiver.
It is noted that in addition to the normal system clock, any sequence of events can establish
a reference clock [22]. In this way, each event is considered as one clock tick that increments
the clock by one unit.
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The covert clock is the reference clock of the FRCC scheme that uses the activities
(i.e., packet transmission) of a subset of nodes in the network (i.e., the covert set) as the
clock ticks. Hence, every time a member of the covert set transmits a packet, the covert
clock is advanced by one unit. It is noted that due to the broadcast nature of the wireless
environment, all users that share the same channel can overhear the transmitted packets.
Therefore, as long as the covert transmitter and the covert receiver track the same covert
set, their covert clock would remain synchronized.
The covert set can be preset in the covert transmitter and the covert receiver, or it may
be generated during the channel operation. For instance, the covert set can be defined as
the set of users that their identity (e.g., MAC address) satisfies a specific condition. As
another example, a user can be included in the covert set based on its location, or signal
strength. It is worth noting that the covert communication scheme should be equipped
with proper error control mechanisms in order to deal with possible mismatches in the
covert clocks of the covert transmitter and the covert receiver (e.g., in case of packet loss
on one end of the covert channel). The analysis of the effect of such error events on the
performance of the covert channel will be covered in Section 4.5.
4.3.2 FRCC Channel Design
Let S be the subset of network users in which their packet transmissions are considered as
clock ticks for the covert clock (i.e., covert set). Let Ct, and Cr represent the covert clocks
at the covert transmitter and the covert receiver, respectively. The covert transmitter of
the FRCC scheme uses a channel access mechanism that is very similar to the traditional
CSMA/CA and binary backoff algorithms. However, the clock that controls the binary
backoff algorithm at the covert transmitter is replaced by the covert clock (i.e., Ct). In other
words, the covert transmitter measures its waiting time before each packet transmission
attempt according to the value of its covert clock instead of the actual reference clock of the
system. The selection of the backoff time at each stage is also modified to be controlled
by the covert message. The combination of these two modifications enables the covert
transmitter to modulate covert information over its packet transmission pattern.
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Figure 4.2 depicts the structure of the covert transmitter contention resolution mecha-
nism that is modified in order to facilitate the FRCC scheme. It also illustrates how the
transmitter embeds the covert message into its transmission window that is controlled by
the covert clock. It is worth noting the similarity between the structure of the contention
resolution algorithm at the covert transmitter (i.e., Figure 4.2) and the traditional binary
backoff algorithm that is shown in Figure 4.1. In more detail, both methods incorporate
a number of stages where each stage consists of a sequence of serially connected states.
The transmitter selects one state in the first stage (randomly or according to the covert
message) and follows the algorithm flow until the packet is successfully transmitted. The
only difference between these two contention resolution algorithms lays in the event that
triggers the move from one state to the next one. In other words, while in the CSMA/CA
algorithm the state transitions are controlled by observing the channel to be idle for a
known period of time (i.e., DIFS), the state of the algorithm in the covert transmitter is
changed when a packet transmission by members of the covert set is detected.
Covert Message Modulation
Each covert communication block starts with a successful packet transmission by the covert
transmitter. The covert transmitter then loads the next covert message and resets its covert
clock (i.e., Ct = 0). Let ω be the covert message from the alphabet set Ω. Each covert
message is associated with a unique state in the first stage of the transmitter’s transmission
window . Hence, the size of the alphabet set is equal to the initial size of the transmitter’s
transmission window (i.e., |Ω| = T0). For simplicity and without loss of generality, let’s
assume Ω = {0, 1, ..., T0 − 1}. Thus, the message ω ∈ Ω corresponds to the state m0ω in
Figure 4.2. It is noted that for any alphabet set Γ of size T0, one can find a one-to-one
mapping that transforms Γ to Ω.
Given the covert message ω, the covert transmitter moves to the state m0ω and begins
to monitor the communication channel to catch successful packet transmission by members
of the covert set (PS is the probability of a successful transmission by members of S). For
each packet, the transmitter’s covert clock is incremented by one unit and the contention
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Figure 4.2: Covert message transmission. PS is the probability of a successful transmission
by members of the covert set.
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resolution algorithm moves towards the last state of the current stage of the transmission
window (i.e., one state to the left in Figure 4.2). It is noted that the covert transmitter
can recognize multiple transmissions of a single packet using the packet’s sequence number
field. When the transmitter reaches the last state (i.e., m00), the covert transmitter sends
its next packet in order to mark the value of its covert clock which represents the covert
message.
For instance, suppose T0 = 4, and the transmitter intends to transmit the binary
sequence B = {01110011} over the covert channel. The transmitter generates the alphabet
set Γ = {00, 01, 10, 11} and splits B into smaller items of size two, where each item is a
member of Γ. It is noted that |Γ| = T0, and the binary to decimal conversion is a mapping
that transforms any elements in Γ to a unique element in Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Hence, the covert
message is mapped to the corresponding states in the contention resolution algorithm as
follows:
B = {01110011} Covert information ready to be send at the covert transmitter.
⇒ {01, 11, 00, 11} Splitting into elements of size dlog2(T0)e = 2.
⇒ {1, 3, 0, 3} Mapping into the corresponding elements in Ω.
⇒ {m01,m03,m00,m03} Mapping into the corresponding states at stage i = 0.
In fact, one can recognize the similarity of the above example to the concept of mod-
ulation in digital communication [92]. In this way, the covert transmitter selects state m01
for the first packet transmission. Similarly, the next packet transmission will begin by
selecting state m03 that correspond to the next covert message in B.
At the other end of the channel, the covert receiver monitors the channel for successful
packet transmission attempts of members of the covert set. Thus, the covert receiver
maintains its covert clock similar to the the covert transmitter. In this way, when the
covert receiver detects a packet from the covert transmitter, it reads the value of its covert
clock (i.e., Cr) and decodes the corresponding covert message. The receiver then resets its
clock and monitors the channel in order to receive the next covert message. It is worth
noting that this scheme does not affect the usual packet transmission of the covert receiver
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or any other node in the system. The covert transmitter also is able to maintain its overt
communication with an exception that its contention resolution algorithm is controlled by
the covert clock instead of a regular binary backoff algorithm.
Packet Loss and Collision Handling
If the covert transmitter fails to transmit its packet on the proper time slot (e.g., due
to collision with other nodes), the covert transmitter expands its contention window and
selects another transmission slot to send the packet. The reason for the covert transmitter
to expand its contention window is two fold. First of all, it is essential for the covert
channel to achieve maximum stealthiness. To this end, the covert transmitter should not
behave differently as compared to other nodes in the system. In the CSMA/CA algorithm,
each node expands its contention window and waits for a random amount of time before
retransmitting its packets. The covert transmitter should not be exempted from this rule,
otherwise it would be easy to detect the covert channel. Thus, the size of the covert
transmitter’s contention window in the ith transmission stage is calculated as follows:
Ti =

T0 0 ≤ i ≤ α
2Ti−1 α < i ≤M
TM i > M
(4.1)
Where, M is the index of the last stage in which the transmitter expands its contention
window. The parameter α is a design parameter of the proposed scheme and will be
discussed in Section 4.3.3. Algorithm (1) shows how the covert clock is used in order to
transmit a covert message. Here, the wait() function exhausts certain number of clock ticks
(i.e., packet transmission by members of the covert set) before it returns the control to the
main process. The function transmit pkt() transmits the packet through the channel and
returns true if the actual receiver of the packet acknowledges the reception of the packet
(i.e., successful transmission).
In addition to stealthiness, expanding the covert transmitter’s contention window plays
a major role in synchronizing end peers of the covert channel. In fact, as the covert message
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Algorithm 1 FRCC transmission sequence.
/* i is the covert transmitter’s current stage index.
function Success = sendpkt(Ti,message)
wait(message);
Success = transmit pkt();
if Success then
return true
else
wait(Ti −message);
return false
end if
is embedded in the value of the covert clock, both nodes require accurate knowledge on
the current state of the covert clock if they are to communicate effectively. To this end,
following each unsuccessful packet transmission attempt, the covert transmitter waits for
exactly Ti − ω clock ticks before expanding its contention window and moving to the next
stage. Hence, the covert clock is equal to
∑i
j=0 Tj at the beginning of the (i + 1)
th stage
regardless of the value of the covert message. This offset is removed from the value of the
receiver’s covert clock (i.e., Cr) in order to decode the covert message as follows:
ωˆ ≡ Cr (mod T0). (4.2)
Where, ωˆ is the decoded covert message at the covert receiver. It is worth nothing that
exhausting T0 − ω clock ticks (instead of Ti − ω) at the end of each stage also satisfies
the synchronization criterion, however it deviates the covert transmitter’s behavior from
normal characteristics of an ordinary user in the system. Hence, it is not an option for a
stealthy channel design.
As the size of the transmitter’s contention window increases, there are more states in
each stage that correspond to a particular message. For instance, if Ti = kT0, there exist k
states in the stage i that corresponds to the message ω (i.e., miω, m
i
T0+ω
,..., mi(k−1)T0+ω). In
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Algorithm 2 Covert transmitter function of FRCC.
/* T0 is the initial size of covert transmitter’s contention window*/
/* PRNG(n) generates a random bit stream of length n.
i = 0; ωs = ω; T−1 = T0;
repeat
if α < i < M then
bi = PRNG(i− α);
Ti = 2
i−α.T0;
ωs = (bi||ω);
else
Ti = Ti−1;
end if
Success = sendpkt(Ti, ωs);
i = i+ 1;
until Success
the FRCC scheme, the transmitter randomly picks one of the aforementioned states and
moves to the next stage. Therefore, despite the increase in the number of possible states
in the forthcoming stages, the size of the message set (i.e., Ω) remains constant. In Section
4.4 it is shown that with an adaptive modulation algorithm, one can take advantage of
the extra capacity due to expansion of the covert transmitter’s contention window, and
increase the covert rate of the channel even further. Algorithm (2) depicts the transmitter’s
function of FRCC. In each stage, bi depicts a random bit stream of size i−α which is used to
selects one of the possible states for the covert message ω in the ith stage of the contention
resolution algorithm.
4.3.3 Design Parameters
In this section, different parameters of the proposed covert communication scheme are
derived. The idea is to optimize system parameters to achieve maximum stealthiness (i.e.,
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similar characteristics as compared to other nodes in the system), and improve the covert
rate of the channel. According to Figure 4.2, it can be observed that the covert transmitter’s
contention resolution algorithm mimics the same principles as the CSMA/CA algorithm.
In fact, in both schemes the transmitter has to wait for a specific amount of time before
each packet transmission/retransmission attempt. Hence, to harmonize the behavioral
fingerprints of these two transmitters (i.e., the covert transmitter and normal CSMA/CA
users), it is important to derive the parameters of a regular CSMA/CA transmitter and
then adapt the covert transmitter to resemble the same characteristics.
Figure 4.1 depicts the two-dimensional Markov chain model for the binary backoff
algorithm which is widely used for performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 MAC archi-
tecture [2]. Each state of this Markov process is represented by an ordered pair (s(t), b(t)),
where b(t) denotes the state of the backoff timer and s(t) represents the current backoff
stage of a given station at time t. It is noted that in this model, t and t + 1 correspond
to two consecutive time slots that may contain a packet transmission or an idle time slot.
A transition from one stage to another one happens upon a successful packet transmission
(i.e., transition from stage s(t) = i to stage s(t + 1) = 0), or after a failed packet trans-
mission attempt (i.e., from stage s(t) = i to s(t+ 1) = i+ 1). The model also depicts how
the back off timer is decremented each time the channel is sensed idle for a DIFS period
of time (i.e., transition from state b(t) = j to b(t+ 1) = j − 1).
Let pc denote the collision probability in a given time slot. In other words, pc is the
probability that at least one of the remaining nodes in the system simultaneously transmits
a packet with the transmitter. Thus,
pc = 1− (1− q)N−1 (4.3)
Where, N is the number of users in the network, and q is the steady state probability
of a packet transmission attempt at a particular time slot. In practice, the transmitter can
learn about the result of its transmission attempt only if it receives the acknowledgment
message from the actual recipient of the packet. The receiver however, sends the Ack
message only if it receives the packet correctly. Hence, if the packet or the Ack message
73
are lost due to the wireless channel noise, the transmitter considers the transmission as a
failed attempt and prepares for retransmission. Let pdatae and p
ack
e denote the frame error
probability of the data packet and the acknowledgment message, respectively. It is also
assumed that each packet in the channel is subject to an independent error event. Thus,
the probability of failure in transmitting a packet due to the wireless channel noise can be
written as follows:
pe = p
data
e + p
ack
e − pdatae .packe (4.4)
Combining Equations (4.3), and (4.4) one can write the transmission failure probability
at a given time slot (i.e., p) as follows:
p = 1− (1− pe)(1− q)N−1 (4.5)
Define bi,j = lim
t→∞
P (s(t) = i, b(t) = j), where s(t) and b(t) represent the stage and the
state of the Markov chain at time t, respectively. Since a transmission happens only at
state 0 of each stage, one can write the probability of transmitting a packet at a given time
slot as follows:
q =
M∑
i=0
bi,0 (4.6)
Where, M is the maximum number of stages that the binary backoff algorithm is allowed
to expand its contention window. It is noted that the transition from state (i− 1, 0) to the
next retransmission state (i.e., (i, 0)) happens only if the former attempt fails. Hence,
bi,0 = p.bi−1,0 0 < i < M (4.7)
Therefore,
bi,0 = p
i.b0,0 0 < i < M (4.8)
However, there is another possible branch that can lead to state (M, 0) in the last stage
of the contention resolution algorithm. In other words, if the transmission attempt in state
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(M, 0) fails, the algorithm remains in stage M as it is not allowed to expand its contention
window any further. Thus,
bM,0 = p.bM−1,0 + p.bM,0
=
p.bM−1,0
1− p =
pM
1− pb0,0 (4.9)
In order to calculate the probability of being in other states of the Markov chain (i.e.,
bi,j, j ∈ [1,Wi− 1]), one can observe that b0,0 = (1− p)
∑M
i=0 bi,0. In other words, a packet
should be successfully transmitted before the algorithm can return to stage 0 and start the
transmission sequence for the next packet. Based on this observation, the probability of
finding the Markov chain in state bi,j for j ∈ [1, wi − 1], and i ∈ [0,M ] can be written as
follows:
bi,j =
Wi − k
Wi
×

(1− p)∑Mi=0 bi,0 i = 0
p.bi−1,0 0 < i < M
p.(bm−1,0 + bm,0) i = M
(4.10)
Thus, given Equations (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10) we have:
1 =
M∑
i=0
Wi−1∑
j=0
bi,j
=
M∑
i=0
bi,0
Wi−1∑
j=0
Wi − k
Wi
=
M∑
i=0
bi,0
Wi + 1
2
=
M∑
i=0
bi,0
2iWmin + 1
2
= b0,0
Wmin + 1
2
M−1∑
i=1
(
pi.b0,0
2iWmin + 1
2
)
+
(pm.b0,0
1− p
(2mWmin + 1
2
)
=
b0,0
2
[
Wmin ×
(M−1∑
i=0
(2pi) +
(2p)M
1− p
)
+
1
1− p
]
(4.11)
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Hence, b0,0 can be derived as follows:
b0,0 =
2(1− 2p)(1− p)
(1− 2p)(Wmin + 1) + pWmin(1− (2p)M) . (4.12)
Combining Equations (4.12), (4.8), (4.9), and replacing them into Equation (4.6) re-
sults in a close form expression for the packet transmission probability of the ordinary
transmitters of the network. Hence,
q =
M∑
i=0
bi,0 =
b0,0
1− p =
2
1 +Wmin + pWmin
∑M−1
j=0 (2p)
j
(4.13)
Equations (4.5) and (4.13) form a system of non linear equations with a unique solution
given the system parameters N ,Wmin and M . This system of equations can be solved
numerically in order to evaluate p and q.
Remark 4.1. The derivation of Equation (4.13) is according to the work by Bianchi [2]
in which the transmitter is assumed to persist on retransmitting each packet until the
receiver successfully acknowledges the packet. In many practical scenarios if the channel
is not under extreme conditions and the network is not overloaded, the transmitter will
eventually manage to transmit its packet after few retransmission attempts. However, in
order to prevent a remote possibility of spending unreasonably long periods of time on
transmitting a single packet, the retransmission process is set to be terminated after a
predefined number of attempts and the packet is ignored. This modification changes the
transmission probability of a node in the system (i.e., q) as it is discussed in [93]. However,
for the sake of simplicity, we adopt the unlimited transmission model of Bianchi (i.e.,
Figure 4.1) in our design process. It is worth noting that the other model that limits the
number of retransmission attempts at the transmitter can be simply adopted for covert
communication through similar procedure as the one that is descried in this chapter.
Transmission Rate Design Criterion
One of the most prominent properties of a transmitter is its transmission rate. Hence, if
the covert transmitter has a different transmission rate as compared to a regular user in
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the system, it can be easily detected by a system observer. Thus, as a design criterion
for the FRCC scheme, the transmission probability of the covert transmitter (i.e., σ) is
restricted to be the same as the packet transmission probability of regular users of the
system. Therefore, one can restrict the transmission probability of the covert transmitter
as σ ≡ q. In this way, Equations (4.5), and (4.13) can be used in derivation of the
parameters of the covert transmitter as the existence of the covert transmitter does not
upset the balance between the transmission failure probability (i.e., p) and the packet
transmission probability of a node in the network (i.e., q).
Transmission Window Design Criterion
Let d0r be the average number of time slots that each regular user has to wait before its
first packet transmission attempt. Thus, given the initial size of the contention window
(i.e., Wmin) and the fact that the backoff timer is selected randomly, one can derive d
0
r as
follows:
d0r =
Wmin − 1
2
. (4.14)
On the other hand, in order to send the covert message ω ∈ {0, 1, ..., T0−1}, the covert
transmitter waits until it observes ω packet transmissions from members of the covert set
before it sends a packet over the channel. In fact, this is the mechanisms that the covert
transmitter uses to mark the value of the covert clock, and communicate with the covert
receiver. Let pi be the probability of a successful packet transmission by a legitimate node
of the system. Thus,
pi = q(1− p)
= q(1− q)N−1(1− pe) (4.15)
Therefore, the probability of observing a successful packet transmission from members
of the covert set can be derived as follows:
PS = |S| × pi. (4.16)
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It is worth noting that in addition to Equation (4.16), the covert transmitter can
progressively improve its estimation of PS during the course of transmission. In more
detail, by observing more packet transmission activities over the channel, specially from
members of the covert set, the covert transmitter can update its estimation of PS, and
adapt its packet transmission policies accordingly.
In order to emulate an ordinary user of the network, the covert transmitter has to spend,
on average, the same number of time slots before its first transmission attempt as compared
to any regular user of the system. This observation forms the second design criterion for
the FRCC scheme. It also dictates the value of the initial transmission window of the
covert transmitter (i.e., T0). Let d
0
c denote the average number of slots that the covert
transmitter has to wait before its first transmission attempt of a packet. In this way, one
can derive d0c as the average number of time slots until the covert transmitter observes
exactly ω packets from members of the covert set, where ω ∈ {0, 1, ..., T0}. Thus,
d0c =
1
T0
T0−1∑
ω=0
∞∑
n=ω
n.
(
n− 1
ω − 1
)
P ω−1S .(1− PS)n−ω.PS
(1)
=
1
T0
T0−1∑
ω=0
∞∑
x=0
(x+ ω).
(
x+ ω − 1
ω − 1
)
P ωS .(1− PS)x
=
1
T0
T0−1∑
ω=0
[ ∞∑
x=0
x.
(
x+ ω − 1
ω − 1
)
P ωS .(1− PS)x
+ ω.
∞∑
x=0
(
x+ ω − 1
ω − 1
)
P ωS .(1− PS)x
]
(2)
=
1
T0
T0−1∑
ω=0
[ ∞∑
x=0
x.
(
x+ ω − 1
ω − 1
)
P ωS .(1− PS)x + ω
]
(3)
=
1
T0
T0−1∑
ω=0
[ω(1− PS)
PS
+ ω
]
=
T0 − 1
2PS
. (4.17)
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The equality in (1) is according to the change of variables as x = n − ω. Meanwhile,
(2) and (3) are based on the definition of the negative binomial distribution function
[84]. Combining Equations (4.14) and (4.17), one can state the second design criterion for
the FRCC scheme by setting the two parameters d0c and d
0
r to be equal (i.e., d
0
c ≡ d0r).
Consequently, the initial size of the transmission window of the covert transmitter (i.e.,
T0) is derived as follows:
T0 = PS(Wmin − 1) + 1. (4.18)
Expansion Postpone Design Criterion
Following each packet transmission attempt, a normal CSMA/CA user expects the receiver
to acknowledge the correct delivery of the transmitted packet. If the packet is acknowledged
by the receiver, the transmitter resets it binary backoff algorithm, and prepares for the next
packet to be transmitted. However, there are cases in which two nodes access the channel
simultaneously (i.e., network collision), or the packet is lost due to the error-prone nature
of the wireless channel. To handle such scenarios, the CSMA/CA algorithm is designed to
enter a retransmission phase in which the transmitter expands its contention window and
waits for another random period of time before it retransmits the packet.
The channel access mechanism of the FRCC scheme (i.e., Figure 4.2) is designed to
mimic the same behavior as a normal transmitter in the network. Thus, after an unsuc-
cessful transmission attempt, the covert receiver has to enter the retransmission phase, and
retry delivery of its packet to the receiver. On the other hand, the covert transmitter is
obliged to keep its synchronization with the covert receiver if the two nodes are about to
maintain their covert channel. To this end, following each unsuccessful packet transmission
attempt and before moving to the next stage of the algorithm, the covert transmitter resets
the covert clock to
∑i−1
j=0 Tj by waiting another Ti−1−ω clock ticks. Where, i is the number
of unsuccessful transmission attempts for the current packet. This re-synchronization task
accounts for additional delay for the covert transmitter as compared to regular users in
the system. Thus, if the covert transmitter doubles the size of its contention window after
each unsuccessful transmission (similar to what happens in a normal CSMA/CA user), the
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average number of time slots that the covert transmitter waits between consecutive packet
transmissions may deviate from the same parameter of ordinary users. Different wait times
translates into different packet transmission behaviors which can be detected by a system
observer, and reveal the existence of the covert channel.
To handle the mismatch in wait times, the covert transmitter is designed to postpone
expanding its transmission window by α stages. For this purpose, the expansion postpone
parameter (i.e., α) of the covert transmitter is selected such that the average number of
slots between the last successful packet transmission, and the αth re-transmission attempt to
send a new packet converges for both ordinary users and the covert transmitter. The post-
pone strategy enables the covert transmitter to control the delay between retransmission
attempts, and compensate for the additional delay due to the synchronization process.
To find the proper value for the expansion postpone parameter (i.e., α), one has to
calculate the average number of slots that each user in the network (i.e., the covert trans-
mitter, and the normal user) has to wait before it completes its αth retransmission attempt.
For the covert transmitter, since it does not expand its transmission window up to the stage
α, the average number of slots between the last successful packet transmission, and the ith
re-transmission attempt for a new packet (i ≤ α) can be written as the average number
of slots to observe iT0 + ω packets from members of the covert set. Thus, similar to the
calculation of Equation (4.17) we have,
dic =
1
T0
(i+1)T0−1∑
t=iT0
∞∑
n=t
n.
(
n− 1
t− 1
)
P t−1S .(1− PS)n−t.PS
=
(2i+ 1)T0 − 1
2PS
. (4.19)
A regular user of the network, on average, spends
Wj−1
2
time slots in the stage j before
retransmitting the packet. It also spends one slot trying to transmit the packet at the
end of each stage. Hence, the average number of slots between the last successful packet
transmission and the ith retransmission attempt for the next new packet (i.e., dir) can be
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written as follows:
dir =
i∑
j=0
Wj − 1
2
+ i
=
Wmin(2
i+1 − 1) + i− 1
2
. (4.20)
Combining the expressions for dir and d
i
c, the postpone expansion design criterion of
the FRCC scheme can be applied by finding the index of the last stage in which the covert
transmitter spends more time slots, on average, trying to transmit a packet as compared
to a regular user. Based on this observation, one can derive the value of the postpone
parameter (i.e., α) as follows,
α = max
i>0
{i| dir ≤ dic}
= max
i>0
{i|(Wmin(2i+1 − 1) + i− 1
2
≤ (2i+ 1)T0 − 1
2PS
)}
= max
i>0
{i|(Wmin(2i+1 − 1) + i− 1
2
≤ (2i+ 1)(PS(Wmin − 1) + 1)− 1
2PS
)}
= max
i>0
{i|(2i − (i+ 1)
i
≤ 2− 3PS
2PSWmin
)} (4.21)
4.4 Adaptive Rate Covert Channel (ARCC)
In order to achieve stealthiness, the covert transmitter is able to to expand the size of
its contention window after unsuccessful transmission attempts. In principle, by doubling
the size of the contention window, the covert transmitter may add an additional covert
information bit to the original covert message (i.e., ω) and increase the covert rate. This
rate increase is due to the availability of more states that corresponds to a particular covert
message after each expansion in the transmission contention window. The Adaptive Rate
Covert Communication scheme (i.e., ARCC) is designed to exploit the aforementioned extra
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capacity in order to increase the covert communication rate between the covert receiver
and the covert transmitter.
The transmission functionality in the ARCC scheme is similar to the one that is de-
scribed for the FRCC scheme. The only exception is on how these two schemes handle
failed packet transmission attempts. In other words, while the covert transmitter of the
FRCC always works with a fixed covert message (i.e., ω ∈ Ω, and |Ω| = T0), the covert
message in the ARCC scheme expands depending on the number of states that are avail-
able in each stage (i.e., ωi ∈ Ω, and |Ωi| = Ti, i = 0, 1, ...,M). By expanding the size of
the covert message, the covert transmitter can modulate more covert information in each
retransmission attempt. Thus, the channel covert rate is improved.
In brief, upon failure in transmitting a packet, if the contention window of the covert
transmitter is supposed to be expanded for the next stage (i.e., i ≥ α, and Ti = 2Ti−1), the
covert transmitter fetches the next covert-bit and appends it as the most-significant bit to
the current covert message. Hence,
ωi = (bi||ωi−1), i ∈ {α, α + 1, ...,M} (4.22)
Where, ωi−1 is the covert message from the previous stage, and bi is the additional covert-
bit that will be transmitted using ARCC. This is analogous to the fact that the number
of states that are available after each expansion of the contention window are doubled as
compared to the number of states in the previous stage (i.e., Figure 4.2). This process is
repeated after each failed transmission attempt until the packet is transmitted successfully,
or the contention resolution algorithm reaches the stage in which the number of states are
no longer expanded (i.e., M). Algorithm 3 depicts the transmission procedure of the ARCC
scheme. The function getbit() returns the next covert-bit which is being concatenated to
the original covert message.
In order to decode the covert message in the ARCC scheme, the covert receiver has to
account not only for the value of the covert clock, but also it has to keep track of how many
covert information bits are added into the original message. This makes the decoding at
the covert receiver a much more complex task as compared to the simple decoding method
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Algorithm 3 Covert transmitter function of ARCC.
/* ω is the original covert message.
/* getbit() returns extra information bits to be concatenated to the original message.
i = 0; T−1 = T0;
ωj = ω, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., α};
repeat
if α < i < M then
bi = getbit(i);
Ti = 2
i−α.T0;
ωi = (bi||ωi−1);
else
Ti = Ti−1;
end if
Success = sendpkt(Ti, ωi);
i = i+ 1;
until Success
of the FRCC scheme. To this end, the covert receiver first decodes the original message
similar to the decoding process at the FRCC scheme (i.e., Equation (4.2) ). Then, it
checks the existence of extra information bits by removing the effect of first α stages from
its covert clock. It is noted that the transmitter’s contention window is not expanded for
the first α stages. Hence, there would be no rate increase on those stages. If the value of
the covert clock (i.e., Cr) is still positive, it means that the transmitter had more than α
unsuccessful re-transmission attempts, and it had to expand its contention window. The
receiver counts the number of expansions by removing multiples of Ti from the value of
the covert clock and progressively decodes the extra covert bits. Algorithm (4) depicts the
ARCC decoding process.
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Algorithm 4 ARCC decoding at the receiver.
function message = decode(Cr)
/* First decode the original message ωo
ωo ≡ Cr (mod T0);
Cr = Cr − ωo;
/* Decode the additional message ωa
if Cr < αT0 then
return ωo
else
Cr = Cr − αT0;
for i = 1 to M − α do
if Cr < 2
iTi then
ωa =
Cr
T0
;
return (ωa||ωo)
else
Cr = Cr − 2iTi;
end if
end for
Cr ≡ Cr (mod 2MT0);
ωa =
Cr
T0
;
return (ωa||ωo)
end if
4.5 Performance Analysis
In this section the performance of the proposed covert communication schemes is analyzed.
First the undetectability of the proposed covert channel is discussed followed by a thorough
analysis of the robustness of the proposed wireless covert communication scheme under
various network conditions and error events. Finally, the achievable covert rate of both
proposed covert communication schemes (i.e., FRCC and ARCC) are studied. Table 4.1
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Table 4.1: Wireless network parameters.
Parameter Selected value
Slot time 20 µs
SIFS 10 µs
DIFS 50 µs
Transmission rate 1 Mbps
Payload size 1500 Bytes
depicts wireless network parameters that is used in this section. The designated values for
system parameters (e.g., DIFS, SIFS) are selected according to the specifications by IEEE
802.11 standard committee [91]. The capacity of the overt channel is selected to be fixed at
1Mbps during the reliability and undetectability analysis of the covert channel. It is noted
that choosing any other channel rate would not change the result of our analysis on the
robustness and stealthiness properties of the proposed covert communication scheme. On
the other hand, as the capacity of the wireless channel plays a decisive role in defining the
achievable covert rate of the covert channel, the covert rate analysis is performed under a
series of different rates for the wireless channel.
The performance analysis is conducted on four distinct scenarios each of which have
different network parameters such as number of users, and the size of the covert set.
For each scenario, the parameters of normal network transmitters (i.e., Wmin, Wmax, M)
are selected according to the recommendations by the IEEE standard committee [91].
Meanwhile, the parameters of the covert transmitter (i.e., T0, α) are derived according to
the proposed design criteria for the covert communication scheme (i.e., Section 4.3.3). The
simulation model consists of implementations of a covert transmitter and a covert receiver
that use the proposed covert communication scheme in order to open a covert channel in
the model. Table 4.2 illustrates the corresponding design parameters of the covert channel
in each scenario.
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Table 4.2: Design parameters for different simulation scenarios.
Parameter SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4
Number of users (N) 25 35 50 15
Size of the covert set (|S|) 16 21 33 10
Covert transmitter minimum window size (T0) 4 7 8 4
Expansion postpone parameter (α) 1 1 1 1
Regular user minimum window size (Wmin) 16 32 32 16
Regular user maximum window size (Wmax) 1024 1024 1024 1024
Number of back-off stages (M) 6 5 5 6
4.5.1 Stealthiness of the Covert Channel
Network covert channels are usually designed in order to hide the fact that information
is exchanged in the system. Thus, it is important to design a covert channel such that it
is extremely difficult for a network observer, even with complete knowledge of the covert
communication scheme, to detect the covert channel. In this section we study the stealthi-
ness property of different elements of the proposed covert communication scheme including
the covert transmitter and the covert receiver.
Covert Receiver
As the covert receiver is a completely passive entity in the proposed covert communication
scheme, it is undetectable even if the covert channel is detected. Moreover, since the covert
transmitter does not need to know the identity of the covert receiver, the covert receiver is
safe even if the covert transmitter is compromised or its information is exposed to a system
observer.
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Covert Transmitter and the Covert Channel
The proposed covert communication scheme is designed based on the concept of behavioral
mimicry. In other words, the covert transmitter is designed to mimic the same transmission
characteristics as a normal user of the system even though it is committed to maintain
the covert communication with the covert receiver. According to the design description
of the proposed covert communication scheme, it can be observed that the structure of
the contention resolution algorithm of the covert transmitter is specifically designed to
approximate the transmission pattern of a regular transmitter of the network. In this way,
the covert transmitter is capable of blending itself into the group of ordinary nodes that
share the wireless channel and remain undetected.
On the other hand, system observers are equipped with a set of tools that are specif-
ically designed to detect covert channels. Thus, in order to evaluate the undetectability
of the proposed covert communication scheme the covert channel is tested against two of
the most well-known statistical tests that are used to detect covert channels in communi-
cation network. In what follows, the effectiveness of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the
regularity test in detecting the proposed covert channel is investigated.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Analysis
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (i.e., KS-test) is designed as a measure to show the difference
in the cumulative distribution function of the sampled data from the covert transmitter’s
traffic as compared to the distribution of the legitimate traffic of the same network. This
test has been already used in detecting watermarked inter-packet delays, and it is a major
tool in detecting timing covert channels [37]. Let S(x) be the empirical distribution of the
inter-packet delays of the covert traffic. Let F (x) be the cumulative distribution function
of inter-packet delays of the legitimate traffic in the same system. The KS-test is defined
as follows:
Hs = sup
x
|S(x)− F (x)|. (4.23)
The test result is the answer to the validity of the null hypothesis that the two samples
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Figure 4.3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov shape test for different simulation scenarios.
are drawn from the same distribution. In this way, the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e., a
covert channel may exist) if the value of Hs is beyond a predefined threshold (e.g., 0.05).
Figure 4.3 illustrates the difference between the cumulative distribution function of the
inter-packet delays of the legitimate traffic and the covert traffic. According to the graph,
the peak difference between the two distributions is less than 5% which is an acceptable
margin for the KS-test. Such a small difference makes it extremely difficult for an observer
to detect any abnormal behavior in the system based on first level statistical tests such
as the KS-test. In other words, the test accepts the null hypothesis that the channel
access pattern of the covert transmitter follows a similar probability distribution function
as compared to the one that is exhibited by normal users of the wireless channel.
Figure 4.3 also highlights how the covert transmitter systematically adapts its behavior
in order to emulate the same transmission pattern as an ordinary user of the system.
According to the discussion in Section 4.3.3, the covert transmitter postpones the expansion
of its transmission window by α stages in order to compensate for the extra delay caused
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by the synchronization process. Therefore, the covert transmitter gets to have a slightly
higher transmission rate up to the point where it starts expanding its transmission window
(i.e., the first peak of the graph). Eventually, by expanding the size of the contention
window the covert transmitter has to wait longer before its next retransmission attempt.
Thus, the covert transmitter is forced to lag behind an ordinary user of the system until
the point in which the contention window of a regular user is large enough such that the
wait times for both covert transmitter and regular users converge (second extreme point
of the graph). This adapting behavior is the key design feature of the proposed covert
channel that enables the covert transmitter to track the transmission pattern of ordinary
nodes in the network and mimic their behavioral fingerprints in order to avoid detection.
Regularity Test Analysis
In addition to the first level statistical tests (e.g., the KS-test), the stealthiness property of
the covert channel is analyzed against the regularity test [35]. In principle, the regularity
test is designed to detect the temporal abnormal behaviors of the covert transmitter. More
precisely, the variance of the inter-packet delays of a normal network traffic flow changes
over time due to different network events and channel conditions (e.g., packet loss, conges-
tion). In fact, regular users of the system have the same reaction to sudden events in the
network. Hence, the characteristics of the normal traffic of the network changes constantly
during the course of communication. However, as the covert transmitter is committed to
transmit a particular covert message, it may not be able to react to the changes in the
network condition similar to other nodes in the system. The regularity test is meant to
detect such behavioral differences and track down covert activities.
To calculate the regularity test score, samples of the inter-packet delays are collected
and then spread into multiple sets of size γ. The standard deviation of each set is calculated
to derive the regularity score Hr as follows:
Hr = std(
|σi − σj|
σi
, ∀i, j, i < j). (4.24)
Where, std is the standard deviation operation, and σi is the standard deviation of the
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Figure 4.4: Regularity test for different simulation scenarios.
ith set of inter-packet delays. A high regularity score means large variance in the statistical
properties of the samples of each set which signals a constant change of behavior in the
sampled traffic. In contrast, a low value for Hr depicts a set of regular inter packet delays
that is likely being controlled by another process and may contain other information (e.g.,
a covert message).
Figure 4.4 shows the regularity score of the covert transmitter and the same score for
ordinary users assuming γ = 50. According to the graph, the covert transmitter’s regularity
score is extremely close to the score of regular users in all four scenarios. In other words,
the covert transmitter has managed to blend itself into the crowd well enough such that
even its temporal behaviors are matched with normal users of the system.
The key in maintaining the regularity score of the covert traffic lies in the design of the
contention resolution algorithm at the covert transmitter, and the effect of the covert clock
on the functionality of the covert channel. By design, the covert clock changes according to
activities of other nodes in the system. Thus, channel activities (i.e., packet transmission)
of members of the covert set are considered as clock ticks for the covert clock. If the channel
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condition changes in a way that normal network users have to wait for a longer period of
time between consecutive packet transmissions (e.g., reduction of channel capacity, high
error rates, etc), the covert clock advances with a slower pace. Consequently, the covert
transmitter has to wait longer, in order to capture enough clock ticks, between any two
consecutive packet transmission attempts. In contrast, if the wireless channel provides a
higher transmission rate to normal users of the network, the covert clock would increase
much faster. This immediately leads into a faster packet transmission rate at the covert
transmitter.
By coupling the covert message modulation process to the channel activities of normal
nodes in the network, the covert transmitter can constantly follow network events and
modify its transmission characteristics in order to mimic the transmission pattern of normal
users of the system. Such an adaptive behavior is an advantage of the proposed covert
communication scheme as compared to other covert channel designs in the literature in
which the regularity score is artificially controlled by switching from one transmission
mode to another [40], or by replaying previously sampled traffic traces of the legitimate
traffic and switch from one sample set to another one periodically [38].
4.5.2 Robustness Analysis
In addition to high undetectability level a covert channel has to be robust as well. This
means the covert receiver should be able to decode the transmitted covert message cor-
rectly and without any ambiguity. In this section, the performance of the covert receiver
in decoding the covert message is analyzed. First the network events that may cause the
error at the covert receiver are identified. Then, methods to control the effect of the afore-
mentioned error events on the channel robustness are discussed. In brief, two independent
packet loss events are considered in order to evaluate the robustness of the proposed covert
communication scheme. Before any further discussion, it is worth noting that by packet
loss we refer to the event of losing a packet due to the inherent channel noise in the wire-
less channel. Hence, packet loss events do not cover the situation in which the transmitter
fails to transmit the packet due to collision with other nodes in the channel. However, all
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numerical analysis in this section are generated based on simulation models that consider
the collision events as well.
The first error event is due to failure in detecting packets from members of the covert
set. It is noted that the covert transmitter and the covert receiver rely on the activities of
members of the covert set (i.e., clock ticks) in order to achieve synchronization. The covert
clock also plays a major role in modulation and decoding of the covert message at the covert
transmitter and the covert receiver, respectively. Hence, any mismatch in the covert clocks
will directly affect the reliability of the covert channel. The second error event is caused by
losing the covert transmitter’s packet at the covert receiver. The covert transmitter uses
its packets in order to mark the value of the covert clock that corresponds to the covert
message. The covert transmitter’s packets also trigger the decoding process at the covert
receiver. Consequently, if the covert receiver fails to detect the covert transmitters packet,
the synchronization between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver is lost which
leads to an errornous detection of the covert message at the covert receiver.
Countermeasures for Packet Loss Events
The error-prone nature of the wireless channel necessitates the existence of error control
mechanisms virtually in all wireless communication protocols. Thus, covert communication
schemes can be designed to take advantage of the aforementioned error control mechanisms
in order to improve the robustness of the covert channel. To this end, we have identified
some properties of the IEEE 802.11 communication standard which can be used in order
to boost the performance of the covert receiver in decoding the covert message.
Acknowledgment Message: In most communication protocols, each successful packet
transmission is acknowledged by the actual receiver of the packet. The acknowledgment
message usually contains the sequence number of the original packet and also the identi-
fication of the packet transmitter. In this way, one can learn about a successful packet
transmission (e.g., packets from members of the covert set or the covert transmitter), either
by detecting the packet itself or observing the corresponding acknowledgment message.
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Packet Sequence Number: The packet sequence number field is also beneficial to
the covert receiver, in particular to control the effect of losing packets from the covert
transmitter. It is noted that losing the covert transmitter’s packet has a pronounced effect
on the synchronization between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver. It also
may cause error propagation at the covert receiver. In other words, if the covert receiver
fails to detect a covert transmitter’s packet, it continues on incrementing its covert clock
and waiting for the packet from the covert transmitter. On the other hand, the covert
transmitter resets its covert clock and prepares for the next round of transmission, therefore
the synchronization is lost. The covert receiver will regain synchronization with the covert
transmitter when it receives another packet from the covert transmitter. Indeed, the covert
receiver can learn about the lost covert transmitter’s packets by comparing the sequence
numbers of the last two consecutive packets that are received from the covert transmitter.
Using the sequence number field of the packets that are received from the covert trans-
mitter, the covert receiver is able to learn about possible lost packets during the course of
communication. Thus, the covert receiver can re-synchronize itself with the covert trans-
mitter, and pinpoint the location of the symbols that are lost due to packet loss events in
the wireless channel. This approach prevents error propagation at the covert receiver.
Channel Coding: Channel coding [51] is another approach to combat the destructive
effect of packet loss events on the robustness of the covert communication scheme. In this
way, the covert transmitter encodes the original message (e.g., the binary sequence B) into
a coded covert message by adding extra redundancy information to the original message.
Then, the coded message is modulated and transmitted using the proposed covert commu-
nication schemes (i.e., the FRCC or the ARCC). Encoding the original message enables
the covert receiver to tolerate more error events during the course of communication, and
still recover the original message with no ambiguity. However, the reliability is achieved
at the cost of the extra bandwidth that is required to send the longer and more redundant
coded message.
93
Numerical Results
In order to evaluate the robustness of the proposed covert communication scheme, a sim-
ulation framework is implemented in which a group of normal CSMA/CA users share a
wireless channel with a covert transmitter and a covert receiver that are designed based on
the specifications of the FRCC scheme. Meanwhile, for the sake of simplicity it is decided to
report only the numerical results that are derived according to the first simulation scenario
in Table 4.2. The covert transmitter and the covert receiver are equipped with routines
to take advantage of the acknowledgment messages and packet sequence number fields in
order to handle possible packet loss events in the channel. In addition, channel coding
is used at the covert transmitter in order to reduce the likelihood of errornous decoding
of the covert message at the covert receiver. In this way, a rate 1/3 convolutional code
with the generator matrix [47; 53; 75], and a rate 1/4 convolutional code with the generator
matrix [17; 13; 13; 15] are used to encode the covert message at the covert transmitter. The
numerical results are collected under two distinct channel configurations from the packet
loss point of view.
• Single error case: In this setup, it is assumed that only one of the covert transmitter
or the covert receiver experiences packet loss from members of the covert set.
• Equal error case: For the equal error case setup, the covert transmitter and the
covert receiver are assumed to have same failure probability in detecting packets
from members of the covert set.
It is noted that the packet loss events at the covet transmitter and the covert receiver
are assumed to be independent. In addition, for the single error case simulation setup, it
can be observed that applying packet loss events on either end of the covert channel does
not change the decoding error rate at the covert receiver.
Figure 4.5 depicts the covert channel bit error rate (BER) based on the packet loss ratio
of the packets from members of the covert set. So far, packets from the covert transmitter
are assumed to be received error-free at the covert receiver. According to the graph, the
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Figure 4.5: Covert channel BER versus the packet loss ratio for the packets from members
of the covert set. The plots are according to the first scenario in Table 4.2. Packets from
the covert transmitter are assumed to be always detected at the covert receiver.
covert communication scheme depicts a noticeable resilience against losing packets from
members of the covert set, in particular at low packet loss ratios (e.g., less than 5%).
This is due to the application of the acknowledgment messages in detecting packets from
members of the covert set. The figure also highlights the effect of channel coding on
boosting the robustness of the proposed scheme. For instance, in the case when both the
covert transmitter and the covert receiver experience 10% packet loss from members of the
covert set (i.e., equal error case), channel coding reduces the BER of the covert channel
from 0.06 (i.e., the uncoded scenario), down to 1.5 × 10−3 for the rate 1/3 channel code,
and even lower to 6 × 10−4 if a stronger channel code is used (i.e., the rate 1/4 code). In
addition, one can observe that the effect of channel coding is much more pronounced in
the single error simulation setup in which only one of the covert transmitter or the covert
receiver experiences packet loss from members of the covert set.
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Figure 4.6: Covert channel bit error rate due to the loss of the covert transmitter’s packets
at the covert receiver. Packets from members of the covert set are subject to error with
packet loss rate equal to 0 for dotted lines, 0.1 for solid lines, and 0.2 for dashed lines. The
plots are according to the first scenario in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.6 depicts the BER at the covert receiver when the covert transmitter’s traffic
is also subject to error. The plots in Figure 4.6 are grouped based on the packet loss
probability of the traffic from members of the covert set. Each group consists of three
plots, one for the uncoded scenario, and the other two for scenarios with channel coding in
place. It is also assumed that the covert transmitter and the covert receiver experience the
same packet loss ratio for packets that are transmitted by members of the covert set (equal
error case). Remarkably, the numerical analysis shows that if the covert transmitter and
the covert receiver enjoy loss-less channels from members of the covert set, the effect of
losing packets from the covert transmitter at the covert receiver is completely compensated
by the extra redundancy that is provided by the implemented channel codes. Hence, those
plots are not reported in the graph. Meanwhile, as the clock tick events of the covert clock
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become noisy, failure in detecting the transmitter’s packet at the covert receiver becomes
noticeable in degrading the performance of the FRCC scheme. In fact, losing track of any
packet from the covert transmitter accounts for losing at least one covert symbol at the
covert receiver. However, the covert receiver benefits from the acknowledgment messages to
reduce the chance of losing the covert transmitter’s packet. Moreover, the covert receiver
can learn about the exact position and the number of lost transmitter’s packets, using
the sequence number field of the packets it receives correctly. This information is used to
improve the decoding performance at the covert receiver.
By comparing the plots in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, it can be observed that the effect
of losing packets from members of the covert set is much more prominent as compared to
the effect of error events due to failure in detecting the covert transmitter’s packets at the
covert receiver. The flat plots of Figure 4.6 confirms this observation proving the fact that
the events that form the covert clock (i.e., packets from members of the covert set) are far
more decisive in dictating the robustness of the proposed covert communication scheme
as compared to the signaling events of the proposed covert channel (i.e., packets from the
covert transmitter).
4.5.3 Covert Rate Analysis
One salient feature of the proposed covert communication scheme is that it allows the
covert transmitter and the covert receiver to keep their overt communication channel. It
is noted that the communication rate of a transmitter is one of the basic parameters that
are constantly monitored by system observers. Hence, in order to achieve stealthiness,
the covert transmitter has to control its overt communication rate such that it does not
deviate from the behavior of an ordinary user of the channel. In fact, this observation is
the basis for the transmission rate design criterion for the proposed covert communication
scheme. In other words, the proposed covert channel is designed with a covert transmitter
that mimics the transmission rate of a normal node in the network, yet its overt traffic
contains a covert message for the covert receiver.
Figure 4.7 compares the overt communication rate of the covert transmitter as compared
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Figure 4.7: Overt communication rate of the covert transmitter and normal network nodes.
to regular nodes in the system. The result in Figure 4.7 confirms the validity of the
transmission rate design criterion that guides the covert transmitter to mimic the same
transmission behavior as normal transmitters in the channel. According to the graph, in all
four scenarios, the overt rate of the covert transmitter is extremely close to the transmission
rate of normal users of the network. Such a close similarity in overt communication rate is
fundamentally important in order to secure the identity of the covert transmitter against
traffic analysis attacks.
Finally, the achievable covert rate of the proposed covert communication scheme is
depicted in Figure 4.8. The graph also illustrates how the covert rate of the proposed
covert communication scheme scales linearly with the overt communication rate of the
network. In fact, the covert channel is capable of achieving relatively high covert rates
without compromising the covertness property of the channel. The contribution of using
ARCC scheme in boosting the achievable covert rate of the channel is also highlighted
in the graph. The dashed lines in Figure 4.8 represent the difference in the achievable
covert rate of the ARCC scheme as compared to the covert rate that can be achieved using
fixed rate covert communication scheme (i.e., FRCC). In fact, using the ARCC scheme
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Figure 4.8: Achievable covert rate of the proposed covert channel. Dashed lines depict the
additional capacity (advantage) that can be achieved using the ARCC scheme.
one can increase the covert rate of the channel by as much as 20% which is a significant
improvement in the achievable covert rate of the proposed covert communication scheme.
4.6 Target Applications
Wireless communication systems have attracted a great deal of attention in communication
industry due to their unique characteristics such as high flexibility and scalability. Today,
mobile devices are incorporated in virtually every aspect of modern societies. In line with
such rapid growth of wireless technology, wireless covert channels offer unique perspectives
on how to provide security, and privacy in such systems.
Sensor networks are among the most promising target environments for deploying covert
channels. The decentralized structure of such networks combined with high degrees of ran-
domness make sensor networks an appealing setting for covert communication. Covert
channels can be utilized in transmitting sensitive information (e.g., authentication infor-
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mation, broadcast commands, and critical updates) in order to increase system security
and prevent adversaries from conducting selective drop attacks on critical information flows
in the network. Covert channels can also be used as a mechanism to safeguard the op-
eration of sensor networks. To this end, a covert message is embedded in the behavioral
fingerprints of the elements of the network such that a particular node or a group of nodes
can be recognized by the embedded covert message. By comparing the expected covert
message with the one that is decoded from the behavioral characteristics of each node, the
monitoring entity can detect abnormal behaviors and trace them back their sources in the
system.
As an example, in [64] a covert communication scheme based on routing protocols in
ad-hoc networks was proposed. In this approach, the covert transmitter generates route
request messages (i.e., RREQ) according to the covert messages it intends to transmit. The
content of the RREQ messages (e.g., destination ID, request lifetime, etc) or the frequency
of generating the messages can be used as the medium for covert communication. Now,
consider a system in which the routing protocol of network elements is adopted to embed a
covert message according to the aforementioned covert communication scheme. The system
observer plays the role of the covert receiver, and monitors the transmitted covert messages
by other nodes in the network. Thus, when a node behaves differently than expected, due
to node compromise or malfunction, the monitoring entity can detect the anomaly and
identify the defective node. A similar functionality can be assigned to the proposed covert
communication scheme in order to monitor the packet transmission behavior of elements of
a WLAN network. In such a configuration, the monitoring entity (i.e., the covert receiver)
expects a specific covert message to be embedded in the channel access process of each
legitimate node of the network. Thus, any node with abnormal behavior that violates
such restriction can be detected and removed from the system. This approach is effective
in particular against rogue nodes that are designed to remain hidden against statistical
analysis tests (e.g., another covert channel).
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4.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter a new covert channel is proposed which is based on the structural behavior
of CSMA/CA and the binary backoff algorithms. To this end, a covert transmitter is
designed by modifying the CSMA/CA algorithm such that the transmitter’s contention
window is controlled by a virtual clock called the covert clock. The covert clock is linked
to the channel activities of a subset of regular nodes in the system using the broadcast
nature of the wireless channel. These activities are observed by the covert transmitter and
the covert receiver in order to synchronize their covert clocks and communicate through
the covert channel.
The proposed covert communication scheme is an example of using behavioral mimicry
in designing stealth and robust covert channels in wireless networks. In fact, the perfor-
mance analysis of the proposed covert channel verifies that the channel can evade detection
by well known statistical tests that are designed to detect covert channels in communication
networks. In more detail, since the packet transmission mechanism of the covert transmit-
ter is influenced by the activities of other users in the system (i.e., the covert clock), the
covert transmitter mimics not only the long term characteristics of a legitimate node but
also reacts to the temporal changes in the system similar to a typical network transmitter.
Thus, the covert channel remains hidden due to the indistinguishable packet transmission
pattern of the covert transmitter as compared to any other node in the network. Using
properties of the original communication protocol (e.g., acknowledgment messages) the
covert channel can achieve high levels of reliability and operate in the error-prone wireless
environment. Another important feature of the proposed scheme is the relatively high
covert rate of the covert channel which scales linearly with the overt communication rate
of the network.
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Chapter 5
Turbo Covert Channel
Similar to the wireless environment, public communication networks (e.g., Internet) can
be considered as suitable frameworks for covert communication. In fact, in a majority
of such network structures, one can identify the three requirements of existing a covert
channel according to the Kemmerer principle. A public network is accessible by many
users providing a shared environment, each user can transmit and receive information by
generating data packets and forwarding them towards the destination address. Hence, the
network can be modified by introducing new traffic flows or modifying the pattern of the
packets in each flow. Finally, each packet contains multiple header fields (e.g., TCP header,
or IP header) each of which are used in one of the protocol layers of the communication
network. These header fields carry enough information to achieve synchronization between
the transmitter and the receiver. For instance, the sequence number field of TCP packets
over the Internet can be considered as a very useful tool to achieve synchronization in
covert communication schemes.
An interesting feature of public communication networks is the range of the network
which is virtually unbounded and can go beyond physical and geographical barriers in the
world. Thus, covert channels in public communication networks can reach much farther
as compared to covert channels over wireless networks which are limited by the range of
the wireless signal. The existence of an enormous number of users, diverse communication
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protocols, and huge volume of information that is exchanged over such communication
networks gives a valuable advantage to the covert transmitter and the covert receiver
to blend among the crowd and remain hidden effectively. In fact, given the scale of the
network, it is extremely difficult for a system observer to monitor all traffic flows and process
them in order to distinguish a possible covert channel in the system. However, despite
the promising properties of public communication networks for covert communication,
designing and implementing a covert channel between two distant nodes has proved to be
a challenging task.
As the size of a communication network increases, the network evolves into a very
complex system that exhibits unpredictable behaviors. The unpredictable nature of com-
munication network necessitates the existence of robust and reliable covert channel designs
that are accustomed to handle extremely noisy environments and powerful adversarial
disruptions. For instance, the packet arrival times in an Internet flow are subject to a
random noise (i.e., network jitter) due to ever-changing network conditions (e.g., network
congestion). Such a variation in the packet arrival times translates directly into noise for
TCP/IP timing covert channels that use the Inter-Packet Delay (i.e., IPD) of the network
traffic as the carrier for the covert message. Furthermore, an active adversarial entity can
easily access the overt channel and maliciously change the channel behavior (e.g., change
the IPDs of the covert traffic), in order to limit the capacity of the covert channel.
Inspired by the challenges of designing robust, undetectable, and high rate covert chan-
nels over public communication networks, in this chapter a new design methodology for
provably undetectable timing covert channels over the Internet is introduced. The pro-
posed framework is based on modeling the covert channel as a differential communication
channel, and using the properties of the communication model in order to derive the formu-
lation for modulation/demodulation processes. Then, a trellis structure is proposed that
is used by the covert transmitter and the covert receiver in order to modulate and demod-
ulate the covert message, respectively. The trellis structure also enables the covert receiver
to perform iterative demodulation/decoding of the covert message and form a turbo covert
channel that significantly improves the reliability of the system. In addition, an adaptive
modulation strategy for the covert transmitter is designed that improves the robustness of
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the channel significantly. To this end, the covert transmitter uses only the error-resistant
portion of the IPD spectrum when it modulates the covert message. However, in order to
keep the stealthiness property of the covert channel, the modulation scheme is designed
such that it does not force the pattern of IPDs of the covert traffic to deviate from the
inter-packet delay pattern of the legitimate traffic of the channel.
The aforementioned modulation strategy combined with the proposed trellis structure
gives the covert channel considerable flexibility to achieve a wide range of covert rates
with extremely low error probability at the covert receiver. Such a robust and reliable
covert channel design can be used in watermarking the information flows that go inbound
or outbound of a communication network infrastructure. In this way, one can track down
possible malicious users even if privacy preserving applications (e.g., Tor) are used in order
to hide the origin of the attack (e.g., distributed denial of service attacks).
5.1 TCP/IP Timing Covert Channels
In general, a timing channel is a communication channel in which the message is modu-
lated by the timing of an specific sequence of events. In computer networks, timing covert
channels are usually designed based on packet transmission events. The design may in-
volve modulating the covert message by controlling the existence or absence of a packet
transmission event in a known period of time, or by using the inter-packet delays (i.e.,
IPD) of a sequence of packets in a traffic flow. The latter approach provides the covert
channel with a higher covert rate that is much harder to detect if designed properly.
Figure 5.1 depicts a basic example of a timing covert channel over the Internet. The
objective for the covert transmitter is to modulate the covert message over inter-packet
delays of the covert traffic. To this end, the covert transmitter designates two constellation
points (i.e., delay values) to represents covert bit-0 (i.e., d = 50ms), and covert bit-1
(i.e., d = 100ms). The delay values are used in order to modulate the elements of the
covert message (i.e., m = {m0,m1,m2, ...}) over IPDs of the covert traffic. In this way, the
covert transmitter delays the next packet in its covert traffic flow by 100ms, if it intends
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Figure 5.1: A simple timing covert channel. The covert information are modulated over
IPDs of the covert traffic (50ms delay for covert bit-0, and 100ms delay for covert bit-1).
to modulate the covert bit-1 (e.g., m0 = 1 ⇒ d0 = 100ms ⇒ t1 = t0 + d0 = 100ms). On
the other hand, in order to transmit the covert bit-0, the covert transmitter generates a
packet that is delayed by 50ms, with respect to the previous transmitted packet in the
covert traffic (e.g., m1 = 0 ⇒ d1 = 50ms ⇒ t2 = t1 + d1 = 150ms). On the other end
of the channel, the covert receiver observes the arrival times of the received packets (i.e.,
τ0, τ1, ...,), and calculates the inter-packet delays of the covert traffic (i.e., δ0, δ1, ...). Then,
the covert message is decoded by finding the corresponding covert bits to the IPDs of the
received covert traffic. The aforementioned timing covert channel can achieve an average
covert rate of r = 103/(50+100
2
) = 13.33 bps, given the assumption that covert bit-0 and
covert bit-1 are equiprobable.
Despite the clear objective of designing timing covert channels over communication
networks, these channels are known to be extremely sensitive to the network noise. In
particular, the variation in the packet arrival times of the covert traffic (i.e., network jitter)
is a major barrier that limits the capacity of timing covert channels over the Internet. As an
example, in the setup of Figure 5.1, the transmitter intends to transmit the covert message
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m = {101}. Thus, the elements of the covert message are mapped to the corresponding
IPDs according to the designated values for each element of m (i.e., m = {1, 0, 1} ⇒ d =
{100 ms, 50 ms, 100 ms}). The set of IPDs are used to define the delays of the packets in
the covert traffic. However, due to the network noise (e.g., network jitter) the inter-packet
delays that are observed at the covert receiver are different from the original IPDs (i.e.,
δ = {δ0 = 120ms, δ1 = 60ms, δ2 = 70ms}). Hence, the covert receiver decodes the covert
message in error as some of the observed IPDs have changed dramatically during the course
of transmission (i.e., τ2 = 70ms⇒ mˆ2 = 1 6= 0 = m2).
The timing covert channel of Figure 5.1 suffers from another design flaw that is more
of a concern than the error sensitive nature of the channel. In fact, the covert traffic
of the covert transmitter exhibits distinctive characteristics that do not exist in normal
traffic flows of the network. The covert traffic consists of a series of packets that are
apart from each other either by 50ms, or 100ms intervals. Such a regulated behavior is
hardly observed in public communication networks. In other word, modulating the covert
message over IPDs of the covert traffic has changed key characteristic properties of the
covert traffic as compared to a normal traffic flow of the network. Thus, the covert channel
is vulnerable to pattern analysis and statistical detection methods. Such attacks could
reveal the existence of the covert channel, violate the privacy of the covert transmitter or
the covert receiver, and even expose the covert message.
The aforementioned example highlights some of the difficulties in designing robust,
undetectable, and high rate covert channels over communication networks. In what follows
we present turbo covert channel (i.e., TCC), an iterative covert communication framework
that is designed according to our design methodology, and it is capable of achieving provable
polynomial undetectability. This means that the covert channel is undetectable against
any polynomial-time statistical test that analyzes samples of the covert traffic and the
legitimate traffic of the system. The TCC scheme also provides means to handle network
noise and adversarial disruptions in order to improve the robustness of the covert channel.
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5.2 System Model
A timing covert channel over the Internet consists of a covert transmitter that intends
to send a covert message to at least one covert receiver, where the covert message (i.e.,
m = (m1,m2, ....,mk)) is a sequence of binary elements (e.g., mi ∈ {0, 1}). For this
purpose, the covert message is modulated into a sequence of IPDs (i.e., d = (d1, d2, ...., dn))
that forms the covert traffic of the covert transmitter. The number of packets that is
required to modulate the covert message (i.e., n) is a function of the message length (i.e.,
|m| = k), the rate of the channel code, and the modulation scheme that is used by the
covert transmitter. At the other end of the channel, the covert receiver detects a noisy
version of the IPDs of the covert traffic (i.e., δ = (δ1, δ2, ..., δn)), as the arrival time of each
packet is subject to an independent random delay. Finally, the received IPDs are processed
in order to decode the covert message (i.e., mˆ) at the covert receiver.
The legitimate traffic of the channel is assumed to have independent and identically
distributed (i.e., (i.i.d.)) inter-packet delays. The (i.i.d.) traffic model is used in analyzing
communication networks as it provides essential properties that makes model-based system
designs and channel analysis tractable [94, 95]. Meanwhile, it is shown that such a model
can be extended to more general traffic scenarios with minor analytical adjustments. For
instance, in [96] it is suggested that a batch renewal process, with (i.i.d.) batch sizes and
(i.i.d.) inter-batch delays, can be used in order to model a traffic source with correlated
inter-packet delays.
The distribution of the inter-packet delays is also a source of vigorous research in com-
munication networks. The early belief in modeling network traffic was to use the Poisson
process to model the packet arrival and connection request events of a network traffic
flow [94]. However, recent discoveries have suggested that for a majority of traffic sources,
specifically those with self-similar behaviors (e.g., shell connections), Pareto distribution
models provide a much more accurate estimation of the real traffic [95]. Hence, the channel
model in this dissertation is modeled according to the Pareto distribution. However, to
achieve a more realistic system model, the legitimate traffic of the channel is derived based
on real world traffic samples according to CAIDA network traces [97].
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5.3 Turbo Covert Channel
In principle, a timing covert channel is a differential communication channel that encodes
the covert message into the difference of the arrival times of the packets of the covert
traffic. In model-based covert channels, the covert transmitter incorporates its knowl-
edge of the statistical properties of the legitimate traffic in order to generate a stream
of packets (i.e., the covert traffic) with similar statistical properties as compared to the
legitimate traffic, yet a covert message is embedded in the inter-packet delays of the covert
traffic. In this section, a detailed description of the modulation and the demodulation algo-
rithms of the proposed covert communication scheme is presented. Then, the decoding of
the covert message is discussed followed by an iterative demodulation/decoding approach
that significantly improves the robustness and achievable rate of the covert channel. It
is worth noting that in all design scenarios, the undetectability of the covert channel is
non-negotiable meaning that the channel should always achieve provable polynomial un-
detectability according to Definition 3.2.
5.3.1 Covert Transmitter
Figure 5.2 depicts a high level description of the proposed covert communication scheme.
The covert message (i.e., m) is encoded by a channel encoder to form the covert codeword
of length n (i.e., u = (u1, u2, ..., un)). Then, the covert codeword is sent to the modulator
block that maps the covert codeword into the inter-packet delays of the covert traffic. In
order to achieve provable polynomial undetectability, the elements of the covert codeword
(i.e., ui, i ∈ [n]) should form a sequence of (i.i.d.) random bits with equal probability for
covert bit-0 and covert bit-1. To achieve such a property, a random interleaver is used to
break correlation between the elements of the covert codeword. The covert transmitter uses
the generated IPDs in order to form the covert traffic that is sent to the covert receiver.
Encoding: The encoder block at the covert transmitter may consist of a single channel
code (e.g., a convolutional code) or a concatenated channel code configuration (e.g., a
Reed-Solomon code as the inner code and a convolutional code as the outer code) [51]. A
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Figure 5.2: High level system model of the turbo covert channel.
rate r = k
n
, k ≤ n channel code accepts an input of size k, and generates a codeword of
length n by adding extra redundancy information to the original message. In this way, the
receiver can tolerate some few errors in the received codeword and still recover the message.
Although using the concatenated codes would significantly improve the reliability of the
system, it is decided to keep the system complexity at minimum with a single convoloutional
code as the encoding block. It is noted that the rate of the channel code plays a major
role in robustness and the achievable covert rate of the covert channel. In other words,
increasing the code rate improves the covert rate at the expense of higher bit error rate at
the covert receiver and vice versa.
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Covert Message Modulation: The modulation block is designed to map the covert
codeword into the IPDs that form the covert traffic. Let F(.) be the cumulative distribution
function (i.e., CDF) of the IPDs of the legitimate traffic of the channel. The key in model-
based covert channels is to design a modulation scheme such that the covert traffic mimics
the same statistical characteristics as the ones of the legitimate traffic of the channel. To
this end, one can apply the application of Monte Carlo sampling and quantile function in
generating a sequence of random numbers that are distributed according to the desired
distribution function (e.g., F(.)) [98].
The construction of Monte Carlo samples for a given distribution function is facili-
tated using the quantile function of the distribution. In brief, the quantile function of a
probability distribution is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (i.e., F−1(.)).
Having the knowledge of the quantile function, one can generate a sequence of random
numbers according to the desired distribution by driving the quantile function with a se-
quence of uniformly distributed random numbers. For instance, the sequence of random
delays d = {d1, d2, ..., dn} will have the same distribution as the IPDs of the legitimate
traffic of the channel if the elements of d are generated as follows:
di = F−1(ai), i ∈ [n] (5.1)
Where, F (.) is the CDF of the IPDs of the legitimate traffic of the channel, and a =
{a1, a2, ..., an} is a sequence of uniformly distributed random numbers (i.e., a ∼ U(0, 1)).
The aforementioned method in generating sequences of random numbers can be used
in order to modulate the covert message over IPDs of the covert traffic. To this end, the
covert message is masked with a sequence of uniformly distributed random numbers (i.e.,
v ∼ U(0, 1)). The masking operation is performed using the addition modulo 1 operation.
Hence, we have:
ai ≡ vi + ui (mod 1), i ∈ [n] (5.2)
It is noted that given the assumption that the elements of u are (i.i.d.) equiprobable
random bits, the result of the masking operation (i.e., a = {a1, a2, ..., an}) is in fact a
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sequence of uniformly distributed random numbers (i.e., a ∼ U(0, 1)) [43]. Thus, one can
pass the elements of the masked parameter (i.e., ai, i ∈ [n]) to the quantile function of the
IPDs of the legitimate traffic (i.e., F−1(.)) in order to generate a sequence of inter-packet
delays that has the same distribution function as the IPDs of the legitimate traffic.
Alternatively, It is possible to map the elements of the covert codeword (i.e., u =
(u1, u2, ..., un)) directly into a sequence of uniformly distributed random numbers (i.e.,
a = (a1, a2, ..., an)) as follows:
ai =
ui + vi
2
, ∀i ∈ [n]. (5.3)
Where, vi ∼ U(0, 1). It is easy to verify that if the elements of the covert codeword
(i.e., ui) are (i.i.d.) and equiprobable random bits, the result of Equation (5.3) (i.e.,
a = {a1, a2, ..., an}) forms a set of uniformly distributed random numbers. Therefore, one
can pass the generated sequence of random numbers as input to the quantile function in
order to form the IPDs of the covert traffic (i.e., di = F−1(ai)).
Figure 5.3 depicts an example of the covert modulation process. According to the
figure, the domain of the input to the quantile function (i.e., the Y-axis in the plot) is
divided in two sections with the border at F(d) = 1
2
. The projection of these two sections
over the CDF of the legitimate traffic (i.e., F(.)), defines the range of inter-packet delays
that are used to modulate covert bit-0, and covert bit-1. Clearly, the delay ranges are not
equal in size, however they are equiprobable considering the distribution function of the
legitimate traffic. The objective of the uniformly distributed random numbers (i.e., vi ∈ v)
is to sweep the domain of the quantile function with equal probability while the elements
of the covert codeword define the range of the IPDs that are allowed to be selected. The
result is a sequence of random delays that are distributed according to the distribution of
the legitimate traffic, yet they carry the embedded covert message as well.
The aforementioned covert modulation strategy treats each element of the covert code-
word independently. However, using a trellis structure in modulating the covert codeword,
it is possible to design a covert modulation scheme that embeds information about not
only an individual element of the covert codeword, but also defines the complete structure
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Figure 5.3: Modulating the covert message u = (0, 1) given the random sequence vector
v = (0.33, 0.18).
of the transmitted message at the covert receiver. In this way, correct detection of some of
the inter-packet delays at the covert receiver would be beneficial in detecting other samples
of the covert traffic that are affected by channel noise or adversarial disruptions.
Consider two independent sequences of (i.i.d.) random numbers v = (v1, v2, ..., vn),
and w = (w1, w2, ..., wn), where the elements of each sequence are drawn according to the
uniform distribution (i.e., v,w ∼ U(0, 1)). Given the covert codeword u, for each element
of the covert codeword (i.e., ui) define si as follows:
si = ui ⊕ si−1, i ∈ [n], s0 = 0. (5.4)
Where, ⊕ denotes the bit-wise XOR operation. It is noted that since the elements of
the covert codeword (i.e., ui, i ∈ [n]) are (i.i.d.) random bits with equal probability for the
covert bit-0 and the covert bit-1, the result of Equation (5.4) (i.e., s = (s1, s2, ..., sn)) is also
a sequence of (i.i.d.) equiprobable random bits (i.e., P (si = 1) =
1
2
= P (si = 0), i ∈ [n]).
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Figure 5.4: Modulation trellis with the branch indicator parameter for each branch.
Thus, one can define the branch indicator parameter (i.e., ai ∈ [0, 1]) that maps the ith
element of the covert codeword (i.e., ui) to a unique branch of the modulation trellis as
follows:
ai =
{
ui+vi
2
si−1 = 0
ui+wi
2
si−1 = 1
, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n (5.5)
Figure 5.4 depicts the modulation trellis and the corresponding branch indicator parameter
(i.e., ai) in each branch of the trellis. It is noted that in order to uniquely identify each
branch of the trellis, two independent sequences of random numbers (i.e., v, w) are required
as the number of the trellis branches are twice the number of the states of the trellis. Given
the binary elements of u, and the uniformly distributed random sequences v and w, it can
be observed that ai ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i ∈ [n]. The trellis starts at state 0 (i.e., s0 = 0) and has
n + 2 stages, one for the initial stage (i.e., the initial packet at the covert traffic), one for
the final transition back to state 0 (i.e., sn+1 = 0), and the rest for the modulation of the
elements of the covert codeword.
Using the branch indicator parameter and the quantile function of the legitimate traffic
(i.e., F−1(.)), the modulation scheme transforms the elements of the covert codeword into
their corresponding IPD values (i.e., di) as follows:
di = F−1(ai), i = 1, 2, ..., n (5.6)
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Thus, the transmission time of the packets of the covert traffic can be written as follows:
tj =
j∑
i=1
di + t0, j = 1, 2, ..., n (5.7)
Where, t0 marks the transmission instance of the initial packet in the flow.
5.3.2 Covert Receiver
The arrival time of the packets of the covert traffic (i.e., τ) is the only channel signal
observable to the covert receiver. However, the packet arrival time is subject to the channel
noise (e.g., network jitter or adversarial jamming). Hence,
τi = ti + ni, ∀ i ∈ [n] (5.8)
Where, ni is the noise affecting the arrival time of the i
th packet of the covert traffic. In
order to decode the covert message, the receiver is required to derive the inter-packet delays
of the received covert traffic (i.e., δi, i ∈ [n]). Hence,
δi = τi − τi−1
= ti + ni − (ti−1 + ni−1)
= di + ni − ni−1 = di + zi (5.9)
Where, τ0 = 0, and zi = ni − ni−1 is the equivalent of the channel noise on the ith element
of the sequence of received IPDs (i.e., δ = (δ1, δ2, ...δn)).
Demodulation: Given the sequence of the received IPDs, the demodulation objective
is to find the most probable covert codeword that is likely to be transmitted by the covert
transmitter. In other word, the demodulation task is to compute P (ui|δ) or equivalently
the log likelihood ratio (i.e., LLR) of the probability function, which is defined as follows :
L(ui) = log
P (ui = 1|δ)
P (ui = 0|δ) , ∀ i ∈ [n] (5.10)
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To this end, using a similar trellis structure as the one used by the covert transmitter,
the receiver performs the maximum a-posteriori probability (MAP) demodulation which is
based on a recursive algorithm proposed by Bahl et al. [99].
During the modulation process, the transition from each stage of the encoding trellis to
the next stage is selected according to the branch indicator parameter (i.e., ai) that depends
on the elements of the covert codeword (i.e., ui). Thus, stage transition probabilities are
considered as intermediate quantities in order to compute the likelihood of the elements
of the covert codeword, given the detected IPDs of the covert traffic at the covert receiver
(i.e., P (ui|δ)). Let Si denote the state of the modulation trellis at stage i, and define
σi(s
′, s) as follows:
σi(s
′, s) = P (Si−1 = s′, Si = s, δ) (5.11)
In fact, σi(s
′, s) represents the joint probability of two individual events. The first event
denotes the transition from state s′ in stage i − 1, to state s in the next stage of the
modulation trellis (i.e., Si−1 = s), when the covert transmitter is calculating the ith inter-
packet delay for the covert traffic. Meanwhile, the second event indicates the detection
of δ = {δ1, δ2, ..., δn} as the sequence of received IPDs at the covert receiver. Using the
definition of σi(s
′, s), Equation (5.10) can be rewritten as follows:
L(ui) = log
P (ui = 1|δ)
P (ui = 0|δ)
= log
P (ui = 1, δ)P (δ)
P (ui = 0, δ)P (δ)
= log
∑
(s′,s):ui=1 P (Si−1 = s
′, Si = s, δ)∑
s′,s:ui=0 P (Si−1 = s
′, Si = s, δ)
= log
∑
(s′,s):ui=1) σi(s
′, s)∑
(s′,s):ui=0 σi(s
′, s)
(5.12)
In other words, instead of calculating P (ui|δ), one can evaluate σi(s′, s) for all branch
transitions that are associated to ui = 1 (i.e., (s
′, s) : ui = 1), and those transitions that are
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taken if ui = 0 (i.e., (s
′, s) : ui = 0), then calculate the LLR value (i.e., L(ui)) according
to Equation (5.12). Furthermore, using the chain rule for conditional probability [98],
Equation (5.11) is rewritten as follows:
σi(s
′, s) = P (Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
αi−1(s′)
×P (Si = s, δi|Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
γi(s′,s)
×P (δni+1|Si = s, Si−1 = s′, δi1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βi(s)
= αi−1(s′) γi(s′, s) βi(s) (5.13)
Where, αi(s) is derived recursively as follows:
αi(s) = P (Si = s, δ
i
1)
=
∑
s′
P (Si−1 = s′, Si = s, δi1)
=
∑
s′
P (Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )P (Si = s, δi|Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )
=
∑
s′
αi−1(s′)γi(s′, s), α0(s) =
{
1 s = 0
0 s 6= 0 (5.14)
Similarly, for βi(s) we have:
βi(s) =
∑
s′
βi+1(s
′)γi+1(s, s′), βn+1(s) =
{
1 s = 0
0 s 6= 0 (5.15)
The initialization of the forward recursion (i.e., α0(s)) is straightforward as the trellis
is assumed to start at state s = 0. Meanwhile, the backward recursion (i.e., βn+1(s)) is
initialized using the starting state of the next block. Figure 5.5 depicts the trellis structure
at the covert receiver where each branch is marked with its corresponding branch transition
weight (i.e., γi(s
′, s)).
Given the recursive formulas for αi(s) and βi(s), it all comes to calculate the branch
transition weights (i.e., γi(s
′, s), i ∈ [n]) in order to derive the LLR of the elements of the
covert codeword. We have,
γi(s
′, s) = P (Si = s, δi|Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )
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Figure 5.5: Demodulation trellis with branch transition weights.
=
∑
j
P (Si = s, δi, ui = j|Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )
=
∑
j
P (ui = j|Si−1 = s′, Si = s, δi, δi−11 )× P (Si = s|Si−1 = s′, δi−11 )
× P (δi|Si−1 = s′, Si = s, δi−11 ) (5.16)
The first term in Equation (5.16) is either 1 or 0 depending on whether the transition
from state Si−1 = s′ to state Si = s is associated to ui = j or not. The second term is the
initial a priori information about the covert codeword at the covert receiver. That is, if
the covert receiver knows that the input bit causing the transition from s′ to s happens
with certain probability. It is noted that since the elements of the covert message are
equiprobable and mutually independent, this term is constant regardless of the stage or
the state of the trellis. Thus, it is canceled out in the LLR formulation.
The last term of Equation (5.16) represents the probability of receiving δi, assuming the
transition from s′ to s took place at the modulation trellis. Let ai(s′, s) denote the branch
indicator parameter that is associated to the state transition (s′, s), according to Equation
(5.5). Hence, one can interpret the last term of Equation (5.16) as the probability of the
event in which the ith IPD was the hypothesis dˆi = F−1(ai(s′, s)), yet the receiver observes
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δi due to the channel noise. Thus, the final term of Equation (5.16) can be written as
follows:
P (δi|Si = s, Si−1 = s′, δi−11 ) = P (δi|dˆi)
= P (zi = δi − dˆi) (5.17)
Where, zi = ni − ni−1 is the equivalent channel noise on the ith IPD. Let fn(n) be the
probability distribution function of the channel noise (i.e., n) that affects the packet arrival
times of the covert traffic. Using the convolution formula for the distribution of sum of
two random variables [84] we have:
fz(z) =
∫
n
fn(z + n)fn(n) dn (5.18)
For instance, if n is uniformly distributed in the range [0,∆] (i.e., n ∼ U(0,∆)), the
distribution of the IPD equivalent noise (i.e., fz(z)) can be derived as follows:
fz(z) =

∆−|z|
∆2
−∆ ≤ z ≤ ∆
0 otherwise
(5.19)
Similarly, if the channel noise has a zero mean normal distribution with variance σ2
(i.e., n ∼ N (0, σ2)), the equivalent channel noise on the inter-packet delay of the received
traffic has a normal distribution with zero mean and variance of 2σ2 (i.e., z ∼ N (0, 2σ2)).
Combining Equations (5.12),(5.13),(5.16), and (5.17) the log-likelihood ratio of the ith
element of the covert codeword at the covert receiver can be written as follows:
L(ui) = log
∑
(s′,s):ui=1 αi−1(s
′) fz(δi − dˆi) βi(s)∑
(s′,s):ui=0 αi−1(s
′) fz(δi − dˆi) βi(s)
= log
∑
s′,s:ui=1 αi−1(s
′)fz
(
δi −F−1(ai(s′, s))
)
βi(s)∑
s′,s:ui=0 αi−1(s
′)fz
(
δi −F−1(ai(s′, s))
)
βi(s)
(5.20)
Where, ai(s
′, s) is the branch indicator parameter that is associated to the transition
(s′, s) (i.e., Figure 5.4). It is easy to verify that all the elements of Equation (5.20) are
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available, or can be derived recursively at the covert receiver. At the end of the demodula-
tion process, the computed LLR values are fed into the de-interleaver block and the result
is sent to the decoder to decode the covert message.
Decoding: The decoding module is a simple Soft-Input Soft-Output (SISO) decoder
[56]. In more detail, the decoding module accepts the LLR values of the elements of the
covert codeword (i.e., the output of the demodulation block) as input, and returns the
decoder’s estimation of the covert message (i.e., mˆ). The decoder block works based on
a similar principle as the one that is described for the demodulation block. The only
difference lies in the fact that the decoder uses a different trellis structure. In fact, the
trellis of the decoder is selected according to the channel code that is used at the covert
transmitter (e.g., the rate 1/2 Voyager code).
5.3.3 Iterative Demodulation/Decoding
In a non-iterative demodulation/decoding configuration (i.e., Figure5.2), each block of
the covert receiver, that is involved in decoding the covert message, benefits from the
information that is gleaned about the covert codeword at the previous blocks (e.g., the
decoder uses LLRs from the demodulator). However, the information flow is unidirectional
and does not run in the reverse direction. This lack of cooperation limits the decoding
performance at the covert receiver and reduces the robustness of the covert channel. One
way to tackle this problem is to use iterative demodulation/decoding. In this way, the belief
of the decoding block on the correct covert codeword elements is propagated back to the
demodulation module for another round of demodulation/decoding. Thus, the decision of
each block is enhanced by extra information that is received from all other blocks involved
in the demodulation/decoding process at the covert receiver.
Figure 5.6 depicts the covert receiver block diagram that is modified to perform the
iterative demodulation/decoding. In this setup, the combination of demodulation, de-
interleaver, and decoder blocks is envisioned as a serially concatenated coding system in
which the outer code is the convolutional code while the demodulation block acts as the
inner code [100]. In fact, since the proposed demodulation block and the decoding block
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Figure 5.6: Covert receiver block diagram with iterative demodulation/decoding.
produce soft-decision outputs (i.e., the log-likelihood ratios of the elements of the covert
codeword), they are very well suited for an iterative demodulation/decoding configuration.
Let’s begin with the demodulation block. The output of the demodulator is the log-
likelihood ratio of the elements of the covert codeword. To this end, the demodulator uses
the received IPDs (i.e, δ), the initial a priori information on the elements of the covert
codeword (i.e., Rai ), and its knowledge about the channel to calculate the a posteriori
probability of the elements of the covert codeword (i.e., L(ui)). Thus, the output of the
demodulator can be written as follows:
L(ui) = log
P (ui = 1|δ)
P (ui = 0|δ)
= log
P (δ|ui = 1)
P (δ|ui = 0) + log
P (ui = 1)
P (ui = 0)
= Rii +R
a
i (5.21)
The first term in Equation (5.21) is called the intrinsic information (i.e., Rii). The
intrinsic information denotes the information that is gleaned about the ith element of
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the covert codeword (i.e., ui) from the input signal (i.e., δ), and perhaps the a priori
information on other elements of the covert codeword at the demodulation block (i.e.,
uj, j 6= i) [101]. The second term is the log-likelihood ratio of the a priori information
on ui. It is noted that the elements of the covert codeword are considered to be (i.i.d.)
equiprobable random bits due to the use of a random permutation block at the covert
transmitter. Thus, there would be no initial a priori information about the elements
of the covert codeword to the modulation block. For clarity of description, lets rewrite
Equation (5.21) in vector format for all elements of the covert codeword. Hence,
Rcm = R
i + Ra (5.22)
Where, Rcm is the composite log-likelihood ratio at the output of the demodulator
block. The result of the demodulation block is passed through a de-interleaver and then
sent to the decoder block as the a priori information about the received covert codeword.
Hence, the input to the decoder is the combination of the a priori information (i.e., Ra)
and the intrinsic information of the demodulation block (i.e., Ri). The decoder uses this
information (i) to produce an estimation of the covert message (i.e., mˆ), and (ii) to compute
the decoder’s version of the log-likelihood ratio of the elements of the covert codeword (i.e.,
Rcd). Thus, we have:
Rcd = R
i + Ra + Re (5.23)
Where, Rcd is the decoder’s composite log-likelihood ratio at the end of the first iteration
round. Re is called the extrinsic information [101], and represents the extra information
added by the decoding block about the elements of the covert codeword. It is worth noting
that Equations (5.23) is valid only if inputs to the decoder are independent. Otherwise,
the log likelihood ratios can not be represented as separate parameters. This indepen-
dence is achieved by the interleaver/de-interleaver blocks between the demodulator and
the decoding block.
The result of the first iteration is returned to the modulation block as the a priori
information for the second round. However, in order for the iterative processing to converge
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to the correct answer, the information used as the a priori information for each block
should not contain the information that has been generated by that block in the previous
round [102]. For instance, the a priori information to the demodulation block for the
second iteration round consists of the original a priori information (i.e., Ra) and the
extrinsic information from the decoding block (i.e., Re), yet it does not include the intrinsic
information which was generated by the modulation block in the previous iteration (i.e.,
Ri). To this end, the output of the decoder has to be subtracted from the results of
the demodulation block before it can be used as the input to the demodulation block for
the next iteration round (i.e., Figure 5.6). The same argument holds for the decoding
block. Therefore, the input to the decoder should be the combination of the original a
priori information and the intrinsic information from the modulation block. However, the
extrinsic information of the previous round should be removed from the decoder’s input.
5.3.4 Guard Band
The iterative demodulation/decoding technique significantly enhances the receiver’s capa-
bility to correctly recover the covert message. However, in-depth analysis of the proposed
scheme reveals that it is possible to improve the reliability of the covert channel even fur-
ther by means that are provided by the flexible design of the modulation scheme. Timing
covert channels in communication networks are usually designed based on embedding the
covert message in the IPDs of the covert traffic. Hence, the error rate at the covert receiver
is significantly reduced if the inter-packet delays that represent bit-0 and bit-1 are easily
distinguishable.
Consider the model-based covert modulation of Figure 5.7, where small delays represent
bit-0 and large delays represent bit-1. In order to preserve the stealthiness property of the
covert channel, the covert transmitter has to select all possible IPDs according to the
distribution pattern of the legitimate traffic. However, for those IPDs that are close to the
domain deliminator line (i.e., d = F−1(1
2
)), the probability of detecting the received IPD
at the wrong side of the threshold line (due to the channel noise) increases significantly.
Such an event would dramatically reduce the decoding performance at the covert receiver.
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Figure 5.7: Model-based covert modulation with guard band.
To solve this problem it is suggested to consider a guard band around the domain
deliminator line (i.e., the shaded region in Figure 5.7), and let the transmitter ignore the
guard band during the modulation process [47]. Unfortunately, this approach forces the
pattern of the inter-packet delays of the covert traffic to deviate from the pattern of the
legitimate traffic which can be detected by a system observer. In fact, it can be shown
that the negative effect of increasing the size of the guard band (i.e., λ) on the stealthiness
property of the channel is much more severe than its contribution to the robustness of the
covert channel.
In order to prevent the negative effects of using the guard band on the covertness of the
channel, we introduce pilot symbols in the design of the turbo covert channel. In this way,
every time the modulation block needs to modulate a message with an IPD in the guard
band region, it uses a pilot symbol instead of an information symbol that carries covert
information. The pilot symbol is known at the covert transmitter and the covert receiver,
hence decoding the pilot symbol is guaranteed to be error-free at the covert receiver. To
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this end, the covert transmitter splits the domain of input to the quantile function (i.e., the
Y-axis in Figure 5.7) into three distinct regions. One region is for the pilot symbols (i.e.,
the guard band) and the other two are associated to modulate covert bit-0 and covert bit-1.
Therefore, the modulation process has to be modified by redefining the branch indicator
parameter (i.e., ai) as follows:
ai =

uki+vki+λ(uki−vki )
2
si−1 = 0, gi ≥ λ
uki+wki+λ(uki−wki )
2
si−1 = 1, gi ≥ λ
1−λ
2
+ gi gi < λ
(5.24)
Where, gi is a uniformly distributed random number (i.e., gi ∼ U(0, 1)) that is generated
by a CSPRNG. The value of gi controls the transmitter’s decision on whether to include
a pilot symbol as the ith symbol of the covert traffic or modulate an information symbol
instead. ki ∈ [n], is the index of the next information bit that is expected to be transmitted
by the covert transmitter and it is calculated as follows:
ki =
{
ki−1 + 1 gi ≥ λ
ki−1 gi < λ
, i ∈ [n], k0 = 0 (5.25)
The state parameter (i.e., si) is also redefined as follows:
si =

uki ⊕ si−1 gi ≥ λ
1 λ
2
≤ gi < λ
0 0 ≤ gi < λ2
, s0 = 0 (5.26)
It is noted that when gi < λ (i.e., pilot symbol modulation), ai and si depend only on
gi. Therefore, similar to the discussion on Equation (5.4), s = (s1, s2, ....) forms a sequence
of (i.i.d.) equiprobable random bits. To be more precise, when gi < λ, the value of the
corresponding state parameter (i.e., si) would be 0 or 1 if gi falls in the lower half (i.e.,
0 ≤ gi < λ2 ) or the higher half of the guard band (i.e., λ2 ≤ gi < λ), respectively. Therefore,
one can realize the probability of the state parameter in this case as follows:
P (si = 0|gi < λ) = P (si = 1|gi < λ) = 1
2
(5.27)
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On the other hand, when the covert transmitter is modulating the covert codeword
(i.e., gi ≥ λ), the state parameter (i.e., si) is defined by combining the corresponding
covert codeword (i.e., ui) and the previous state of the encoder trellis (i.e., si−1). However,
since the elements of the covert codeword are (i.i.d.) equiprobable random bits, the value of
the state parameter (i.e., si) can be either 0 or 1 with equal probability as well. Therefore,
P (si = 0|gi ≥ λ) = P (si = 1|gi ≥ λ) = 1
2
(5.28)
Combining Equations (5.27) and (5.28) for any j ∈ {0, 1}, we have:
P (si = j) =
∑
gi
P (si = j|gi)P (gi)
= λP (si = j|gi < λ) + (1− λ)P (si = j|gi ≥ λ)
=
1
2
(5.29)
By sharing g = (g1, g2, ...) between the covert transmitter and the covert receiver,
the receiver gains perfect knowledge on the location, and the value of the pilot symbols,
regardless of the channel condition and the covert message. It is worth noting that sharing
the random vector g does not imply any additional constraint on the system design. In
fact, the covert transmitter and the covert receiver already have a shared secret that can
be used to generate sequences of independent random numbers.
In addition to increase the minimum distance between IPDs that reflect covert bit-0
with those that represent covert bit-1, pilot symbols can be used to improve the effective-
ness of the demodulation/decoding process at the covert receiver. In more detail, having
perfect knowledge on pilot symbols, the receiver uses this information in order to refine its
estimation of the elements of the covert codeword. In addition, the covert receiver can use
the pilot symbols to update its estimation of the statistical characteristics of the channel
(i.e., fz(z)) which directly affects the decoding performance at the covert receiver.
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5.4 Performance Analysis
The three main performance metrics of a covert communication scheme i.e., undetectability,
reliability, and covert rate are the major players of the performance analysis study of the
turbo covert channel. In this section, we test the ability of the TCC scheme to evade
detection, provide a robust covert communication channel, and achieve high covert rate.
5.4.1 Undetectability Analysis
Hiding the communication channel without being detected is one of the main design cri-
teria of a network covert channel. In other words, the stealthiness property of the turbo
covert channel is of a great importance in analyzing the effectiveness of the proposed covert
communication framework. To this end, it is shown that the TCC scheme achieves provable
polynomial undetectability according to Definition 3.2. This means that the turbo covert
channel is undetectable against any polynomial-time statistical test that analyzes the sam-
ples of the covert traffic and the legitimate traffic. A salient feature of the TCC scheme
is that its covertness property is always assumed to be non-negotiable. In other words,
the channel should always achieve polynomial undetectability regardless of the channel
conditions (e.g., error rate) or the configuration parameters of the system (e.g., code rate,
guard band size).
To show the undetectability of the TCC scheme, we first confirm that the set of branch
indicator parameters (i.e., a = {a1, a2, ...}), form a sequence of (i.i.d.) uniformly dis-
tributed random numbers. Then, a reduction is demonstrated that transforms the problem
of detecting the covert channel into the problem of distinguishing the output of a CSPRNG
from a true random sequence. This leads to a contradiction according to Definition 3.3.
Preposition 5.1. Let v, w, g, λ ∼ U(0, 1) be four independent uniformly distributed random
variables generated by a CSPRNG according to Definition 3.3. Define u and s to be two
independent binary random bits that take values 0 or 1 with equal probability. Let the
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branch indicator parameter (i.e., a) to be defined as follows:
a =

u+v+λ(u−v)
2
s = 0, g ≥ λ
u+w+λ(u−w)
2
s = 1, g ≥ λ
1−λ
2
+ g g < λ
(5.30)
Then, a is uniformly distributed in the range [0, 1]. In other words,
fa(x) =
dFa(x)
dx
=
{
1 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(5.31)
Where, fa(.) denotes the probability density function (i.e., PDF), and Fa(.) is the cumu-
lative distribution function (i.e., CDF) of the random variable a.
Proof. The proof comes directly from the definition of a, and the properties of u, s, v, w, g,
and λ. We have,
Fa(x) = P (a ≤ x)
=
1∑
u=0
1∑
s=0
[
P (a ≤ x|u, s, g ≥ λ) P (u, s|g ≥ λ) P (g ≥ λ)
+ P (a ≤ x|u, s, g < λ) P (u, s|g < λ) P (g < λ)]
(a)
=
1∑
u=0
1∑
s=0
[
(1− λ)P (u, s)P (a ≤ x|u, s, g ≥ λ) + λP (u, s) P (a ≤ x|u, s, g < λ)]
(b)
=
1∑
u=0
1∑
s=0
[(1− λ)
4
P (a ≤ x|u, s, g ≥ λ) + λ
4
P (a ≤ x|g < λ)]
=
1− λ
4
1∑
u=0
1∑
s=0
[
P (a ≤ x|u, s, g ≥ λ)]+ λP (a ≤ x|g < λ)
(c)
=
1− λ
4
1∑
u=0
[
P (a ≤ x|u, s = 0, g ≥ λ) + P (a ≤ x|u, s = 1, g ≥ λ)]
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+ λP (
1− λ
2
+ g ≤ x)
=
1− λ
4
1∑
u=0
[
P (
u+ v + λ(u− v)
2
≤ x|u) + P (u+ w + λ(u− w)
2
≤ x|u)]
+ λP (g ≤ x− 1− λ
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pg(x)
=
1− λ
4
1∑
u=0
P (v ≤ 2x− u(1− λ)
1− λ |u) + P (w ≤
2x− w(1 + λ)
1− λ |u) + Pg(x)
=
1− λ
4
(
P (v ≤ 2x
1− λ) + P (w ≤
2x
1− λ)
)
+
1− λ
4
(
P (v ≤ 2x− (1 + λ)
1− λ ) + P (w ≤
2x− (1 + λ)
1− λ )
)
+ Pg(x)
(d)
=
1− λ
2
P (v ≤ 2x
1− λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P0(x)
+
1− λ
2
P (v ≤ 2x− (1 + λ)
1− λ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1(x)
+Pg(x)
= P0(x) + P1(x) + Pg(x) (5.32)
Where, (a) is according to the fact that u, s, and g are independent random variables.
The equality in (b) comes from the fact that u and s are (i.i.d.) equiprobable random bits.
From the definition of the random variable a (i.e., Equation (5.30)), one can realize that
given g < λ, the random variable a depends only on g and λ. This observation forms the
basis for the equality in (c). Finally, the transition in (d) is based on the fact that v and w
are independent and uniformly distributed random variables (i.e., v, w ∼ U(0, 1)). Hence,
one can express the terms P0, P1, and Pg according to the following formulas respectively,
P0(x) =

1−λ
2
x > 1−λ
2
x 0 < x < 1−λ
2
0 x ≤ 0
(5.33)
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P1(x) =

1−λ
2
x > 1
x− 1+λ
2
1+λ
2
< x ≤ 1
0 x ≤ 1+λ
2
(5.34)
Pg(x) =

λ x > 1+λ
2
x− 1−λ
2
1−λ
2
< x ≤ 1+λ
2
0 x ≤ 1−λ
2
(5.35)
Combining Equations (5.32), (5.33), (5.34), and (5.35) one can write Fa(x) as follows:
Fa(x) = P0(x) + P1(x) + Pg(x) =

1 x > 1
x 0 < x < 1
0 x ≤ 0
(5.36)
Hence,
fa(x) =
dFa(x)
dx
=
{
1 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(5.37)
Using the result of Preposition 5.1, we state the undetectability of the turbo covert
communication scheme according to the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. Let F(.) be the CDF of inter-packet delays of a sequence of samples from
legitimate traffic of a channel (i.e., d˜ = {d˜1, d˜2, ...}). Consider d = F−1(a) to be the
sequence of IPDs of the covert traffic of the same channel that is generated according to the
turbo covert communication scheme. Then, there exist no polynomial time statistical test
that can distinguish d from any same length samples of the legitimate traffic of the network
(i.e., d˜). In other words, for any probabilistic polynomial time statistical test T (.), and
any positive number κ, there exists a negligible function ν(κ) such that:
|T (d)− T (d˜)| = ν(κ) (5.38)
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Proof. Since all elements of the random sequences that are used by the covert transmitter
of the turbo covert channel (i.e., v,w,g) are generated by a CSPRNG, they are mutually
independent from each other. In addition, the elements of the covert codeword (i.e., u),
and the state variables (i.e., si) are designed to be equiprobable independent random bits.
Hence, from Equation (5.24) and Preposition 5.1, it can be observed that the set of branch
indicator parameters (i.e., a = (a1, a2, ....)) is a sequence of (i.i.d.) random variables
drawn according to a uniform distribution. This is analogous to the output of a CSPRNG
according to Definition 3.3.
Now assume there exists a polynomial-time statistical test (i.e., T ) that is capable of
distinguishing the sequence of IPDs of the covert traffic (i.e., d) from the samples of the
legitimate traffic of the network (i.e., d˜). Hence, one can define another polynomial-time
statistical test (i.e., T ∗ = T ◦ F−1), that can distinguish a = F(d) from a true sequence
of random numbers. However, this contradicts with the fact that a has the properties of
the output of a CSPRNG.
In other words, the turbo covert channel achieves provable undetectability against any
polynomial-time statistical test that runs on the samples of inter-packet delays of the covert
traffic and the legitimate traffic of the same network.
5.4.2 Covert Rate Analysis
The covert rate of the TCC scheme is defined as the ratio of transmitted covert information
bits to the number of packets in the covert traffic. Hence, the covert rate of the channel
is denoted in bits/packets (i.e., bpp). From the structure of the covert transmitter (i.e.,
Figure 5.2) it can be observed that the covert rate of the TCC scheme is directly affected
by the channel code rate (i.e., r). In fact, the higher the code rate the covert codeword
contains more covert information and less redundancy which directly translates into higher
covert rate for the channel. However, increasing the rate of the channel code means that
the received codeword at the covert receiver contains less redundancy information to deal
with possible channel noise.
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The size of the guard band is another compelling factor in the achievable covert rate of
the TCC scheme. In fact, the covert rate of the turbo covert channel changes proportionally
to the size of the guard band. It is noted that when the guard band is in place, the covert
transmitter modulates pilot symbols instead of covert information bits when it generates
packets with IPDs within the guard band region. Thus, with a guard band of size λ, the
covert transmitter modulates a pilot symbol with probability λ. Hence, one can write the
expected achievable covert rate of the proposed turbo covert channel (i.e., ρ) as follows:
ρ = r(1− λ) (5.39)
Where, r is the rate of the channel code, and λ is the guard band size. It is noted
that by using a more reliable modulation scheme (i.e., larger guard band) the transmitter
achieves the flexibility to increase its channel code rate in order to compensate for some
of the rate loss due to the transmission of pilot symbols. This is analogous to the concept
of adaptive coding and modulation in digital communication [103]. In this way, the covert
transmitter can use the channel code rate, and the size of the guard band as two control
parameters to achieve a desired balance between the covert rate and the robustness without
compromising the stealthiness property of the channel.
5.4.3 Robustness and Channel Reliability
The robustness of the turbo covert channel relies on the channel code that is selected at
the covert transmitter (i.e., code rate), the modulation strategy (i.e., guard band size),
and also the effort of the covert receiver on decoding the covert message (i.e., number
of decoding iterations). In this section the robustness of the TCC scheme is studied in
terms of decoding bit error rate (i.e., BER) at the covert receiver under different system
configurations. In fact, using a variety of channel codes and guard band sizes, one can
demonstrate the flexibility of the TCC scheme in adapting to channel conditions and
system requirements. On the one hand, there is the setup with no guard band in the
modulation block, where the reliability of the channel depends solely on the channel code
and the iterative demodulation/decoding process at the receiver. On the other hand,
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Table 5.1: Performance analysis system configuration parameters
System parameter Selected value
Channel code rate r = 1
2
, 2
3
, 3
4
, 6
7
Guard-band size λ = 0.15, 0.25
Cumulative distribution function F(d) = 1− (α
d
)β
Quantile function F−1(a) = α( 1
1−a)
1
β
Pareto distribution parameters α = 49ms, β = 0.95
Jitter standard deviation σ = 10ms
Jamming noise distribution n ∼ U(0,∆)
Maximum jamming noise level ∆ ∈ [0, 200ms]
the transmitter may choose to use a guard band in the modulation process, and use a
higher channel code rate to compensate for the rate loss due to the pilot symbols in the
covert traffic. It is noted that the existence of a channel code is necessary for the iterative
demodulation and decoding process at the covert receiver. Table 5.1 summarizes the
parameters of the system configurations that are used for the performance analysis of the
proposed turbo covert communication scheme.
The channel code in use is a rate 1/2 convolutional code with the generator matrix
[133; 171]. Given this mother code, one can puncture the original covert codeword and
generate a wide variety of channel codes with different code rates [51]. It is noted that
combining a second stage channel code (e.g., a Reed-Solomon code [104]) with the first
stage convoloutional encoder would significantly improve the decoding performance of the
covert receiver, yet it is decided to leave the system complexity at minimum with a single
encoder block.
To model the legitimate traffic of the channel, samples of about 106 SSH packets are
extracted from CAIDA traffic traces [97]. These samples represent the traffic pattern of
shell sessions that are used as the legitimate traffic of the channel. In this way, the CDF of
the legitimate traffic is derived according to Pareto distribution as F(d) = 1− (α
d
)β, where
α = 49ms is the scale parameter and β = 0.95 is the shift parameter of the distribution.
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Figure 5.8: BER performance of the TCC scheme with no guard band.
The channel noise consists of two main components. The first element represents the
inherent network noise due to the channel jitter or packet loss. This noise component is
modeled using samples of about 106 packets that are collected over the Internet, and has an
average standard deviation of 10ms. The second component is the jamming noise that is
added to packet arrival times by an active adversarial entity. The jamming noise may have
any arbitrary distribution and usually is much more notable as compared to the network
jitter. In this section, the jamming noise is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the
range [0,∆].
Figure 5.8 illustrates the bit error rate at the covert receiver, given different channel code
rates with no modulation guard band. For each individual channel code, the performance
of a single decoding round and three rounds of iterative decoding are reported. The graph
is based on the maximum expected jamming noise (i.e., ∆) for a uniformly distributed
jamming noise. According to the graph, the covert receiver can withstand high levels of
adversarial disruption and yet decode the covert message with extremely low error rates.
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The graph also reveals the importance of iterative decoding on boosting the decoding
performance of the covert receiver. In fact, performing only three rounds of iterative
demodulation/decoding can reduce the error rate by more than 4 orders of magnitude
(e.g., BER is reduced by a factor of 10−4 for r = 3/4 at ∆ = 100ms). It is worth noting
that such a significant improvement is achieved with no extra bandwidth overhead. The
computational complexity of decoding at the covert receiver is also minimal due to existence
of efficient implementations of the MAP decoding algorithm [105].
In addition to the channel code, the modulation scheme provides some degrees of free-
dom that can be exploited using the proposed guard band scheme. The effect of using
guard band on the performance of the TCC scheme is depicted in Figure 5.9. In fact,
the impact of the modulation guard band on BER of the covert receiver becomes much
more pronounced with the iterative decoding in place. For instance, given the maximum
jamming delay of ∆ = 160ms, a rate 2/3 channel code barely makes a difference when
no guard band is used (i.e., Figure 5.8). In contrast, using even small guard band sizes,
the error rate decreases to 3 × 10−5 for λ = 0.15, and even further to less than 10−6 for
λ = 0.25.
The graphs in Figure 5.9 also illustrate the effect of increasing the size of the guard band
on the decoding performance of the covert receiver. In fact, expanding the guard band
separates the IPDs that represent covert bit-0 and covert bit-1 even further. This makes
it much easier to remove the channel noise and decode the covert message correctly at the
covert receiver. Thus, the covert channel becomes extremely robust and can withstand
enormous adversarial disruption and channel noise levels. For instance, it can be observed
that increasing the size of the guard band from λ = 0.15 to λ = 0.25 enables the covert
receiver to withstand adversarial disruptions with relatively high jamming noise levels
(e.g., ∆ = 200ms), and yet recover the covert message with very low bit error ratio (e.g.,
10−4). However, this performance improvement comes with the bandwidth overhead that
is needed for the pilot symbols in the covert traffic.
The application of the modulation guard band can be combined with the proper se-
lection of the channel code at the covert transmitter in order to achieve optimum tradeoff
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(a) λ = 0.15
(b) λ = 0.25
Figure 5.9: BER performance of the TCC scheme with guard band in place.
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between the robustness and the covert rate of the channel. Since using the guard band
improves the channel reliability, the covert transmitter may increase the channel code rate
in order to compensate for the bandwidth reduction due to the pilot symbols. Figure 5.10
compares the performance of different combinations of guard band sizes and channel code
rates while the covert rate of the channel is kept constant in each scenario. According to
the graph, by combining the guard band and the iterative demodulation/decoding tech-
nique, one can push the performance boundaries of the TCC scheme even further and
achieve higher covert rates with lower decoding error rates simultaneously. For instance,
The graph illustrates that with ∆ = 130ms and after three rounds of iterative decoding,
the decoding performance of the combination of the guard band of size λ = 0.11 and a
rate 3/4 convoloutional code (i.e., Figure 5.10a) is 10 times (i.e., one order of magnitude)
superior than the BER performance of a rate 2/3 convolutional code with no guard band
(i.e., λ = 0). It is worth noting that in both cases the achievable covert rate of the channel
is similar (i.e., ρ = 2/3bpp). Moreover, the decoding complexity of the covert receiver in
both cases are the same as the receiver performs three rounds of iterative demodulation
and decoding in either configuration.
The plots in Figure 5.10 reveal another important design criterion of the TCC scheme.
According to the graph, the trade-off between the selected code rate and the guard band
size is not linear, and varies depending on the covert rate and noise level in the channel. It
is noted that, in order to fix the covert rate of the channel, enlarging the guard band should
be combined with increasing the code rate of the channel code. However, increasing the
code rate reduces the strength of the channel code up to a point that the decoding block
at the covert receiver can not efficiently contribute to the iterative demodulation/decoding
process, specifically in noisy channel conditions. The result is a poor decoding performance
for covert channel configurations with high rate channel codes. As an example, for the
maximum expected noise level of ∆ = 130ms and the covert rate of ρ = 2/3bpp, the
graphs in Figure 5.10a illustrates similar decoding performance (i.e., BER ≈ 10−3) for the
covert channel configuration that uses no modulation guard band (i.e., r = 2/3, λ = 0),
and the setup that is formed by combining the guard band of size λ = 0.22 and a rate
6/7 convoloutional code. Meanwhile, the combination of a rate 3/4 convoloutional code
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(a) Covert rate= 2/3 bpp
(b) Covert rate= 1/2 bpp
Figure 5.10: BER performance of the TCC scheme given a fixed covert rate.
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with the guard band of size λ = 0.11 hits a remarkably low error rate at 7 × 10−5. This
is a considerable improvement in the decoding performance of the covert receiver which is
achieved with no bandwidth overhead or computational complexity at the covert receiver.
Therefore, one has to pay special attention in balancing the size of the guard band and the
channel code rate, when designing a turbo covert channel.
5.5 Target Applications
Covert channels over public communication networks have attracted a lot of attention
due to their application in secure communication, hidden coordination, side channel au-
thentication, and their effectiveness in watermarking packet streams that flow in/out of a
communication network. Typically, these applications enforce the requirement of having
a stealthy and robust covert communication channel that resists adversarial disruption
without being detected.
Providing a stealth communication channel to transmit authentication information is
another promising line of application for covert channels. In order to improve system
security, each node has to be authenticated before it receives service in the system. Using
cryptographic primitives for authentication ensures the correctness of the authentication
process (i.e., only legitimate users receive service), however it can not protect the channel
that is used to exchange the authentication data. Thus, an adversarial entity may target
such communication channels in order to disrupt the authentication process. Therefore,
it is suggested to use covert communication schemes to send authentication information
through a hidden communication channel in the system [64,106].
The impressive ability of public communication networks (e.g., Internet) in reaching be-
yond geographical and political borders has triggered intense censorship activities in order
to restrict data communication over computer networks. Thwarting censorship barriers is
another major application of network covert channels. In particular, there are several pro-
posals on using covert channels to bypass filtering systems that aim to limit the free flow of
information over the Internet [107,108]. It is noted that using encryption or anonymization
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techniques can only protect the contents of the communication channel or the identity of
parties that exchange information over the network. However these methods are hardly
effective in dealing with restrictions that are usually imposed by censorship authorities.
Covert channels have been extensively used in de-anonymization and flow watermarking
roles. It is noted that the anonymization services in communication networks can be easily
exploited by attackers or compromised users in order to lunch untraceable attacks. Using
covert channels the downstream network nodes can glean more information about the
upstream path of a packet stream. In this way, it is possible to correlate network flows
through different network nodes (i.e., stepping stones) [109], or trace back the source of
a network flow (i.e., potential attacker) that may have come through an anonymization
system in order to hide the true identity of the transmitter. [110].
The application domain of covert communication schemes over computer networks is
rapidly expanding, and every day a new approach that incorporates covert channels for
secure communication is introduced in the literature. However, the reliability of a covert
channel is considered to be a decisive factor when it comes to deploying covert channels
in real life scenarios. In fact, the sensitivity of covert channels to the network noise and
adversarial disruptions often proves to be a major obstacle that limits the functionality of
covert channels in practice. The proposed turbo covert communication scheme provides a
promising solution to this challenge as it achieves a high level of undetectability combined
with remarkable tolerance against channel noise and adversarial disruptions.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter a new framework for robust, undetectable and high rate timing covert chan-
nels over public communication networks is introduced. Based on the proposed framework,
a model-based covert channel is designed that combines a trellis structure and an adaptive
modulation scheme to map the covert message into inter-packet delays of the covert traffic.
The design enables the covert receiver to perform iterative demodulation/decoding of the
covert message that is proven to achieve extremely high level of robustness even in the pres-
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ence of active adversarial entities in the channel. A salient feature of the proposed covert
communication scheme is that it achieves provable undetectability regardless of the channel
condition, desired robustness, and the covert rate of the channel. Performance analysis of
the proposed scheme reveals that the turbo covert channel can withstand extremely high
levels of channel noise and adversarial disruption while it maintains an excellent unde-
tectability level and high covert rate.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Covert channels have attracted a great deal of attention as a security threat in com-
puter systems. Traditionally, covert channels are viewed as communication pathways that
are neither designed nor intended to exchange information. However, these paths can
be exploited by unorthodox methods to leak sensitive information beyond the permitted
boundaries that are defined by access control authorities. The secrecy of theses channels
mostly relies on inherited secrecy from the obscurity of the communication method and
the resource that is used for communication. However, as the shared resource is exposed,
the covert traffic can be detected due to the effects of modulating a covert message over
normal characteristics of the shared resource.
The evolution of computer networks and wireless technology led the communication
community to revisit the concept of covert communication not only as a security threat
but also as an alternative way of providing security and privacy to communication net-
works. However, network covert channels often rely on resources in target communication
network that are likely to be monitored by system observers and traffic analysis entities.
Therefore, new design strategies are required to construct stealth, reliable and high rate
covert channels that are suited for such a noisy and tightly monitored environment.
In this dissertation we explored a novel design methodology for network covert channels.
Undetectability, robustness and the achievable covert rate of the channel are the major ob-
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jectives in our design methodology. The design methodology is based on the concept of
behavioral mimicry in which the covert transmitter aims on mimicking the statistical be-
haviors of a normal node in the system. In this way, the generated covert traffic inherits
the same statistical properties of a normal traffic flow of the system. Thus, it would be
extremely difficult for a system observer to track down the covert channel based on the
statistical characteristics of the covert traffic or the behavioral fingerprints of the covert
transmitter. In order to identify the proper medium for covert communication we propose
to search for available sources of randomness in communication protocols and network en-
vironments. It is noted that randomness is used in design of communication protocols in
order to achieve fairness, stability, and scalability. Such sources of random behavior can be
exploited for covert communication in order to facilitate modulating a covert message over
behavioral characteristics of the covert transmitter. In fact, in this thesis we have identi-
fied several sources of randomness in communication protocols such as random behaviors
in access control protocols (e.g., CSMA/CA) and cryptographic algorithms (e.g., digital
signature schemes). By combining the covert modulation process with the inherent random
behavior of the communication protocol, the covert transmitter achieves more degrees of
freedom and releases itself from constraints that are imposed by the existence of a fixed
covert message in its behavioral fingerprints. Thus, the covert transmitter acts more like a
normal transmitter of the system and the covert traffic resembles the properties of a normal
traffic flow in the network. A salient feature of such design methodology is the ability to
design covert channels with high levels of stealthiness that is a vital requirement for covert
communication over tightly monitored environments like communication networks.
Robustness and achievable rate of covert communication schemes are also studied in
this dissertation. In fact, without a reliable communication channel, the covert receiver
can not decode the covert message and the channel becomes practically ineffective. More
importantly, the channel design needs to be resistant against active adversarial attacks
in which an active adversary deliberately introduces noise to the covert traffic in order to
disrupt the normal flow of covert information. To elaborate more on our design mythology,
in the second part of this dissertation we have introduced two practical covert communi-
cation schemes according to the behavioral mimicry covert communication approach. To
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this end, wireless LAN and public computer networks (i.e., Internet) are selected as target
environments for covert communication. The selection is due to the diverse applications,
incredibly widespread usage, enormous number of devices, and the huge volume of infor-
mation that are exchanged over these networks. For each covert communication scheme a
three step design approach is followed. First of all, we identified a proper source of ran-
domness in the target communication network. This leads to the selection of the medium
that is used for covert communication. Then, an approach to exploit the shared resource
and modulate the covert message is proposed. The modulation approach is designed specif-
ically based on the concept of behavioral mimicry. Thus, it enables the covert transmitter
to mimic the behavioral characteristics of a normal transmitter in the network. Finally,
proper modifications are proposed in order to increase the robustness and the achievable
rate of the covert channel.
The proposed wireless covert communication scheme is based on the structural behav-
iors of the CSMA/CA and the binary back off algorithms. The covert message in this
approach is modulated over the inter-packet delays of the covert transmitter’s traffic, how-
ever the delays are measured based on a uniquely designed clock called the covert clock.
The covert clock is a virtual clock that uses the channel activities of a subset of regular
nodes in the system as its clock ticks. The packet transmission process of the covert trans-
mitter is controlled by the covert clock as well. Consequently, the packet transmission
activities of the covert transmitter are automatically linked with the normal transmission
pattern of the elements of the network. This adaptive behavior proves to be crucial in
making an undetectable and stealth covert communication scheme. Using the broadcast
nature of the wireless environment, the covert receiver is capable of observing the same
channel activities as those that are observed by the covert transmitter. Thus, the covert
receiver can synchronize its covert clock with the one at the covert transmitter. In order
to match the behavioral characteristics of the covert transmitter to the ones of a normal
node in the channel, three design criteria for the covert transmitter are proposed (i.e.,
transmission rate, transmission window, expansion postpone design criteria). The adap-
tive design of the covert transmitter enables it to mimic not only the long-term statistical
characteristics of a normal transmitter in the channel, but also it can exhibit the temporal
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short-term behaviors of an ordinary network node. This means that the covert transmitter
can react to unpredictable network events (e.g., packet loss) very similar to an ordinary
transmitter in the channel. Thus, it is difficult to detect the covert channel even using
second order statistical test like the regularity score. By using the properties of the origi-
nal communication protocol (e.g., acknowledgment messages), the covert receiver increases
the likelihood of decoding the covert message and improve the channel robustness in order
to operate in the error-prone wireless environment. Another important feature of the pro-
posed scheme is that the covert rate of the channel linearly increases with the overt rate
of the communication channel. We have backed up our analysis of the proposed scheme
with a series of numerical analysis tests. The numerical results confirm that the proposed
wireless covert communication scheme achieves relatively high covert communication rates
with outstanding security and reliability scores.
We also introduced turbo covert channels which are a family of model-based timing
covert channels over public communication networks (e.g., Internet). Turbo covert com-
munication schemes are designed based on sound engineering foundations of communication
theory, and they are intended to be extremely reliable against network noise and adversarial
disruptions. To this end, we have modeled the covert channel as a differential communi-
cation channel over a noisy environment. The covert modulation process is formed by
combining an efficient trellis structure with an adaptive modulation scheme that maps a
covert message into inter-packet delays of the covert traffic. The adaptive modulation de-
sign gives the covert transmitter enough degrees of freedom to use only the error resistance
portion of the available inter-packet delay spectrum without compromising the stealthiness
property of the channel. In fact, assuming that the inter-packet delays of the overt traffic
of the channel are (i.i.d.) random variables, the proposed covert communication scheme
achieves provable polynomial undetectability, regardless of the network condition, desired
robustness, and the expected covert rate of the channel. This means the covert channel
is undetectable against any polynomial-time statistical test that analyzes samples of the
covert traffic and the legitimate traffic of the system. It is noted that this assumption does
not limit the practically of the turbo covert channel design as (i.i.d.) random processes
have been widely used in modeling the traffic of communication networks. The design
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of the covert modulation process enables the covert receiver to perform iterative demod-
ulation/decoding of the covert message that is proven to achieve extremely high level of
robustness even in the presence of active adversarial entities in the channel. We argue
that the proposed covert communication scheme is a solid candidate for a diverse range
of applications that require robust and undetectable covert channels in communication
network. We have discussed a few of such applications and provided insight on how the
proposed scheme can be adapted for those services in practical scenarios.
In brief, the contribution of this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
• Based on the concept of behavioral mimicry, we proposed a design methodology
that addresses the challenge of designing robust, undetectable, and high rate covert
channels over communication networks.
• We have recognized the inherent randomness in communication protocols and net-
work environments as the key in finding a proper medium for covert communication.
We have identified several sources of randomness and provided examples on how
these random behaviors lead to the discovery of suitable shared resources for covert
channels.
• We introduced a novel covert communication scheme for wireless networks. The
design of the new covert communication scheme begins with identifying the source of
randomness in the legacy system which leads to the selection of the medium for the
covert communication scheme. Next a step-by-step design approach was presented
in order to adopt the original communication protocol for the purpose of covert
communication. The result is a set of design criteria that defines the operational
parameters of the covert transmitter.
• We introduced turbo covert channels (TCC) which are a family of model-based net-
work timing covert channels. The TCC family is capable of achieving incredibly high
levels of robustness due to the implementation of an adaptive modulation scheme
at the covert transmitter and the iterative demodulation/decoding at the covert re-
ceiver. The covert channel also proved to be polynomially undetectable, under correct
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assumptions, against any polynomial-time statistical test that runs on the samples
of the covert traffic and the legitimate traffic of the channel.
In addition, we have supported our proposed design methodology and covert communi-
cation schemes with extensive numerical analysis and tests. In fact, the proposed schemes
are studied from undetectability, reliability, and achievable covert rate perspectives. The
dissertation also includes discussions on prospective applications and the feasibility of de-
ploying the proposed covert communication schemes in practical scenarios.
6.1 Future Directions
We have identified two main fronts that one can consider as future directions on extending
the contributions of this dissertation. The first front is focused on the concept of behav-
ioral mimicry covert communication and the design methodology that is presented in this
dissertation. In this thesis, the randomness in communication protocols and computer
networks is studied as the gateway to select proper resources for covert channels. We also
presented few examples of such random sources in communication protocols. However,
the diversity of network topologies, devices, and communication protocols implies the exis-
tence of countless possible sources of randomness that are yet to be discovered and studied
from covert communication perspective. As an example, we discussed the application of
behavioral mimicry covert communication in sensor networks. Design of such covert com-
munication schemes demands extensive research and requires further study of the design
methodology that is presented in this dissertation.
The second angle on extending the contributions of this thesis is on improving the
performance of the proposed covert communication schemes. The proposed turbo covert
communication scheme is mainly designed with the mindset of optimizing the robustness
of the covert channel under the constraint that the channel should achieve provable poly-
nomial undetectability. The other perspective of such design is to consider the achievable
covert rate of the channel as the primary objective. In more detail, the presented version of
the turbo covert transmitter modulates only one bit of the covert codeword in each packet
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transmission. By splitting the domain of available inter-packet delays to more than two
sections, one can increase the number of possible symbols per packet transmission in order
to increase the achievable covert rate of the covert channel. However, this requires some
modifications in the modulation scheme, guard-band configuration, and more importantly
the design of the trellis structure that is used for encoding and decoding the covert message.
It is noted that increasing the covert rate of the channel inevitably impacts the reliability
of the covert communication scheme which has to be studied as well.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, preventing illegal exploitation of privacy preserving ser-
vices is one of the most promising applications of robust and undetectable network covert
channels including the turbo covert channel. However, implementing such covert commu-
nication scheme over an overlay of privacy preserving nodes would expose the channel to
re-packetization, and extensive packet reordering noise. The effect of such environment
may significantly reduce the reliability of the covert channel, and limits its efficiency for
watermarking network flows over public communication networks. In [50] it is suggested
to use a family of trellis codes called toroidal codes for covert communication. These chan-
nel codes are specifically designed to control the effect of symbol injection error events
on the robustness of network covert channels. We conjecture that the trellis structure
that is presented in [50] would be an exceptional addition to the proposed turbo covert
communication scheme, in particular against inherent network noise due to the privacy
preserving services and complex adversarial attacks. The same research plan can be ap-
plied to the proposed wireless covet communication scheme. In fact, the proposed wireless
covert communication scheme relies on traditional implementations of convoloutional codes
to handle possible error events in the channel. Although the covert receiver is supposed to
be capable of tracking lost and retransmitted packets using sequence number information
of the received packets, we believe the combination of the proposed covert communication
scheme and the toroidal codes would increase the resilience of the covert channel design,
in particular against byzantine attacks in wireless networks. This approach can also be an
efficient addition for covert communication schemes in sensor networks.
149

References
[1] S. Zander, G. Armitage, and P. Branch, “A survey of covert channels and countermea-
sures in computer network protocols,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 44–57, 2007.
[2] G. Bianchi, “Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination func-
tion,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 535–
547, 2000.
[3] B. Lampson, “A note on the confinement problem,” Communications of the ACM,
vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 613–615, 1973.
[4] D. Bell and L. La Padula, “Secure computer system: Unified exposition and multics
interpretation,” tech. rep., DTIC Document, 1976.
[5] B. Lampson, “Protection,” ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 18–24, 1974.
[6] S. Lipner, “A comment on the confinement problem,” ACM SIGOPS Operating Sys-
tems Review, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 192–196, 1975.
[7] P. Barham, B. Dragovic, K. Fraser, S. Hand, T. Harris, A. Ho, R. Neugebauer,
I. Pratt, and A. Warfield, “Xen and the art of virtualization,” vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 164–
177, 2003.
151
[8] S. Foley, “A model for secure information flow,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy, pp. 248–258, IEEE, 1989.
[9] J. Gray III, “Countermeasures and tradeoffs for a class of covert timing channel,”
tech. rep., Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 1994.
[10] S. Katzenbeisser and F. Petitcolas, Information Hiding Techniques for Steganography
and Digital Watermarking. Norwood, MA, USA: Artech House, Inc., 2000.
[11] S. Brand, “Dod 5200.28-std department of defense trusted computer system evalua-
tion criteria (orange book),” National Computer Security Center, 1985.
[12] G. Simmons, “The subliminal channel and digital signatures,” Advances in Cryptol-
ogy, pp. 364–378, 1985.
[13] T. Handel and M. Sandford, “Hiding data in the OSI network model,” in Information
Hiding, pp. 23–38, Springer, 1996.
[14] R. Kemmerer, “Shared resource matrix methodology: An approach to identifying
storage and timing channels,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, vol. 1, no. 3,
p. 277, 1983.
[15] C. Girling, “Covert channels in LANs,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,
vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 292–296, 1987.
[16] J. Patrik and P. Gallagher, A guide to understanding covert channel analysis of
trusted systems. National Computer Security Centre NCSCTG030, 1993.
[17] D. Kundur and K. Ahsan, “Practical internet steganography: data hiding in IP,” in
Proceedings of Texas Workshop on Security of Information Systems, vol. 2, 2003.
[18] G. Fisk, M. Fisk, C. Papadopoulos, and J. Neil, “Eliminating steganography in inter-
net traffic with active wardens,” in Proceedings of the Information Hiding Conference,
pp. 18–35, Springer, 2003.
152
[19] K. Ahsan and D. Kundur, “Practical data hiding in TCP/IP,” in Proceedings of the
ACM Workshop on Multimedia Security, vol. 2002, 2002.
[20] J. Rutkowska, “The implementation of passive covert channels in the Linux kernel,”
in Chaos Communication Congress, 2004.
[21] S. Murdoch and S. Lewis, “Embedding covert channels into TCP/IP,” in Proceedings
of the Information Hiding Conference, pp. 247–261, Springer, 2005.
[22] J. Wray, “An analysis of covert timing channels,” Journal of Computer Security,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 219–232, 1992.
[23] V. Berk, A. Giani, G. Cybenko, and N. Hanover, “Detection of covert channel encod-
ing in network packet delays,” tech. rep., Department of Computer Science, Dart-
mouth College, Technical Report TR2005536, 2005.
[24] J. Giles and B. Hajek, “An information-theoretic and game-theoretic study of timing
channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 48, no. 9, pp. 2455–2477,
2002.
[25] W. Hu, “Reducing timing channels with fuzzy time,” Journal of Computer Security,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 233–254, 1992.
[26] J. Giffin, R. Greenstadt, P. Litwack, and R. Tibbetts, “Covert messaging through
TCP timestamps,” in Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pp. 189–193, Springer, 2003.
[27] J. Millen, “20 years of covert channel modeling and analysis,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 113–114, IEEE, 1999.
[28] K. Ahsan, “Covert channel analysis and data hiding in TCP/IP,” Master’s thesis,
University of Toronto, 2002.
[29] C. Rowland, “Covert channels in the TCP/IP protocol suite,” First Monday Peer
Reviewed Journal on the Internet, vol. 2, no. 5, 1997.
153
[30] C. Abad, “IP checksum covert channels and selected hash collision,” Available at:
http://www.gray-world.net/papers/ipccc.pdf, 2001.
[31] R. Rivest et al., “Chaffing and winnowing: Confidentiality without encryption,”
CryptoBytes (RSA laboratories), vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 12–17, 1998.
[32] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway, “Collision-resistant hashing: Towards making UOWHFs
practical,” in Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference,
p. 470, Springer, 1997.
[33] M. Padlipsky, “Limitations of end-to-end encryption in secure computer networks,”
tech. rep., DTIC Document, 1978.
[34] S. Cabuk, C. Adviser-Brodley, and E. Adviser-Spafford, Network covert channels:
design, analysis, detection, and elimination. PhD thesis, Purdue University, 2006.
[35] S. Cabuk, C. Brodley, and C. Shields, “IP covert timing channels: design and detec-
tion,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pp. 178–187, ACM, 2004.
[36] G. Shah, A. Molina, and M. Blaze, “Keyboards and covert channels,” in Proceed-
ings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, vol. 15, p. 5, USENIX
Association, 2006.
[37] S. Gianvecchio and H. Wang, “Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based
approach,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, pp. 307–316, ACM, 2007.
[38] S. Cabuk, C. E. Brodley, and C. Shields, “IP covert channel detection,” ACM Trans-
actions on Information Systems and Security, vol. 12, pp. 22:1–22:29, Apr. 2009.
[39] S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, D. Wijesekera, and S. Jajodia, “Model-based covert tim-
ing channels: Automated modeling and evasion,” in Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection, pp. 211–230, Springer, 2008.
154
[40] Y. Liu, D. Ghosal, F. Armknecht, A. Sadeghi, S. Schulz, and S. Katzenbeisser, “Hide
and Seek in Time: Robust Covert Timing Channels,” in Proceedings of the 14th
European Symposium of Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), pp. 120–135,
Springer, 2010.
[41] R. Walls, K. Kothari, and M. Wright, “Liquid: A detection-resistant covert timing
channel based on ipd shaping,” Computer Networks, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 1217–1228,
2011.
[42] K. Kothari, “Mimic: An active covert channel that evades regularity-based detec-
tion,” Master’s thesis, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University
of Texas at Arlington, 2010.
[43] S. Sellke, C. Wang, S. Bagchi, and N. Shroff, “TCP/IP timing channels: Theory
to implementation,” in Proceedings of the 28th IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications, pp. 2204–2212, IEEE, 2009.
[44] S. Sellke, C. Wang, S. Bagchi, and N. Shroff, “Camouflaging timing channels in web
traffic,” tech. rep., School of Elecetrical and Computer Engineering, Purdo Univer-
sity, 2009.
[45] R. W. Smith and G. Scott Knight, “Predictable design of network-based covert com-
munication systems,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, pp. 311–321, IEEE, 2008.
[46] A. Houmansadr and N. Borisov, “CoCo: coding-based covert timing channels for
network flows,” in Proceedings of the Information Hiding Conference, pp. 314–328,
Springer, 2011.
[47] “Covert Fountain,” tech. rep., Department of Computer Science, University of Cali-
fornia Davis,Technical Report CSE-2011-6, 2011.
[48] M. Rodrigues, “Timing channel codes for covert communication and network flow
tracing,” Master’s thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012.
155
[49] Y. Liu, D. Ghosal, F. Armknecht, A. Sadeghi, S. Schulz, and S. Katzenbeisser, “Ro-
bust and undetectable steganographic timing channels for iid traffic,” in Proceedings
of the Information Hiding Conference, pp. 193–207, Springer, 2010.
[50] R. W. Smith and G. S. Knight, “Predictable three-parameter design of network
covert communication systems,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–13, 2011.
[51] S. Lin and D. Costello, Error control coding. Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1983.
[52] K. Szczypiorski, “HICCUPS: Hidden communication system for corrupted networks,”
in Proceedings of the International Multi-Conference on Advanced Computer Systems,
pp. 31–40, 2003.
[53] L. Butti and F. VEYSSET, “Wi-Fi Advanced Stealth,” in Proceedings of the Black
Hat US, 2006.
[54] S. Li and A. Ephremides, “A Network Layer Covert Channel in Ad-hoc Wireless
Networks,” in Proceedings of the 1st IEEE Conference on Sensor and Ad-Hoc Com-
munications and Networks (SECON), pp. 88–96, 2004.
[55] T. Carroll, “Chaotic communications that are difficult to detect,” Physical Review
E, vol. 67, no. 2, p. 026207, 2003.
[56] J. Proakis et al., Digital Communication. Osborne-McGraw-Hill, 2001.
[57] W. Ditto and T. Munakata, “Principles and applications of chaotic systems,” Com-
munications of the ACM, vol. 38, no. 11, pp. 96–102, 1995.
[58] H. Schuster and W. Just, Deterministic chaos. Wiley-VCH, 2006.
[59] E. Lorenz, “Deterministic nonperiodic flow,” Journal of the atmospheric sciences,
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 130–141, 1963.
156
[60] T. Carroll, “Noise-robust synchronized chaotic communications,” IEEE Transactions
on Circuits and Systems, vol. 48, no. 12, pp. 1519–1523, 2001.
[61] L. Pecora and T. Carroll, “Synchronization in chaotic systems,” Physical review
letters, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 821–824, 1990.
[62] E. Scho¨ll and H. Schuster, Handbook of chaos control. Wiley-Vch, 2008.
[63] L. Frikha, Z. Trabelsi, and W. El-Hajj, “Implementation of a covert channel in the
802.11 header,” in Proceedings of the International Wireless Communications and
Mobile Computing Conference, pp. 594–599, IEEE, 2008.
[64] S. Li and A. Ephremides, “Covert channels in ad-hoc wireless networks,” Ad Hoc
Networks, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 135–147, 2010.
[65] T. Dog˘u and A. Ephremides, “Covert information transmission through the use of
standard collision resolution algorithms,” in Proceedings of the Information Hiding
Conference, pp. 419–433, Springer, 2000.
[66] S. Li and A. Ephremides, “A covert channel in MAC protocols based on splitting
algorithms,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference, pp. 1168–1173, 2005.
[67] Z. Wang, J. Deng, R. Lee, and P. Princeton, “Mutual anonymous communications:
a new covert channel based on splitting tree MAC,” in Proceedings of the 26th IEEE
International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 2531–2535, 2007.
[68] T. Calhoun, R. Newman, and R. Beyah, “Authentication in 802.11 LANs using a
covert side channel,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Com-
munications, pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2009.
[69] C. Kra¨tzer, J. Dittmann, A. Lang, and T. Ku¨hne, “WLAN steganography: a first
practical review,” in Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Multimedia and Security,
pp. 17–22, ACM, 2006.
157
[70] R. Holloway, “Covert DCF - a DCF based covert timing channel in 802.11 networks,”
Master’s thesis, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, 2010.
[71] S. Bhadra, S. Bodas, S. Shakkottai, and S. Vishwanath, “Communication through
jamming over a slotted ALOHA channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information The-
ory, vol. 54, no. 11, p. 5257, 2008.
[72] N. Kothari, R. Mahajan, T. Millstein, R. Govindan, and M. Musuvathi, “Finding
protocol manipulation attacks,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 Con-
ference, vol. 41, p. 26, 2011.
[73] D. Denning, “A lattice model of secure information flow,” Communications of the
ACM, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 236–243, 1976.
[74] P. Porras and R. Kemmerer, “Covert flow trees: A technique for identifying and an-
alyzing covert storage channels,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pp. 36–51, IEEE, 1991.
[75] R. Kemmerer, “A practical approach to identifying storage and timing channels:
Twenty years later,” in Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applica-
tions Conference, pp. 109–118, IEEE, 2002.
[76] A. Donaldson, J. McHugh, and K. Nyberg, “Covert channels in trusted LANs,” in
Proceedings of the 11th National Computer Security Conference, pp. 17–20, 1988.
[77] A. Jeng and M. Abrams, “On network covert channel analysis,” in Proceedings of the
3rd Aerospace Computer Security Conference, 1987.
[78] I. Moskowitz and M. Kang, “Covert channels here to stay,” in Proceedings of the
9th Annual Conference on Computer Assurance, Safety, Reliability, Fault Tolerance,
Concurrency and Real Time Security, pp. 235–243, IEEE, 1994.
[79] J. Millen, “Covert channel capacity,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pp. 60–66, 1987.
158
[80] I. Moskowitz and A. Miller, “Simple timing channels,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 56–64, IEEE, 1994.
[81] M. Kang and I. Moskowitz, “A pump for rapid, reliable, secure communication,” in
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pp. 119–129, ACM, 1993.
[82] M. Kang, I. Moskowitz, and D. Lee, “A network pump,” IEEE Transactions on
Software Engineering, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 329–338, 1996.
[83] M. Kang, I. Moskowitz, and S. Chincheck, “The pump: A decade of covert fun,” in
Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp. 7–pp,
IEEE, 2005.
[84] A. Papoulis, S. Pillai, and S. Unnikrishna, Probability, random variables, and stochas-
tic processes. McGraw-Hill New York, 2002.
[85] P. Peng, P. Ning, and D. Reeves, “On the secrecy of timing-based active watermark-
ing trace-back techniques,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pp. 15–pp, IEEE, 2006.
[86] S. Gianvecchio and H. Wang, “An entropy-based approach to detecting covert timing
channels,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 8, no. 6,
pp. 785–797, 2011.
[87] C. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Technical
Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[88] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, 1976.
[89] A. J. Menezes, P. C. Van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryp-
tography. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1997.
[90] A. Tanenbaum and M. Van Steen, Distributed systems, vol. 2. Prentice Hall, 2002.
159
[91] I. . W. Group, “IEEE 802.11 WG. Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications,” IEEE Std 802.11-2007 (Revision
of IEEE Std 802.11-1999), 2007.
[92] J. Proakis and M. Salehi, Digital communications. McGraw-Hill New York, 2001.
[93] Q. Ni, T. Li, T. Turletti, and Y. Xiao, “Saturation throughput analysis of error-prone
802.11 wireless networks,” Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, vol. 5,
no. 8, pp. 945–956, 2005.
[94] L. Kleinrock, Queueing Systems. Wiley-interscience, 1975.
[95] V. Paxson and S. Floyd, “Wide area traffic: the failure of Poisson modeling,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (ToN), vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 226–244, 1995.
[96] W. Li, R. Fretwell, and D. Kouvatsos, “Analysis of correlated traffic by batch re-
newal process,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on E-Business and
Information System Security, pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2009.
[97] “The CAIDA UCSD Anonymized Internet Traces 2011,”
http://www.caida.org/data/passive/passive 2011 dataset.xml.
[98] S. Ross, A First Course in Probability. Prentice Hall, NJ, 2009.
[99] L. Bahl, J. Cocke, F. Jelinek, and J. Raviv, “Optimal decoding of linear codes for
minimizing symbol error rate,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 20,
no. 2, pp. 284–287, 1974.
[100] P. Hoeher and J. Lodge, “Turbo DPSK: Iterative differential PSK demodulation and
channel decoding,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 837–
843, 1999.
[101] C. Berrou, A. Glavieux, and P. Thitimajshima, “Near shannon limit error-correcting
coding and decoding: Turbo-codes. 1,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Communications, vol. 2, pp. 1064–1070, IEEE, 1993.
160
[102] M. Gertsman and J. Lodge, “Symbol-by-symbol MAP demodulation of CPM and
PSK signals on Rayleigh flat-fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on Communica-
tions, vol. 45, no. 7, pp. 788–799, 1997.
[103] A. Goldsmith, Wireless Communications. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
[104] I. Reed and G. Solomon, “Polynomial codes over certain finite fields,” Journal of the
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 300–304, 1960.
[105] M. Valenti, “A guided tour of CML, the coded modulation library,” Morganown, W.
Va.: Iterative Solutions, 2008.
[106] R. Degraaf, J. Aycock, and M. Jacobson, “Improved port knocking with strong
authentication,” in Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference, pp. 10–pp, IEEE, 2005.
[107] N. Feamster, M. Balazinska, G. Harfst, H. Balakrishnan, and D. Karger, “Infranet:
Circumventing web censorship and surveillance,” in Proceedings of the 11th USENIX
Security Symposium, pp. 247–262, USENIX Association, 2002.
[108] A. Houmansadr, G. Nguyen, M. Caesar, and N. Borisov, “Cirripede: circumvention
infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability,” in Proceedings of
the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 187–200,
ACM, 2011.
[109] X. Wang and D. Reeves, “Robust correlation of encrypted attack traffic through step-
ping stones by manipulation of interpacket delays,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 20–29, ACM, 2003.
[110] X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia, “Network flow watermarking attack on low-
latency anonymous communication systems,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, pp. 116–130, IEEE, 2007.
161
